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The thesis examines the phenomena of opr71-4,/5 , political change and 
political subversion in Syracuse from 415 to 305 B.C. The Introductory 
Chapter gives a general outline of the problems in this area, together with 
some discussion of the critical background. As the problems involved with 
the ancient sources for the period under discussion lie outside the 
mainstream of the thesis, these have been dealt with in the form of an 
appendix. 
Central to the question of civil strife is the problem of definition 
and causation. The First Chapter is therefore concerned with the 
terminology used by the Greeks to describe their civil disturbances, 
together with a discussion of Aristotle's theory of revolutionary cause and 
the preservation of constitutions. The conclusion reached in this chapter 
is that, although revolutionaries were often motivated by their own personal 
ambitions, their ability to gain support from other sections of the 
community and, on occasions, carry out successful revolutions, lay in the 
fact that the government itself had been inadequate in some areas. 
Chapter Two deals with the nature and type of revolutionary activity 
in Syracuse from the point of view of the revolutionaries. This involves an 
examination of their motivation and method. Their method was dependent, in 
the first instance, on the means available to them. This led to a 
discussion of their use of propaganda, the availability of arms and manpower 
and the use of speed, secrecy and personal violence. Allied to the means 
available is the extent of support gained by revolutionaries. It is found 
that there were four main areas of support — group and family associations, 
the Syracusan people, exiles, and allies and outside powers. The extent of 
support from each of these areas is therefore reviewed. 
(v) 
Next, the problem is analysed from the point of view of the various 
governments. The Third Chapter discusses the problems facing those 
governments and their attempts to maintain their constitutions or position, 
along with the failures that led to outbreaks of revolutionary activity. It 
is found that Syracuse had its own inherent problems due to the diversity of 
their population and the tendency of the Syracusans to entrust command to a 
single ruler. The success of that single ruler was due to his capacity to 
command mercenaries, to gain capable and loyal subordinates, to keep the 
goodwill of the people and to deal with any opposition. Each of these 
aspects is examined but it is also found that, despite his capability, the 
single ruler's position always remained threatened since his position was 
usually unconstitutional. The final section of this chapter therefore 
involves a discussion of the constitutional difficulties facing the various 
governments and their failure to find an adequate constitutional arrangement 
that allowed for the role of the single ruler. 
Beneath the personalities and capabilities of the various individuals 
opposing or controlling the government, lay the fundamental problem of Greek 
social and economic attitudes. Chapter Four discusses the general aspects 
of these attitudes and the stresses on the Syracusan constitution caused by 
the widening of privilege and the change of values that had occurred by the 
end of the Fifth Century and continued throughout the Fourth Century B.C. 
In an examination of the specific problems of the economic situation at 
Syracuse it is found that this was an area in which both governments and 
revolutionaries alike failed, even though many revolutionaries gained 
support from the people by the promise that they would improve the economic 
situation of the poor. 
The final chapter reviews and assesses the constant problems that led 
to a recurrence of civil strife in Syracuse from 415 to 305 B.C., with 
reference to what may be regarded as general Greek problems and what were 
peculiarly Syracusan or Sicilian problems. 
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INTRODUCTION : SCOPE AND INTENTION  
(The following chapter also touches briefly on the critical background, 
further details of which can be found in the footnotes and Bibliography.) 
Civil strife in its various forms was prevalent in Ancient Greece 
and has been commented upon as such by ancient and modern scholars alike. 
The ancient historians, philosophers and orators saw it as one of the, 
major dangers to the survival of the city-state and therefore often 
digressed from their particular topic to comment on its evils. The 
modern historians have also noted the recurrence of civil strife in Greece 
and the standard general works on the Greek city and Greek history mention 
it in such terms as the besetting evil of the polls or its endemic disease. 1 
In recent times, the phenomena of 14-7/0-/c 	Xre(4r 7.46%f and political 
subversion has received more particular attention and much scholarly work 
in this area has been done. But, in my opinion, the work that has been 
done has been either rather broad and general in its range or restricted 
to an examination of a specific incident of political upheaval. 
Most notable on the broad level are the works which discuss the 
Ancient World from a Marxist viewpoint. Many of these are conveniently 
located in the articles and bibliographies in Arethusa 8 no. 1 (1975). Of 
particular value to the Greek scholar are those by G.E.M.De Ste Croix and 
R. Padgug. 2 However, these works are limited by their attempt to explain 
or describe the conflicts in the Greek World in Marxist terms. 3 General 
works on political theory and the interrelation of classes are numerous, 
one of the most recent being E. & N. Wood, Class Ideology and Ancient  
Political Theory (Oxford, 1978). In terms of revolutionary cause, A. Fuks, 
'Patterns and Types of Socio-Economic Revolution in Greece from the Fourth 
to the Second Century B.C.', Ancient Society 5 (1974) deals basically with 
broad socio-economic movements and the resulting stress on a community 
unable to absorb the. changes within its framework. 
2. 
Fuks, having identified some seventy cases of socio-economic 
revolution during the period studied, noted the wide range in both space 
and time of those cases and used them for his cumulative picture of types 
and patterns of socio-economic revolution. His work contains much that is 
valuable for an understanding of the conditions which led to revolutions 
and for analysing the various types of revolution. While his work showed 
the wide extent of revolutions and fixed revolutionary behaviour within the 
perspective of broad historical and economic developments, it did not 
explain why revolutions occurred in some places and not in others and why 
they occurred at precisely the time at which they did. For example, given 
the socio-economic premise from which Puke operates he needed to explain 
why revolution occurred in Syracuse in 356 B.C. rather than 366 B.C., 
particularly since the economic conditions were basically the same on both 
occasions. 
Fuks did note that Athens was conspicuous for its lack of socio-
economic revolution in the Late Classical and Hellenistic Age. He believed 
that this was the result of a large middle class, a comparatively good 
economic situation and the well-developed system of public welfare. 4 But 
what also needs to be ascertained is why some places with difficult 
economic conditions did not experience revolutions of some type and why 
some places with a reasonable economy did. Part of the answer lies in the 
fact that not all revolutions are socio-economic ones, a fact that Puke 
himself realized. 
While a study of those places which did not experience revolutions 
would be somewhat absurd if carried to any length, I believe that part of 
the answer can be discovered in the study of a particular place in order to 
ascertain why revolutions occurred there at some times and not at others 
and to assess the relative importance of socio-economic factors to other 
causes of civil strife. 
Of the more specific works, the Doctoral Dissertation by R.P. Legon, 
3 . 
Demos and Stasis : Studies in Factional Politics in Classical Greece, 
(Cornell University 1966) stands out. Legon dealt with six cases of 
57..(0.-/5 , five from the period of the Peloponnesian War and one from the 
first half of the Fourth Century. He did not concern himself with the 
meaning of er7,(d75 but accepted the meaning of 'civil strife'; but then his 
aim was to assess the role played by the demos in a 'stasis' situation and 
his material was arranged accordingly. Moreover, the scattered geographi-
cal extent of his references do not permit any assessment of the instances 
of ern".07.5" in relation to the continuous history of the particular place at 
which the upheaval occurred. 
Instances of or-zwov5 and 04/70 4-7b(675 during the Peloponnesian War 
have received a great deal of attention, most notably by A. Fuks, 
I.A.F. Bruce, D. Gillis and R.P. Legon. 5 Many of these articles are 
written from the viewpoint of the effect of the war between the two major 
powers and the intervention of those powers on civil disturbances in the 
cities in Greece. The revolutions during the period at Athens in 411 B.C. 
and 404 B.C. have, of course, received most attention in both the general 
works on Athens and in articles, too numerous to mention, devoted specifi-
cally to the complex political situations on those occasions. 6 For the 
Hellenistic period, the problem of class struggles and civil strife has 
received attention by W. Tarn and A. Fuks. 7 
As can be seen from this brief account, the attention given to 
revolutionary struggle has been varied in both range and location. What 
seems to be absent is work devoted to the study of revolutionary struggles 
in relation to a single place over a significant time span. 8 Therefore, 
the following work is a modest attempt to bridge the gap between the 
specific and the general. For this reason I have confined myself to the 
civil problems of Syracuse from 415 B.C. to 305 B.C. This has the 
advantage of viewing civil strife within a limited geographical area, 
thereby enabling me to discuss revolutionary activity in relation to the 
4. 
conditions of that particular area and to assess the relationship between 
political change and change in socio—economic conditions. Moreover, it is 
hoped to discover what features of the revolutionary struggle remained 
constant, irrespective of changes in environmental conditions. 
The starting point of 415 B.C. has been chosen since it was the 
Athenian invasion of Sicily and the stress that it laid upon the Syracusans 
that marked the beginning of the constitutional problems they were to 
experience for the next century. The terminal date marks the approximate 
date of Agathocles' assumption of the royal title and can be taken as 
inaugurating the Hellenistic era in Sicily. After Agathocles, monarchy was 
established as a concept which, although not legitimate, was at least 
acceptable to the ayracusans. 
The choice of Syracuse for the study has been made since it was 
illustrative of the continuous nature of political upheavals and it is the 
one place, apart from Athens, for which there is, with the notable 
exception of the years 337-317 B.C. some sort of continuous historical 
narrative to be extracted from the sources. As a detailed discussion of 
those sources is outside the mainstream of this thesis, the problems and 
bias in the principal sources is dealt with in the form of a brief appendix. 
Syracuse, of course, had its own particular problems which were 
different from those experienced by the Greek cities of the Mainland and 
the extra stresses these placed on Syracusan society is also examined. In 
the area of Sicilian history, E.A. Freeman's History of Sicily Vols. I—IV 
(Oxford, 1891-1894) is still indispensable. Notable recent contributions 
have been made by H. Berve, LI. Finley, K.F. Stroheker, R.J.A. Talbert 
and H.D. Westlake. 9 
Since there are several different instances of civil disturbance in 
the period under question, 1° only one or two particular instances are dealt 
with in detail at any one time. This is at the time when they most 
illustrate the point under discussion. Thus, detailed discussions of the 
various civil disturbances occur at different places within the thesis. 
It is hoped that this method minimizes repetition and helps to avoid the 
monotony of a straight narrative. 
Before discussing the situation at Syracuse I have felt it 
necessary to define and discuss the terminology used by the Greeks to 
describe their civil disturbances, as well as their view of the causes of 
such disturbances. The principal works used for this are Thucydides and 
Aristotle. Again, modern works on these authors are numerous but have not 
dealt in detail with their terminology in this area. The standard works on 
Aristotle's political thought remain those of Newman and Barker. 11 A 
recent article by Ph Wheeler, 'Aristotle's Analysis of the Nature of 
Political Struggle', sheds some light on the problem. 12 His work clearly 
differentiates between c-rier/s andr,ir.viteA ' but he does not deal with the 
relationship between 0-1;<67.5 and other forms of revolutionary behaviour. 
To give some idea of the prevalence of civil strife in the Greek world, the 
examples selected to illustrate points in this chapter are mainly from 
areas outside Sicily. These examples are meant to be illustrative and by 
no means exhaustive. 
The conclusion reached from Chapter One is that although the 
revolutionaries were often motivated by their own personal ambitions, their 
ability to gain support from other sections of the community lay in the 
fact that the government itself had been inadequate in some areas. 
Chapter Two therefore deals with the nature and type of revolutions 
in Syracuse from the point of view of the revolutionaries who, after all, 
were the instigators of revolutionary change at a particular moment in 
time. Revolutions, however desirable are nonetheless difficult to carry 
out successfully. There was always the expectation on the part of the 
revolutionaries that they would win and that they would gain sufficient 
support for their cause. The reason why they felt compelled to resort to 
arms and the basis of their belief that they could gain support must be 
6 . 
found in the performance of the particular government to which they were 
opposed. The third chapter is therefore concerned with the problems of 
the Syracusan governments; their constitutional difficulties and their 
inability to impose sufficient deterrents. It is found that the 
constitutional arrangements were insufficient to meet the demands of the 
practical situation and that the Syracusans had a tendency to entrust rule 
to a single person. 
The fourth chapter discusses the socio—economic conditions of the 
time to illustrate the ways in which these helped to promote instability by 
creating groups of people willing to support revolutionary change in the 
belief that their position would be improved by so doing. 
In the final chapter the various aspects are reviewed and an 
assessment made of the constant underlying problems that led to the 
recurrence of civil strife in Syracuse in the Fourth Century B.C., with 
reference to what may be regarded as general Greek problems and what was 
peculiarly Syracusan or Sicilian. 
7. 
CHAPTER 1 : REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE AND THE PRESERVATION OF CONSTITUTIONS 
In a discussion on the causes of revolutionary change, what is meant 
by revolutionary change must first be clarified. To do this, reference has 
been made principally to Aristotle's comments on the subject in the 
Politics, since Book V of that work is the most general and complete extant 
ancient account of the phenomenon of revolutionary change. Where necessary, 
reference has been made to other authors, particularly Thucydides, to help 
distinguish revolutionary change from other forms of change. 
The problem of Definition 
Aristotle, in the Politics, commented that "many forms of 
constitution have come into existence with everybody agreeing as to what 
. 	r/ 
is just (iv o'NoL(ov), that is proportional equality ( 1/4 v c 6bv), 
but failing to attain it". 1 This failure was due to the definition of what 
was proportionate equality and the fact that there were different inter-
pretations implies that any definition of a basis of order was potentially 
discriminatory when seen from another point of view. Therein lay one 
important source of instability. Aristotle, in fact, suggested that 
because of this changes (/cm4/0..rt) occurred in constitutions. 
was a general term used to denote changes in government, varying from 
reform to revolutionary activity. As such, its use did not necessarily 
have any revolutionary connotations. 
A more specific word used was dv41141-W. This he claimed occurred 
"when each of the two parties oligarchs and democrats has not got the share 
in the constitution which accords with the fundamental assumption that they 
happen to entertain". 2 This makes the basis ofo—r.aciv a conflict 
between two parties. The nature of such conflicts must be examined to 
ascertain whether Aristotle believed that they were always revolutionary in 
the sense that they were aimed at the overthrow of the existing government 
by force. 
8. 
Since the first condition of such conflicts was a state of 
inequality, ô '& "' then is a conflict over political equality, however 
the different contenders may define equality. In such a situation there 
were two opposing factors; the existing government which had failed to gain 
the allegiance of the contending group and the group itself, who engaged in 
T7407> since presumably no other method of change was possible. 
The aim of those involved in 6-70icri4f , v was to gain political 
control, either by establishing a new form of government or by making the 
existing constitution more or less characteristic of its type. Inequality 
was the starting point and the source of factions (0-771r'5  ) from which 
6-70(ay4Zr(1/ occurred. (5 7-0(675. then, has the meaning of that sectionalism 
within a state which was the antecedent to active conflict. It was not 
revolutionary, in the sense that a new form of government established by 
force, or the threat of it, was necessarily the end point, it was merely 
the overthrow of the particular rulers, though their successful overthrow 
may have entailed a new form of government. 3 
Indeed Aristotle's use of if—AeS was quite wide in its applica-
tion, including such events as the establishment or abolition of certain 
magistracies, 4 events which need not have included any sedition, but may 
have been achieved through ordinary constitutional methods and would come 
under what we would term reform. Such things would seem to have been 
better expressed by the wider term/ei7w6)4i. But he restated at 1301b 
26-29 that 	was due to the desire for equality. Obviously then, the 
reforms were the result of inequality, and in this sense the conflict over 
the inequality was described as a c-f-<01-es or factionalism which endangered 
the smooth running of the state, but did not give rise to active conflict 
(erre6-411V ). Unfortunately, Aristotle did not deal with the problem of at 
what point the static nature of da-, ,.;/07.5 could be said to have developed 
into the more active state of cr -r-03-7jra- which thereby created a type of 
0-ne675 as an active concept. 
9. 
To what extent the word 45v.755. can be classified as revolutionary 
raises the problem of terminology. For C.J. Friedrich, "Political 
revolution, then, may be defined as a sudden and violent overthrow of an 
established order". 5 Accepting this terminology removes the word 
revolution from its more restricted popular concept of a mass movement 
against a government, for the definition exists in essence by its 
explanation of the method and consequence of political disturbance rather 
than by the composition of those instigating the disturbance. It does, 
however,'have certain limitations, for its emphasis on 'sudden' centralizes 
the definition around the actual revolutionary event. 
Other commentators would extend the term revolution to cover the 
whole process of pre-planning and organisation before actual conflict 
(however spontaneous and sudden a revolution may appear to be, this 
planning is necessary to distinguish a revolution from such acts as 
assassination), as well as the consolidation of the transferred power. 
When that power is not transferred they prefer to use the title rebellion 
or revolt. 6 In both concepts, violence is an integral part of the 
definition, since this characteristic distinguishes a revolution from a 
reform of a more peaceful nature which nevertheless resulted in a change 
or overthrow of government. One may therefore conclude that revolution 
occurs when more peaceful methods of change were not possible. The actual 
recourse to violence in revolutionary activity may be sudden, the 
revolutionary situation need not be. 
It is in fact the potential for violent change, just as much as the 
whole process of revolutionary change that was covered by the word er-A41s 
in Aristotle and Thucydides. Thus the sense and meaning of crT4 -/s- in the 
political situation varied in different contexts: 
1. It may simply mean the formation of a party in which there was a 
prevalence of party spirit. In this case there was only a potential 
for violent change and reconciliation was still feasible. 
10. 
2. It can have the sense of the actual existence of factions, and hence 
can be seen as one of the preconditions for revolutionary struggle. 
It was thus a steady state of continued interaction between rival 
groups. This was prevalent in Sicily where the cities were said to 
be in a continuous state of 0-Ike-Ls , not necessarily confined to 
those within the city itself, but also including pressure from exiles 
in the near vicinity, which may or may not have resulted in open 
combat. It was this mere existence of factions to which Aristotle 
referred when he said that contempt was a cause of factional strife 
er-fx 0-46 .1 v ) and attacks ( 	-7/ toit er t9a c (la) 7 
3. It could embrace a whole process or series of processes, beginning 
with the conditions which led to conflict and including the conflict 
and the overthrow of the government, as well as the subsequent 
conditions, particularly since discord often occurred after the change 
since the opposition was neither reconciled nor quelled. Thus 
Thucydides, in describing the situation on Corcyra, said that it was 
in a state of o--7-Kerr_s through several processes: 
(a) The seeking of allegiance by the returned prisoners; 
(b) The attacks made by opposing groups by means of legal 
impeachments; 
(c) The actual seizure of power by the few (e, ( - 6)'(/°(); 
(d) The reaction from the people (S luas ), or perhaps more 
accurately the leaders of the people; 
(e) The mass killings; 
(f) The time during which the Corcyraeans in the city were harassed 
by the exiles who had established themselves inland. 
It was only after the exiles had been successfully exterminated that 
the o-7=.0-r_s was said to have ended. 8 
4. a-76.`eir could occur as distinct from an actual change in the 
constitution. In such cases it was the active rivalry between two 
11. 
groups for control of the existing constitution and would cover the 
concept of a coup d' -tat. It was in this sense that Herodotus used it 
when he spoke of the rivalry that led to the original opening of the 
vote to the people in Athens, by Cleisthenes. 9 
5. It could, but rarely, have an extended application to include rivalries 
between the various cities. Thus Hermocrates, in his speech at Sicily 
as reported by Thucydides, 10 mentioned that 0-7;a9'43. was especially the 
cause of the destruction of cities. He then called for unity, not only 
between private individuals within the cities, but between the cities 
themselves. In this context it had the meaning of discord or strife, 
but a discord occasioned by that factionalism which sought to further 
its interests by appeals to, and involvements with, other cities. 11 
The one consistent feature of er74I1s was its factional basis, a 
basis which usually led to conflict (armed or not). M. Wheeler noted the 
distinct factionalism evident in the word 0 .71-01071 9 but went too far, I 
believe, when be asserted that, "the prevalence and distinctive character 
of 'stasis' may be explained as arising from the fact that if an 
influential or an organised 'opposition' group does come into being, its 
aim cannot be, as it often is under a modern party system, merely to 
- substitute its policy for that of the group in power; it must be to capture 
power and, wholly or partially, modify the constitution." 12 Wheeler has 
not allowed for the instances of dr ,--4 07s which were primarily motivated by 
personal ambition and were 5not directed at the constitution but merely at 
those in charge of it. 
A city was not always in a state of or,w-fr with the existence of 
contending groups. A city reached a state of crALTS when the conflicts 
reached the stage of weakening the city by disunity, thereby endangering 
its effective running as a unit. When the two opposing groups (whatever 
their nature) existed in rivalry that still left the city intact, 
was not used. Thus, Sparta, although showing changes in opinion as the 
12. 
result of rival policies, was noted for its freedom from 01-7;.(0-, r and its 
general harmony 0/Ah'944 ). 13 
Given its factional basis, 4,--"rs was used to cover a variety of 
types of revolutionary activity. It had little to do with the numbers 
involved, for Aristotle spoke of oligarchs against oligarchs and oligarchs 
against democrats without implying that the whole population, or even a 
majority were involved. 0-7;'elf could involve several people or as few as 
the case at Syracuse 14 when two ruling men were involved in er/w4 rt, v 
the result of a love affair and the constitution subsequently changed. It 
incidentally also shows that political ideology need not have been the 
initial basis of 	• But nevertheless, the o-In4ws situation was 
only important if those quarrelling were within the politically powerful 
group, whereby the political stability of the state was endangered. In the 
above-mentioned case the situation swelled since the two rivals stirred up 
the people who also became involved in the strife. 
Again the factional basis of a-77,4ris was stressed and Aristotle 
believed that it was necessary to dissolve the factions of powerful men. 15 
It was, in fact, the existence of these factions that provided a basis upon 
which a swelling of conflict could occur. Linked to such factions was, of 
course, the problem of family rivalries. The problem with these factions 
was that they could each command a reasonable following and as Aristotle 
also noted, once a rivalry widened to include large sections of the state, 
there was the necessity that the groups which supported either side were 
nearly equal, for if one group was manifestly stronger, the remainder would 
not have been willing to risk an active encounter. 16 It was at this level 
that political ideology was often used, and the frequency with which such 
active states of cr-nwo7s occurred in the Greek world lay in the fact that 
there were always significant numbers to support rival ideologies so that 
individuals could gain a sufficiently wide support for their own selfish 
reasons by advocating one or other of the political ideologies; promising 
1 3. 
political control to the masses or political exclusiveness to the few. 
Aristotle did not believe, however, that 49- 7;4"fs between different 
sections of the people Ce:crptos) was worth speaking about to any extent. 17 
This would imply that he thought such factionalism was capable of being 
resolved without affecting the existing constitution. Thus, although 
believing in the existence of such rivalry, he did not consider that it 
endangered the effective running of the state. This seems an extraordinary 
viewpoint. He did not, in fact, allow sufficiently for the different aims 
and desires of those making up the 'demos', nor for the rivalry between 
individual demagogues and their followers for control of the people. Else-
where he mentioned how tyrants arose as a result of demagogues winning the 
people to their side in opposition to the rich, 18 but he failed to note 
that it was also in opposition to other demagogues and leaders of the 
people. The case of the rise of Dionysius I in Syracuse typified this, to 
name but one example. 
There were some changes that Aristotle believed occurred without 
cr-AKO-r,5 	These were election intrigue, carelessness and alteration by 
small stages. 19 The latter would refer to those changes which were the 
result of different economic and/or social conditions, but were ' 
capable of being absorbed into the constitutional framework, thereby 
modifying that constitution. In cases where the conditions changed but the 
, constitution did not, the resulting stress on that constitution made it 
more liable to overthrow as the result of some form of 0 0's • Thus, 
where a property qualification was altered by small stages, this was an 
alteration to suit changing conditions. In the case of election intrigue, 
the problem lay within the constitutional framework. The intrigue was used 
by individuals for their own personal advancement in terms of the particular 
constitution and not in an attempt to change that constitution. The 
elimination of such intrigue did not require any real modification of the 
constitution, but only in the method of applying the constitution, as for 
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example, the selection of archons at Athens by lot rather than election in 
c. 487 B.C. to prevent the possibility of bribery. 
The starting point of a 'stasis' situation was not always a 
political one, but to be titled as o--pes the groups involved must have 
some sense of political ideology. Even when the outburst was over such 
matters as a dowry or a love affair, it was only ifthe)people involved were 
within the ruling elite or were potential rulers that 0-"x"r/s- could be said 
to have developed. Similarly, the use of lawsuits, attributed particularly 
to democrats 20 but quite prevalent among oligarchic governments as well, as 
the speeches of Lysias reveal, often led to a-rjars since the suits were 
aimed at the politically powerful and often resulted in the defendant's 
political defeat. 
The events leading to the revolution on Corcyra in 427 B.C. are 
illustrative of this interrelation between politics and the law. The 
returned prisoners sought to bring Peithias to trial because of his 
promotion of Athenian interests. On his acquittal he retaliated by 
bringing to trial five of his richest opponents on a technical charge. The 
penalty imposed upon them was severe and although they asked for a 
reassessment of their fine, Peithias, who was a member of the Council to 
which the appeal was made, persuaded his colleagues to enforce the full 
penalty with the result that the five accused, since they faced ruin, 
resorted to violence. 21 
The pretexts of such charges varied, but the intended result, 
political removal of an opponent, did not. Thus, at the end of the 
Peloponnesian War, the oligarchs who sought to destroy the democracy at 
Athens, first tried to remove the principal advocates of democracy by 
bringing various charges against them. 22 
The nature of a 0.-s situation did require that the participants 
possess citizenship and independence. There was no sense that slave 
uprisings created c7--, s • In the advent of such, t/f4,-,- tie,qc41/was employed. 
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This word had more radical implications than 0-14 Cr4W • Aristotle used it 
when describing a situation at Thurii when the rule passed into a dynasty 
and the whole system ( -74c5 ) was changed by those who set to work to 
wei,7vaiPev (innovate). 23 
From Thucydides, it would appear that YE4/4"' covered a meaning 
ranging from dangerous subversive action to radical revolution that aimed 
at changing the whole social and political structure of the state. Thus, 
when the Athenians demolished the walls of their independent ally, Chios, 
they did so in the belief that the Chians were planning some revolutionary 
movement against them (vciur). 24 This would seem to mean subversive 
action aimed at changing the existing status of the relationship between 
Athens and Chios. In the case of the Spartans, after the Athenians had 
occupied Pylos which could have become a centre for any helots contem-
plating desertion, they felt a fear of revolution (vie i-"1 	) against 
their constitution. The fear was so strong that they were compelled to 
place hoplite garrisons throughout their territory, rather than make a 
full—scale attack on the Athenians. 25 In this case, the revolutionary 
movement would have altered the whole structure of society in Laconia by 
removing Spartan dominance and elitism. This fear severely hampered 
Spartan foreign policy and restricted their capacity to engage in external 
campaigns at long distances from Laconia. 
The difference between eriskor- v and 	seems to be that of 
degree. Both entailed the concept of the overthrow of government.vg.i>eArify 
tended to be feared as about to happen, whereas a-A,a4ev , in whatever 
form, was an actual  ity. cr-r-earj7fcv essentially involved the rivalry of 
factions, but this was not necessarily the case with itgi.vrrMscv. The 
latter involved a fear of the complete change in economic and social 
system. Thus, those who feared the dynamic nature of Alcibiades at Athens, 
feared that he - was seeking to revolutionize the government in some new or 
unacceptable way. Those who engaged in er-71. /,'Gris strove for some form of 
16. 
oligarchy or democracy within which to exert their policies and both forms 
of government were accepted in the Greek world as a whole, loathed though 
they may have been by sections within the individilal cities. Essentially 
the victors of orrn.'073 did not radically alter the social system, nor did 
they intend to. 
,4 The problem with the term efet, rifigew is that it was used to express 
fears which when they became an actuality were in fact referred to as a 
state of crive-rs• Thus Thucydides, speaking in general about civil 
disturbances, stated that those who wished to initiate subversive action 
(vt6,d7tA'fl1/) easily found support. 26 Having acquired this support, 42-41th 'S 
ensued. o-r,(075 in its revolutionary sense, as distinct from V""'"fdPi riv 
required contending factions and an observable point in time when the 
welfare of the city had become such that effective running of the 
government was extremely difficult or had ceased to exist. 
In the interests of either innovatory revolution (Ya-/ 7011") or 
factional conflict Orr-(erzike(v) some person or persons were said to be 
engaged in conspiracy (7"`""). But such a conspiracy may also have 
meant no more than individual opposition to a city's government, or an 
attempt by one group to betray ( 71;00(5 - ) the city, as in the case of 
those who admitted the Thebans into Plataea in 431 B.C. On that occasion 
there was no instance of 477.(0/S since the betrayal did not involve 
conflict within the city based on political control of the government and 
its policies. Whatever their political leanings, the people of Plataea 
combined to resist what was regarded as foreign intervention. Such 
instances of betrayal to another power were frequent in Greece, 
particularly on occasions of inter-city warfare. 
To betray a city to an outside power required the utmost secrecy 
and, if effective, resulted in a new government backed by the power to whom 
the city was betrayed. It did not necessarily involve conflict with the 
betrayer's political opponents, a conflict essential in the concept of 
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/- er-2ors. But although such betrayals were not described as o7wars 
themselves, they were often the result of an already existing state of 
(77w 0/5 
Thus 0-7-Qrar-s may be distinguished as a state of conflict over the 
political control of the city between factions, such that the welfare of 
the state was jeopardized..40P-' ceased to exist when one of the 
contending parties managed to gain secure control and was able to establish 
an effective and unopposed running of government. It was waged between 
citizens. The examples given by Aristotle of 0.--.Le5 occurring because of 
differences in people 0,<W/64°1 were all examples of Greek citizens 
within a city, 27 the conflict arising when additional settlers from another 
Greek city had been admitted into the city as citizens. No group was, in 
theory, inferior to any other group. In the case of Syracuse, it was only 
after the mercenaries and foreign troops had become citizens that they were 
said to be engaged in 	. 28 
cy-rdert.,e cc I/ 	was not employed then in conflicts over citizenship, but 
rather, given that all had citizenship, over who should have political 
control, though non—citizens, especially slaves may have been, and often 
were, brought in to aid a contender to gain political control in an already 
existing state of o'wo-fs 29 Underprivileged citizens were also used to• 
gain support. In this way, Peisistratus was said to have acquired a 
politically underprivileged group to support him. 3° That such a group did 
support him against the rich attests to the fact that they felt 
economically exploited and were therefore prepared to support the leader 
who promised to alleviate their situation in a way in which the existing 
government had not. Either that government had not seen the problem or, 
having seen it, had not considered that it needed solving. It was not 
political ideology that gave Peisistratus his supporters, but expediency. 
They did not want, and did not get political power, as was evident a little 
later when Peisistratus' opponents combined to expel him. 31 
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The coalition of Peisistratus' opponents, Megacles and Lycurgus, was 
short—lived and Peisistratus returned, not with the backing of the under-
privileged Athenians, but of the followers of Megacles who had switched 
sides. 32 But that alliance was also only temporary, for when Megacles 
became reconciled to Lyourgus' faction Peisistratus seems to have gone into 
voluntary exile. 33 These realignments between the leaders of the various 
groups show a erzfars situation among the ruling elite, none of wham were 
powerful enough to rule in their own right. Peisistratus, realizing the 
shaky nature of coalitions with the ruling elite or sections of it, and the 
ineffectiveness of local support, returned with money and mercenaries with 
which to firmly establish himself by force. 34 
Allied to the quality of citizenship in the use of the word 1,77 6W.S. 
was the quality of independence. Where a rebellion occurred between a 
subject city and its superior, no matter how loose or tight that subjection 
was, the city was said to be in a state of revolt ceeo-r4d4). In 427 B.C. 
the Lesbians were forced into their revolt from Athens ( 07 S) before 
they were ready. 35 Similar terminology was used in regard to the earlier 
36 , revolts of EUboea, Samos and Byzantium. .effia7avde was then, an assertion 
of independence on the part of a subject city. In a relationship where the 
element of subjection was not so distinct as it was between Athens and what 
had been the Delian League, but was rather an alliance between a major and 
a lesser power, the breaking of the alliance by the lesser power was also 
seen in terms of :e5ba-neit...z 4, Thus the people of Messina were said to have 
revolted from Athens. 37 The cases of such revolts were numerous in times 
of war, and though often accompanied by some form of 0 ,:fat) , the latter 
was neither a precondition nor an inevitable result of the former. That 
errao-i5 often occurred when a city revolted was not surprising for there 
were usually several factions within a city, each of which favoured a 
different policy. 
Later writers, when speaking of a situation where the citizens were 
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virtually subjects of a tyrant, used 310177%(&4'e or dat>cr'''-"1-5 to describe the 
revolt of those citizens from that tyrant. Thus the cavalry revolt against 
> / Dionysius I in 405 B.C. was referred to as an incident ofoehber -,v 0-'s 38 At 
other times when the people rebelled against the Dionysii similar 
terminology was used. 39 In the case of the rebellion of 404 B.C., after 
Dionysius I had regained his position on Ortygia, the people were divided 
J among themselves ( 	/ er,sold fcV ) as to whether to continue the siege or not. 4° 
Similarly, in the military area, where a desertion occurred as 
distinct from rivalry within the one army for command,Zeloc -d'4-c was used. 
This was the case with Agathocles' general, Pasiphilus, who deserted 
) to Deinocrates. 41 
Thus cr-rad4qfev and trnearS can be distinguished from vcA-4vAii 6-44//67 , 
iPocT/Afoa and ei¢licrlitMc • A further problem of definition arises in 
Aristotle since he did not differentiate consistently between cri-.4 , 11 and 
In the section in Book V on the changes in particular types of 
government he used/7w/Vtbvto describe things which were in fact cases of 
erpoliciev . The point seems to be that change in a general sense can be 
used for Situations of cr-Adviek("/ ; that is, all situations of o---2.' 0741 ei are 
also cases of/kine/A\rev, but the reverse is not so. In this I would 
dispute Barker's implied definition as revealed when he said that "In 
practice the discussion of revolutions c/Avg:960Ad() turns out to be a 
1 discussion of seditious kerra/ iricS ), whether they are ultimately followed by 
a revolution and a change in the constitution, or involve no such result1:42 
/4t .xeidoX., by its wide application in Aristotle can hardly be translated as 
'revolutions' and although a large part of the discussion on governmental 
change centres around factional conflicts (crikits ), some changes involve 
no sense of 0-76, a-ls , but are what we would term reforms and some overthrows 
of government, although revolutionary, do not involve a sense of sedition. 
P. Calvert, in his brief discussion, while recognising the wide 
range of meaning inherent in the word 
r'1 
 is, due to his translation 
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of/980i..“ forced to the alarming conclusion that, "for him (Aristotle) 
therefore, revolution is not an exceptional phenomenon, but a necessary 
fact of political change. It is a political phenomenon, both violent and 
non-violent, representing the fundamental process of change which leads to 
the alteration or displacement of social groupings". Aristotle, although 
realizing that 'revolutions' were frequent, did regard them as both 
exceptional and avoidable. Political change itself was less exceptional 
and since it did not necessarily require the element of potential violence 
would, I believe, be a more appropriate way of translating Aristotle's 
usage oft-c7.5/CNitv and its related words. 
Allied to the problem of terminology is the use of the word /ove/v , 
for which Liddell and Scott give two basic meanings : to set in motion, 
change or innovate, and to disturb or stir up. In V 1304b 8 Aristotle 
stated that "they / ,(fec5O0t constitutions, sometimes by force (/ 96L) and 
sometimes by fraud (>7..c )". The word, then, expressed the actual 
process of change, whereas/a -f-e/IMi‘e expressed the phenomenon of change, 
while crAcr4cv was a term to describe a specific means by which atc*Ay 
.occurred. 
But some forms of attack which resulted in a change of government 
were covered by the term 3g7iefjacreadc. and not o---4,o4tiv , although many causes
of the attack were the same. In the section on changes in monarchies, the 
causes given are the result of the attitude and behaviour of the particular 
ruler, and whether the end result aimed at removal of the ruler or the fact 
. 	/ of the ruler's existence, those who were involved were guilty of  
and not of.41ev. ;/w774-aa( would appear to mean an attack against a 
particular individual, sometimes with the belief that the removal of the 
individual would result in the fall of.the system. These results, which if 
successful usually resulted in the extermination of the monarch, were 
treated more in the vein of treachery Ow ,"004) and those involved were 
- plotters (%7.,4,3te , r/c.:) against the king. 
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Aristotle's treatment of revolutionary activity in the case of 
tyranny is similar. Consequently, those involved were often said to be 
engaged in plotting or treachery. 45 But the example of the tyranny of the 
family of Gelo at Syracuse is instructive of another type of overthrow. In 
that case, those sharing in the rule ".(fr. Tv) engaged in factionalism 
(4') over the succession. 46 This factional conflict was between 
members of the ruling family - between those who, while not actually 
ruling, had tremendous influence with those who were. It is what we would 
term a dynastic feud. Gelo's family attached confederates to themselves to 
expel Thrasybulus, but were themselves expelled as well. This type of 
factional conflict was akin to the rivalries between families for control 
of either a democracy or oligarchy, and because of this element of 
factionalism ernec4rei, was the term used. Such factionalism between those 
who had a share in the government was regarded as one of the two principal 
methods of the destruction of monarchies. 47 
Thus o-r-0575 was used to describe the particular phenomenon of 
factionalism and rivalry within the state which had, at the very least, the 
potential to undermine the unity of the state since each of the factions 
aimed at conti.ol of the government for themselves and were prepared to gain 
that control by legal or illegal means. "i/rdemeois was used, in relation 
to the citizens within a city-state, in the cases where the people (or a 
section of them) rebelled against a tyrant. 
Aristotle's Theory of Revolutionary Cause  
As can be seen from Aristotle's terminology, when discussing 
revolutions he was also concerned with political changes in general. He 
considered that the stability of the state was its natural condition and 
that consequently any action against it was the result of defects in or 
perversions of the particular governmental system. 48 On the ideological 
level there was always the potential for change since the fundamental basis 
for the desire for change lay in how men thought their community ought to 
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be governed. In the Greek world there were two prevalent and different 
viewpoints; that of the democrats, who believed that if they were equal in 
any respect they were equal absolutely, and that of the oligarchs who 
believed that if they were unequal in one respect they were unequal 
wholly. 49 
Thus a basic instability existed where men did not feel that they 
had a share in the government in accordance with their fundamental 
assumption as to whether political justice should be based on numerical 
equality or on equality according to worth. As C.W. Brown Jr. remarked, 
"As long as two competing views of justice persist - the one solidly based 
in the logic of economics, the other solidly based in the logic of 
politics, the one justifying natural inequality, the other indicating the 
probable justice of equality - the state must remain in a condition of 
potential sedition". 5° 
But this potentiality for change did not always become an 
actuality. As Aristotle observed, "When the one or the few or the many 
rule with an eye to the common interest these constitutions must 
necessarily be right ones, while those administering with an eye to private 
interest of either the one or the few or the multitude are deviations". 51 
Without necessarily adopting Aristotle's view of true and deviating 
constitutions, it is obvious that if the existing government, albeit based 
on the viewpoint of a section of the population, satisfied the needs of 
those with a different viewpoint, then the opponents had no need to resort 
to a change of goiernment in order to gain their ends, except where 
political ideology was felt as a strong principle. This was rare, 
revolutions were rather the result of the feeling that the existing govern-
ment was not catering for all the needs of the community. 
Because of this need to pursue the common interest, Aristotle 
counselled that those in oligarchies should treat those outside the ruling 
clique fairly, honourably and in a democratic spirit 52 and that they should 
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take some care of the poor. 53 Similarly, in democracies it was necessary 
to spare the wealthy and not cause their properties or incomes to be 
divided up. 54 
Thus, although the rival concepts of equality existed, it was 
possible for them to co-exist rather than be mutually destructive. Their 
mere existence does not explain why changes occurred at some places and not 
at others and on what occasions the rivalry became such as to endanger the 
effective running of the government. The responsibility for such changes 
lay in the behaviour of a particular government at a particular time. A 
governmental failure highlighted the precarious nature of the fundamental 
assumptions used to justify the government's existence. This failure on 
the part of the government provided a basic reason for bringing about 
change. Such changes occurred when a significant section of the popular-
tion, either within the ruling group or outside it, felt that they were 
being treated unjustly. The leaders of revolutions were therefore 
motivated by a sense of injustice, either on the political or economic 
level. Accordingly, they sought to win either honour or gain or to 
redress the loss of them. 55 
The occasions for such activity were many and varied, and as Barker 
remarked, "for men possessed by a sense of injustice, and looking forward 
to the advantages to be gained, the excuse of any occasion will suffice". 56 
But to resort to a violent change of government required, on the part of 
the revolutionaries, the hope and belief that they would be successful. 
This meant a sufficiently widespread support for the revolutionaries and a 
corresponding disaffection with the government. Thus Aristotle, without 
explicitly saying so, arrived at the conclusion that although the motives 
of the revolutionaries were an important consideration, those motives were 
a consequence of the existing government's actions. 
FOr among the seven principal causes given by Aristotle : honour, 
gain, insolence, fear, excessive prominence, contempt and disproportionate 
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growth of power, 57 the first six can all be linked by the common feeling, 
whether correct on the part of the persons feeling it or not, that they 
were being unjustly or unwisely treated. Gain, honour and insolence were 
direct abuses by the existing government, while fear, excessive prominence 
and contempt were the result of feelings aroused in others by the perfor-
mance of the government. This lack of confidence in the government could 
be directed either against the people who operated a particular constitu -
tion, rather than against the constitution itself, or against the type of 
constitution that allowed exploitation of some kind to occur. 
A closer analysis of Aristotle's seven principal causes is necessary. 
/, Honour (7-71) and gain (k(or;$ ) he asserted were motives (as distinct 
from objectives) since the revolutionaries saw "other men in some cases 
justly and in other cases unjustly getting a larger share of them". 58 The 
former reveals that a government acted too well in its own interests, that 
ii was too democratic or oligarchic, 59 while the latter that the men in 
power abused their position. 
,c/, In the case of insolence ( vrirs ), the people rose against the 
constitution that allowed such behaviour to occur. 60 But a change of 
constitution did not necessarily remove this cause since the fault may not 
have been so much with the system as with the men in charge of it. Their 
effective removal ought to have removed the cause rather than create 
0-44675 which has wider implications than the solving of an offence at a 
particular moment by an individual(s). Such behaviour did, however, 
provide a pretext for factional opposition from which factional conflict 
occurred. 
With fear (04,s ) there is a dual concept; the fear on the part of 
some that they would be punished for some wrong they had actually committed, 
and fear of the result of impending lawsuits, brought against people 
unjustly it would seem, and from the example given, this was action on the 
part of the government. 61 The first instance is an example of individual 
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selfish behaviour and cannot really be regarded as a result of the 
particular political structure. But in the second case, no matter who 
initiated the lawsuit, it reveals that the legal system was capable of 
being used in the interests of political power rather than justice. 
Fear was, in a sense, an indirect cause for it only occurred when 
there was something to fear. In the case of democracies, Aristotle 
asserted that the fear arising among the nobles was the result of actions 
brought against them by the demagogues. 62 But he did not deal with why the 
demagogues acted in that way. It was not Merely to curry favour with the 
people. What they were in effect doing was redressing the balance between 
the rich and the poor, acting, that is, as a result of economic inequality. 
This must have been such that the poor did not feel that the liturgies 
provided by the rich were sufficient compensation for the very real 
economic imbalance. 
Excessive prominence (0;71,0)1 ) was asserted as causing a-10-0 
"when some individual or body of men is greater and more powerful than is 
suitable for the state and the power of government", 63 but this Aristotle 
did not qualify, except to comment that it gave riseto a monarchy or 
dynasty and hence some places had ostracism. The mere fact of excessive 
prominence need not have mattered except where it was used to abuse one 
group, or where the person or group in power acted contrary to the wishes 
of those who invested them with that power. The fear ofexcessive 
prominence seems to have emerged from the common Greek feeling which arose 
from the Fifth Century B.C. propaganda aimed at damning tyranny. It then 
came to be applied more generally. In actual fact, excessive prominence 
did not always lead to conflict) as the Career of Pericles in Athens 
revealed. Pericles was careful not to abuse his position and he therefore 
retained the trust and confidence of the people who had elected him to 
power. The people only rose against him when other conditions made them 
feel (correctly or not) that his policies were not in their interests. 
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This feeling was the result of the effects of the Peloponnesian War and not 
of excessive prominence as such. 
/ Contempt (kw714geoev7075 ) as a revolutionary motive was the result of 
the failure of the government to maintain order. Aristotle cited the 
example of Thebes, where the democracy was ruling so badly that disorder 
and anarchy set in." In effect it lost credibility. Contempt, then, is 
the result of the failure of the government to retain the confidence of the 
people. It also implied that those who wished to change the government 
believed that they were powerful enough to do so. 
Of Aristotle's first seven causes of change, the last, growth 
/ contrary to proportion (00%,57.5 4;92.c 70 Q(i/.4 X°r") is of a different 
category. It is a characteristic over which the iuling government had very 
little control. The examples given were all changes in the composition of 
the particular cities, changes that necessitated a corresponding change in 
the constitution, as at Tarentum, where the great decrease in the notables 
led to the establishment of a democracy. 65 Such changes in composition, 
since they occurred unnoticed were particularly difficult to deal with. It 
may well be significant that in this section Aristotle consistently used 
/eff -rdAXcloand not ZZv 	In 4ct, in some cases the transition 
could be smooth, as with the Argives who were forced by Cleomenes to admit 
more citizens. 66 
This type of change was far less easy to deal with than the others. 
The other causes were all based in human nature. A government could avoid 
creating the resentment that led people to start a revolution for honour or 
gain and could behave in such a way as not to display insolence and 
excessive prominence, nor create fear or contempt. But with dispropor-
tionate growth there was a need to modify the existing constitution to 
allow for the change, or prevent the disproportionate growth in the first 
place. As Newman noted, "Aristotle's analysis of the causes of e,--L073 
and constitutional change reveals, in fact, the existence of causes with 
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which it is extremely difficult for the statesman to deal, however great 
his skill and watchfulness. Aristotle himself seems, indeed, to be hardly 
conscious of this. He hardly realizes how difficult it is to prevent 
and constitutional change when they are brought about by changes in 
the size or credit of classes, or other social changes not easily guided or 
controlled. He may possibly have underrated the difficulty of doing this, 
for we find him in 7 (5). 8.1308b 30 advising statesmen under certain 
circumstances to 'try to increase the midway class' without betraying much 
consciousness of the difficulty of the task". 67 Aristotle also assumed 
that an astute statesman would be able to discern the nature of a growth 
which may well have begun in small stages and only gradually achieved a 
disproportionate size. What in effect occurred in such situations was the 
estrangement of the ruling elite. The introduction of new elements created 
a realignment of attitudes. These new attitudes led to revolution when 
allowance was not made for them within the existing constitution. 
After the first seven causes, Aristotle added two further causes, 
somewhat like addenda. These were racial difference 	)68 
and geographical locality (7ofri's ), 69 The examples of racial difference 
were all cases of people from different Greek cities, not what we would 
call racial difference at all, with the exception of the example of the 
Syracusan foreign troops and mercenaries. In such cases, revolutions 
occurred due to a failure to achieve a satisfactory representative govern-
ment which catered for the different backgrounds. This was a typical Greek 
problem since the Greeks looked to their own cities and customs with 
intense local feeling. Where a significantly different element was 
admitted into the city, as at Syracuse, factionalism started which led to 
fighting only after the foreigners had been made citizens. Probably they 
had been made citizens but given no real political power, and there were, 
no doubt, significant sections of the population who did not wish them to 
have been admitted at all. 
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The consideration of geographical conditions, judging from the 
example given of Athens, was not so much based on physical conditions of 
the country as on the distance of some people from the centre of govern-
ment and the difference of occupation which led to differences in the 
concept of the type of government preferred. Just how much real difference 
there was between the Piraeus and Athens is difficult to assess. 70 The 
Piraeus, no doubt, contained a large section of metics who did not affect 
the government anyway, not having citizenship, but they did, of course, 
have the power to persuade indirectly, especially in the age of demagogues 
and orators. But on the general level, distance from the centre of govern-
ment meant a real difference in political power since those in country 
areas could rarely exercise their right (if they possessed it) to attend 
the assembly. 
At 1303b 15-17 there is a summing up which makes the greatest 
division in the population that between virtue (4-57) and vice 
/ 
(/09,0y ,A). This division can be seen to be the basis of gain, honour, 
insolence, fear and contempt. The next division after that was between 
, wealth ( ,9",""r/0‘) and poverty (47E ,//x ), which he had only dealt with 
tentatively in his seven major causes. It can, however, be linked back to 
the basic concept of how men thought their government should be run, a 
concept illustrated by Pericles in the Funeral Speech when he stated, not 
that there should be no poor people, but that poor people should not be 
denied political rights merely because they were poor. 71 
But Aristotle did not deal in detail with economic conditions in 
their broad sense. He touched on them, in a limited way, when he mentioned 
that men started revolutions when they saw others getting a larger share 
than they ought, 72 but this was related to specific moments in time and can 
be seen as an abuse of position, rather than as a consideration of the 
general economic situation. He did not deal with the effect of the 
changing economy on how the government ought to be run, except in the 
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changes that affected the basis of eligibility for political office, when 
eligibility was determined by a property qualification. In fact, his view 
of this was somewhat contradictory. In discussing how to preserve 
oligarchies he mentioned that the qualification ought to be relaxed or 
tightened in relation to the changing economy. 73 He did not seem to 
realize the difficulty of doing this without changing the form of the 
constitution and elsewhere he counselled against such small changes. 74 The 
important point is, however, that such changes must be noticed by the 
ruling government and some allowance made for them. 
Linked to this was a need for an awareness that poor people did 
exist and that some help should be given to them. This was never satisfac-
torily resolved in the Greek world and it was often within the poorer 
sections of the community that rival leaders were able to gain support, by 
promising such things as a redistribution of land or abolition of debts. 
In enumerating further examples of the cause of er/L-rs and change 75 
he gave examples that can be included under his seven main causes. Petty 
quarrels and quarrels among the nobles were basically the result of gain, 
honour, insolence or excessive prominence. Hence he advocated that such 
factions should be broken up at the beginning, for the whole city often 
became involved. Just how one could stop a quarrel over a love affair or 
an estate is difficult to determine. What must be stopped was the 
extension of the quarrel to include factions. The allegiance of family 
groups and personal loyalties could not be removed, but it was vital that 
the conflicts arising from them should not affect the running of the city 
as a whole. There was a need to distinguish the personal from the 
political. 
In this light, the selfish interests of the ruling group assume 
importance, for they were prepared to use any means, including political 
concepts, for their own personal advantage. Thus political expediency was 
more important than the formulation of a policy based on a constructive 
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view of the needs of a city at a particular time. Aristotle did come to a 
recognition of this element when he stated that ernicrefs and  
were prevalent among nobles. His solution was to guard against this 
rivalry by legislation, but as Newman remarked, "By what laws would he seek 
to prevent the rise of discords and rivalries among the notables? Partly 
perhaps by laws requiring the differences to be at once referred to 
authorities entrusted with the task of reconciling them .... Again, men 
hopelessly at feud might be required by law to go into exile, a cause 
vainly recommended by one of the elder citizens at Syracuse before the rise 
of the stasis described in 1303b 20 5qq"• 76 
There was, in fact, a need to channel the capacity for 	into  
healthy competition rather than destructive strife. 77  When rival groups 
were not prepared to do this, the whole polis became involved. 78 What 
Aristotle did not examine was why the whole city was prepared to support 
one or other of the sides. Their support was often given on the basis of a 
political promise of some kind, for people did not join an allegiance simply 
over a personal wrong done by one noble to another. This meant, of course, 
that those joining one group or other thought that they had something to 
gain from so doing and this in turn was prompted by the failure of one 
group to cater for the needs of the other. This failure on the part of the 
nobles to curtail their rivalry was also mentioned at 1304a 38 where he 
stated that they stirred up factions due to envy (#2Zires), a concept which 
can be linked to the earlier /(//roGs and 	. 
Another cause mentioned was the growth in reputation of a particular 
magistracy or any other section of the state. 79  ( In this sectionve7-4/4:Mfev 
was again used, presumably since he spoke of differences which were the 
result of environmental changes and which were therefore capable of being 
absorbed into the existing constitution without necessitating active 
conflict. 
The general instability was further aggravated by the size of the 
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Greek polls, in which every person felt he had, given the right of citizen-
ship, a potentiality for active participation in the government. With such 
potentiality it was natural that any politically minded individual inclined 
to whatever form of government admitted his desire for power and served his 
interest best. In view of this, there was a real danger when the two 
opposing groups became numerically equal, since, as Aristotle noted, when 
one group was greatly superior to the other, the smaller group would be 
unlikely to rebel when it had so little hope of success. 80 
Throughout his account, Aristotle does not deal significantly with 
the difference between 0-7hrc which existed because of the abuse of the 
existing constitution or its weakness in offsetting or coping with the 
various threats he mentioned, and er-niors which can be seen in terms of the 
fact that the nature of the particular government was iA itself inapprop-
riate. Consequently, there is no real difference in his account.between 
changes which we would class as modifications in relation to changing 
conditions, and erreeriS as the result of either: 
1. Sufficient sections of the population feeling politically excluded and 
having been so for a considerable time, or 
2. The effect of the immediate situation on the form of government — the 
extent to which the government was able to cope with tensions that must 
arise since situations change, or 
3. The failure of government to acceptor perhaps even recognize the 
changed situation that has necessitated some change in government. 
Beneath the generalized account of revolutionary motivation, 
Aristotle saw that particular constitutions were prone to particular 
stresses most of which were variations of his major causes. In the case 
of democracies, he considered the licentiousness (oz04 .>Vi/.k ) of the 
demagogues to be a key feature. 81 This manifested itself either by direct 
attacks on the owners of property by the common people having been stirred 
by the demagogues, or by slander, prosecutions or excessive liaiility for 
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public services instigated on the part of the demagogues themselves. By so 
doing they forced the oligarchs to unite against them. Thus the irrespon-
sibility of democratic governments was a prime reason for revolutionary 
activity against them and as C.W. Brown Jr. noted, "The wealthy are 
generally strong enough in any state to stimulate a cohesive democratic 
element, but the wealthy only act as one when the democratic element 
(usually led by demagogues) threaten either the entire class - or a 
sufficient number of the rich for all to be afraid".82 
From the examples given, it appears that the demagogues acted from 
economic considerations. At Rhodes, the issue was over pay for public 
services and state upkeep the wealthy objecting to financing such a 
system. 83 At Megara, the issue was again economic for the demagogues 
wished to distribute money to the people. 84 One would very much like to 
know why this was necessary. Though Aristotle believed that the demagogues 
often acted unjustly toward the rich in order to curry favour with the 
masses, it would seem from these instances that the demagogues were not 
acting from self-interest only, but rather in response to the economic need 
of the city (and some of its people) at that particular time. 
Within democracies, the constitution also tended to change when the 
same man was both leader of the people and genera1. 85 At this point he 
emphasized that this phenomenon was more prominent in earlier times than in 
the Fourth Century B.C., but elsewhere he spoke of the change from 
democracy to tyranny because of the prominence of the individual without 
hinting that it was rarer in more recent times. 86 For both earlier and 
later times the usual method of gaining sole power was through a combina-
tion of military prowess and gaining the confidence of the people by 
actions hostile to the rich. Such a process relied not only on the populam-
rity of the particular person, but also on the fact that there was a real 
difference between the rich and the poor. 
In the case of oligarchies, Aristotle allowed that a precondition of 
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changes was the mistreatment of the multitude. This formed a potential for 
87 
revolutions to occur. 	However, such revolutions needed a leader and 
therefore he dealt with the motives and types of leaders. 88 As with other 
forms of constitution, the general failure of oligarchies arose from either 
the ambitions and behaviour of particular rulers or from the weakness of 
the constitution itself. 
With regard to the performance of the rulers, their failure arose 
from rivalry to gain support, 89 personal allegiances and conflicts, 90 and 
excessive exclusiveness whereby those who regarded themselves as economi-
cally and socially among the ruling class were not admitted to political 
control. 91 Such rivalries and exclusiveness were dangerous since they 
often led to the warring factions seeking support from other sections of ' 
the population (or from an outside power), thereby undermining the unity of 
the state. 
Aristotle also saw that some oligarchies were vulnerable due to 
constitutional weaknesses. One such weakness could be found in the method 
of election. He believed that it was an inappropriate method of election 
when the magistrates were elected by the people rather than by the classes 
from which the offices were drawn. 92 This was dangerous since it created 
the possibility of members of the oligarchy seeking and depending on populap-
rity with the voters. Another danger existed when the law courts were not 
filled with those who had political control, for the possibility then 
existed that the person on trial may try to curry the favour of the people 
in the hope of a favourable verdict. Aristotle consistently draws a 
distinction between the part played by the people and that played by the few 
within any political machine. He therefore reached the point of wishing to 
restrict legal power to the few. This would not have reamed the possibi-
lity that the accused would try to influence the jury and hence some 
conflict may well still have ensued. By not admitting the people into the 
legal system, he would only lessen the extent of the conflict, he would not 
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remove its cause. For as long as men were willing to abuse the legal 
system and utilize it in the interests of political control, instability 
was inherent. This raises the problem of the failure of the Greek system 
to achieve any sort of independent arbitration system. As well as being a 
problem in oligarchies it was present in democracies also, as at Corcyra in 
427 B.C. where the wealthy oligarchs were tried in a court which was 
composed of people of democratic interests who were able to influence the 
court decision in order to ruin their political opponents. 93 
There were some causes that were external to the behaviour of the 
ruling clique that led to change in oligarchies. But these were, in a 
sense, accidental for they attested to a change in environmental conditions 
such as the introduction of mercenaries who needed to be catered for within 
the constitution, or by what Aristotle himself refers to as an accident or 
chance occurrence(0-7Ari-07-4 ), the increase in the number of wealthy and 
therefore of number eligible, under a property—based constitution, to 
exercise political power. 94 This was really a further example of what he 
would term disproportionate growth, albeit a growth which may have occurred 
in small stages. 
Since tyranny was regarded by Aristotle as having the evils of both 
democracy and oligarchy, it was vulnerable to attack by both the nobles and 
the people. Because the tyrant did not trust people, mistreated them or 
settled them in scattered areas, they were willing to rise against him, but 
as Aristotle noted, it was from the nobles, against whom the tyrant waged 
war, that the leaders of attacks originated. 95 It was in the interests of 
honour and gain that such attacks were made, either the noble himself 
wishing to have the advantages associated with tyranny and therefore aiming 
to make himself tyrant, or to avoid the loss of those qualities through 
being subject to a tyrant. Thus some attacks were against the person of 
the ruler and others against the office. 
The personal attacks on tyrants (as with those on monarchs) were the 
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result of the mismanagement of the ruler who indulged in insolent 
behaviour. This created the desire for revenge, 96 fear of oppression, 97 or 
contempt for the particular person. 98 All such causes Aristotle summed up 
as originating from two main ones, hatred and contempt. 99 
In general, no matter what type of constitution, one further cause 
ofor,-- es dealt with in passing by Aristotle, was the intervention of an 
outside power, which he claimed used to happen when Athens and Sparta were 
contending for control of Greece. 100  This is rather a broad generalization 
and not supported by examples, perhaps since he felt that the phenomena was 
so well known that he need cite no examples. It is necessary to examine 
how such intervention occurred. Rarely was it direct, unasked—for inter-
vention imposed by a major power on the whole population. Generally it 
arose from a major power supporting an already existing faction within a 
city, which saw an external backing to their power as necessary for the 
survival of that power. Thus the 04-75Les situation was already present and 
was capitalized on by major powers. 
Thucydides' comments in this area are instructive. He maintained 
that the escalation of civil strife during the Peloponnesian War was to be 
seen in the foreign aid engaged. In so far as his comment was limited to 
the foreign aid sought by the revolutionaries, and the fact that both 
Athens and the cities of the Peloponnese formed centres of refuge for 
exiles, the comment was valid, but in so far as he believed that unless 
Athens and Sparta were at war "there would have been no excuse or desire 
for calling them in", 101 he missed the mark. The Greek cities found ample 
reasons for calling in not only Athens or Sparta, but other cities to help 
them in their internal situation. They may simply hire mercenaries, or 
appeal for help as a colony, as Epidamnus did at the outset of the war, 102 
or appeal to a neighbouring city for help. Many cities in Sicily had 
elements that were prepared to seek assistance from Syracuse, and in Italy 
the exiles from Rhegium sought aid from their neighbours, the Locrians. 103 
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The self-interest of such groups in calling in external aid can be 
mitigated, in part, by the fact that one faction could not successfully 
eliminate the discontented parts of the population and hence relied on 
outside help to maintain (or regain) their position. The conflicting 
desires of groups within the population, all of whom had been led to 
believe that active participation in the polis was expected and fundamental 
to one's existence (this at least was traditional) could not be reconciled, 
and often led to violence. The violent aspect of such conflicts escalated 
when major powers were involved, particularly in times of war, but the 
causes that led to the recourse to violence in the first place, were not 
the result of external powers or the existence of war, but were to be found 
in the nature of the particular government and its failure to solve the 
socio-economic problems of the community which it governed. 
• Aristotle on the Preservation of Constitutions  
Since the basic cause of revolutionary change was injustice of some 
kind, Aristotle cited the removal of injustice as the means of preserving 
constitutions. This injustice could be either in terms of the constitution 
itself or in terms of the management by particular people of a constitution. 
In both cases, he noted the fundamental truth that those who favoured a 
constitution needed to be greater in number than those who did not. 104 The 
particular government also needed to show moderation, particularly in its 
methods of dealing with sectional interests. 
In the first instance he noted that precautions had to be taken 
against anything being done contrary to the constitution of the time. 105  
In the absence of an absolute constitution this was extremely difficult, 
and elsewhere Aristotle noted, albeit reluctantly, that changes must be 
made in constitutions. He now noted that illegality often crept in 
unobserved, and he must be referring to what happened with practice and 
usage rather than decrees passed in accordance with the constitution. He 
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was by no means clear on what he regarded as legal, and what as illegal, 
change. In fact, small changes were often necessary to retain confidence 
in the constitution, particularly when the constitution needed to be 
adapted to changing conditions. His attitude seems to stem from his belief 
that any change in a particular constitution led to either a perversion of 
that constitution or changed it into another constitution. 
On the whole, he was not concerned with a change in constitutional 
form that needed to be made in view of changing conditions and which would, 
if made at the appropriate time, prevent violent revolutionary change. 
Such changes do in fact follow from his primary maxim that those in favour 
of a constitution should be more than those who were not. From this it 
follows that any major shift in conditions needed to be accompanied by a 
change in the constitution. 
Another fundamental safeguard was dependent on the behaviour of 
those in charge of the government. Those in office had to be sure to give 
proper treatment both to other members of the ruling body and to those out-
side it. 106 In this area, short term of office was considered an advantage 
since it was not so easy to do wrong if only in office for a short time. 107 
Similarly, it was essential that promotions were of a minor nature and 
spread over a long period of time. Restraints must also be imposed by the. 
laws so that no citizen became excessively prominent or influential as a 
result of wealth and family connections. 108 This was difficult in 
practice, since family connections and alliances were a fundamental basis 
of Greek society, and concerted interest in politics by groups was neces-
sary for an understanding of governmental processes and policies. Part 
of the problem with the democracies of that time was that the people's 
confidence in them was shaken by the fact that rule was sometimes exercised 
by those who neither knew the constitution thoroughly nor were adept in 
handling it. 109 urthermore, in most systems, some offices needed long 
tenure for the effective shaping of consistent policy or conduct of 
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business, especially in times of war. In the absence of long tenure, 
consistent policy was only achieved by the formation of groups who strove 
to have friends of a similar viewpoint succeed to a particular office. 
This attentuated the rivalry between factions for the control of an office. 
Such rivalries and ambitions needed to be checked from the outset. 
This required a considerable degree of foresight on the part of those in 
power. They had to recognise danger from certain people or sections of 
society and take action against it. The usual method was exile. This was, 
however, only a respite. If an individual were exiled, there were always 
his followers and friends to continue opposition to the government, 110 and 
if a whole group were exiled, that group would band together and, having 
gained support from an external source or from discontented sections within 
their own city, effect their return by force. 111 
Aristotle did not, in fact, deal with the mechanics of preventing 
change in democracies and oligarchies. However, with tyranny, he noted two 
methods whereby it could be preserved and dealt with them in some detail. 
The two options were repression and conciliation. Repressive methods were 
aimed at making the subjects unable to revolt. This was done by such things 
as keeping the people poor, occupied on buildings or external war, unarmed, 
the use of alien troops and a spy service, and sowing distrust between the 
various classes of society. 112 
On the conciliatory side, the tyrant could gain the goodwill of the 
people by using his strength in moderation, refrain from using his power 
and office as a source of gain and by exercising a degree of self control 
in his personal behaviour to avoid falling into contempt. 113 
On the economic level, Aristotle saw that due to economic increases, 
changes in the relative sections of the population occurred and therefore 
there needed to be an adjustment in terms of property qualification 
required for political privilege. 114 This is contrary to his disbelief in 
small changes but it did have the advantage of not alienating those of a 
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similar economic and social standing from those who controlled the govern-
ment. But in general, exceptional prosperity needed to be guarded against 
and Aristotle believed that there should be a large number of those of 
medium wealth. 115 He did not seem to realize the difficulty of any govern-
ment controlling the size and nature of the various classes, especially 
since some form of state control over wealth would be, in part, against his 
own argument against the communistic approach of Plato. 116 
On the political level, apart from avoiding resentment through 
excessive prominence and mismanagement, and fear of a loss of _honour, 
Aristotle believed that the holding of office should not be a source of 
financial gain. For as he observed, the majority did not so much resent 
being debarred from office as the thought that officials were helping them-
selves to public money. Hence the handing over of office needed to be 
public and an account rendered. 117 
The principle needed was that of the middle way, whereby those not 
within the ruling group were not alienated by those governing. To consoli-
date a government's position the people needed to be educated to the way of 
living that belonged to that constitution. 118 For the leaders, they needed 
loyalty to the established constitution, a capacity for the work involved 
and the kind of honesty and goodness that belonged to the way of life in 
question. 119 
Throughout, Aristotle failed to allow for what could be regarded as 
necessary and what were unnecessary changes. Consequently, he had no real 
solution to theTroblem of disproportionate growth, a problem which may well 
have been the result of an expanding or more diverse economy. 
Furthermore, his system based on moderation was static in concept. 
It presupposed that an unquestioned constitutional framework could be set 
up and that allegiance to that system could be gained by education and law. 
But no matter what the educative system, the widening of contact throughout 
the Greek world and beyond, which had occurred from the Sixth Centry B.C. 
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onwards, meant that alternative governmental systems were known. The know-
ledge of such alternative systems, together with the effect of outside con-
tacts on the economic and social life of the polis resulted in an awareness 
of the faults within a particular governmental system andthe desirability, 
given a change in conditions, of altering the constitution to a more accep-
table form. Sparta, of course, by remaining aloof from such outside con-
tacts and ideas was able to retain a stable constitution, reinforced by a 
narrow social system and the necessity of ruling a subject population. But 
Sparta was exceptional. 
Also, Aristotle advocated the use of law to retain a static situation. 
He talked, for example, of creating laws against faction (cr'g€a's ) and 
rivalries (r0ovtoc/A 4.- ) among the nobles. 120 He claimed that the astute 
• politician ought to be able to discern such factionalism and rivalry at the 
outset and prevent others outside the immediate quarrel from entering into 
it. This was extremely difficult to do with alliances based on personal 
allegiances. Though the various political associations known as i'l".e 1/64 e04- 1' 
were particularly strong, they remained loose associations of friends, 
against which no legal system could effectively legislate. 121 
Similarly, it was difficult to prevent men becoming too powerful in 
office, friends or wealth, 122 particularly in times of war when the out-
standing and successful general naturally acquired greater preemminence and 
a group of friends ready to support him. Success in warfare also resulted 
in the particular general gaining the confidence of the people and hence 
their support should he wish to advance politically. Conversely, failure 
in war meant a corresponding loss of prestige and political effectiveness. 
From the point of view of friendship, it is difficult to see how ' the 	. 
Aristotle proposed could determine who would be a friend of whom. 
Concluding Remarks  
Despite Aristotle's detailed account of the different types of 
changes in, and methods of preserving constitutions, several basic factors 
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emerge. Although there was always a potential for revolutionary change, 
the realization of that change only occurred when the government had failed 
to retain the allegiance of the people over whom it ruled. Thus he saw 
that revolutionary behaviour was the result of the behaviour of the existing 
government in conjunction with the desires and aims of the revolutionaries. 
Thus, the ultimate success of a government lay in the extent to which 
it was able to maintain an identification between its leaders and its 
citizens; or hold those citizens down by force or fear. The ruling group 
in the Greek cities could rarely command a sufficient majority of active 
support to maintain its position by force. Hew successfully they were able 
to maintain an identity could not be gauged by the political fanaticism of 
some political clubs, but rather from the view ofthelmajority of the 
citizens. The general populace had to be convinced that the existing 
government was the most suitable. In such a case, they did not support 
revolutionary Movements. 
The attitude of the general populace can be gauged from Thucydides , 
work. It would appear that, throughout the Peloponnesian War, the middle 
sections of the population Kmilaw -,A3vol,A,711)v) were, on the whole, content. 
+los was a term used loosely by Thucydides to sometimes designate those 
in charge of a demOcratic faction, as in the description of events at 
Corcyra where 4:7: gycoc were in conflict with r; lmor ;123 and sometimes 
to express the concept of the populace generally, as in the description of 
the internal trouble at Megara, where neither of the opposing sides felt 
confident of the support of the people. 124 
But the Aaws , due to its nature was a:flexible unit and could be if 
used by one or other of the contending parties for power, especially if it 
were offered things that had not been forthcoming from the existing govern-
ment. At the very least, its passive acceptance of a regime was necessary. 
Thus the oligarchs in the revolution at Athens in 411 B.C. created 
suspicion throughout the city so that the general populace feared each 
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other, especially since they had been led to believe that the number 
supporting the new oligarchy was far larger than it was in actuality. They 
therefore remained silent. Thus, although revolutionary initiative came 
from members of the ruling elite or political clubs, a revolution needed 
the passive or active support of the general populace for its continued 
success. 125 
Where individuals could maintain a sufficiently large following they 
often resorted to more constitutional methods to achieve their ends. Thus 
Alcibiades and Nicias combined to effect the ostracism of Hyperbolus in 
417 B.C., showing that they could command a sufficient political following 
prepared to accept their initiative. 126 This was allied to the respect of 
people for traditional families. At Athens, the Alcmaeonids relied on the 
respect for their family name in their political campaigns in the Fifth 
Century B.C. 127 That such support was insecure, however, is shown by the 
condemnation of Alcibiades by the assembly in 415 :B.C. 128 
But when the use of constitutional methods was not possible, 
individuals who had become disorientated from the system, often as a result 
of the behaviour of the ruling elite, were prepared to resort to subversive 
action. To do so required support, and this was found from the disaffected 
sections of the community, the employment of mercenaries, or the enlistment 
of foreign aid. Because Aristotle did not deal with the difference between 
violent and non—violent change, he did not deal with the effect of military 
force in revolutions in any detail in Book V. As Newman remarked, "We 
gather, for instance, from 6 (4).13.1297b 16 sqq. that changes in the 
relative importance of different arms of the military force of the State 
bring with them changes of constitution, but we hear nothing of this in the 
Book before •us. 129 Changes in the relative importance of the cavalry, 
hoplite and naval contingents undermined the claim of the oligarchs that 
they should have more political control because they were more involved in 
the defence of the city. On another level, there was the problem of the 
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prestige and following that centred around a successful general. 
What was needed was a government that could make some provision for 
the successful general and could change with changing conditions, yet still 
retain the respect and confidence of the people in its efficiency and 
validity. It was this dilemma of a valid constitution despite changing 
conditions that led to the constant oscillations between forms of government 
in many Greek cities. 
At the end of the Fifth Century B.C., the Greek world was 
experiencing a process which dated back to the end of the Sixth Century, of 
oscillation between varying forms of democracy and oligarchy (with the 
exception of Sparta and the backward towns). Thucydides noted that the 
leaders of democratic movements used, as justification for their power, the 
slogan of political equality for the multitude (fl'00 P 	or"3" 1"'/P ) 
and the few used the concept of temperate or moderate aristocracy 
(,4/paroiew4's 644ovos) to justify oligarchy. 130 That the leaders of both 
points of view co—existed in a city and could propound their point of view, 
reveals a diversity of approach upon which a leader could gain sufficient 
support to, if not actually overthrow a government, at least harass it in 
such a way as to limit its effective control. Thus Athenagoras, in the 
debate at Syracuse, mentioned that people within the city created rumours 
to frightenthelpopulace and to try to gain the government for themselves. 
Action was not taken against such people, he complained, and hence the city 
was rarely tranquil, but suffered many civil disturbances. 131 Athenagoras 
was speaking from his own political viewpoint, but the fact that he used 
such a plea attests to a continued state of unrest between the opposing 
elements in the city. 
Because of this diversity there was a move, particularly in times of 
war, when the underlying economic and social stresses were highlighted, to 
look toward the outstanding individual. In wartime he provided a focal 
point for resistance and his success in that area gained him popularity 
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with the result that the people believed that he would also be able to 
resolve the economic and social problems of the time. To this end, in 
Sicily in the Fourth Century B.C., the confidence of the people was often 
vested in the single ruler. There was, however, no corresponding 
constitutional move to legitimize that position, nor were the social and 
economic stresses successfully resolved, so that e.,"70/01 S 	°"/th:r—A/61-s and 
political subversion remained continuous phenomena. 
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CHAPTER TWO : THE NATURE AND METHOD OF REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE AND POLITICAL 
SUBVERSION IN SYRACUSE,  415-305 B.C. 
A. Revolutionary Motivation 
Syracuse, in the Fourth Century B.C. experienced several instances 
/ of o-7:40-/s , atio crnials and political subversion. A survey of these 
instances reveals a variety in the nature of the change attempted and in 
the aims of those who instigated the attempts. 1 Broadly speaking there 
were two different types of aim. In the first case there were those who 
aimed at changing the existing constitution, and in the other there were 
those who sought to change the person in charge of a particular 
constitution. 2 
In the former category can be placed Hermocrates' attempt, 
Dionysius I's gaining of the tyranny, the peoples' opposition to him in 
404 B.C. and 396 B.C., Dion's professed aim in returning from exile, the 
opposition to Dion on the part of Heracleides, Hippo and the Syracusans in 
356 B.C., the exiles who appealed to Corinth in 346 B.C. and the expedition 
of Timoleon in response to that appeal, the taking over of control by the 
oligarchs in c. 320 B.C. and the democratic expulsion of them and finally, 
Agathocles removal of oligarchic opposition and subversion of the democracy 
in the revolution of 317 B.C. 
Within this group there was, however, a wide difference in motive. 
The motives of Hermocrates, Dionysius, Dion and Agathocles appear to be 
primarily personal. Hermocrates worked in opposition to the extreme 
democracy of Diodes because it was that democracy which had exiled him. 
Although he was able to discredit Diodes and effect his exile he was 
unable to obtain his own recall, indicating the lack of general support.for 
him among the demos at Syracuse. Since he then returned in secret, at the 
head of a group of mercenaries, it would seem that the Syracusan fear that 
he wished to make himself tyrant was not wholly unjustified. The attempt 
miscarried, but it taught his followers, one of whom was Dionysius, a 
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valuable lesson. 
The establishment of Dionysius' tyranny raises more questions than 
is often realised. Why Dionysius was chosen will be dealt with later, bUt 
why those who backed him were prepared to support one man, rather than try 
to create an oligarchic clique also needs to be examined. I would suggest 
that the answer lies in the fact that they saw the impossibility of 
creating an oligarchy in opposition to the newly inspired democracy, 3 
despite the fact that the leader of the democratic movement was in exile. 
Moreover, it was probably a very small group of influential people who 
sought the change, since the cavalry, who would have been from the 
wealthier group, held the abortive demonstration against Dionysius in the 
same year as he assumed the position of general with full powers. 
In view of their numerical inferiority, the failure of the use of 
force by Hermocrates, and the certainty of strong and widespread opposition 
to any constitutional change that tried to limit the franchise or curtail 
the power of the people, 4 the supporters of Dionysius opted to subvert the 
constitution and place Dionysius in sole control. In this they were 
successful since they achieved it within the framework of the constitution, 
the threat of Carthage making a sole general both reasonable and acceptable 
to the people. The motives of the principal instigators of this take-over 
were personal. Dionysius and Philistus operated from a desire for personal 
honour and fame with the wealth attached to it, 5 while Hipparinus was 
motivated by the selfish desire to acquire wealth to offset that which he 
had squandered. 6 
The personal element was also foremost in the actions of Dion. A 
review of his alleged motives in the light of what he actually achieved are 
indicative of this. Aristotle spoke of the overthrow of Dionysius II as a 
cfneo+t between those having a share in the tyranny. 7 In the initial 
conflict Dion fared badly and was exiled. It was only after this that he 
considered taking the people to his side. This was not through a concern 
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for their condition but rather for his own self-interest. This personal 
motive was also stressed by Aristotle when he spoke of tyrannies being 
overthrown as a result of contempt. 8 It must be remembered that, although 
Dion had contempt for Dionysius II, he left his return until such a time as 
Dionysius II forced his hand. The stay of ten years in Greece, during most 
of which time he was inactive, is hardly indicative of the political and 
social reformer and zealot that Dion was reported to be in the sources. 
The people were prepared to support Dion since they had no-one else and he 
promised to restore their freedom, but his attitude to their situation was 
basically the same as Dionysius, as his opposition to the appointment of 
Heracleides, his repeal of the land bill and his retention of supreme 
office showed. 9 
In the case of Agathocles, the confused and contradictory accounts 
of his rise to power10 are unanimous, however, in their portrayal of 
Agathocles as an opportunist motivated by personal ambition. His mentality 
was the mentality of the mercenary soldier who allied himself to whichever 
side promised the greatest reward. As it happened he capitalized on the 
divergence of interest between the rich and the poor. Having gained the 
support of the poor and come to some agreement with the Carthaginian 
general, Hamilcar, he succeeded in being elected er:77..cs oe,37-0/9Ar 
in 317 B.C., a position which he converted to that of self-proclaimed 
monarch in c. 505 B.C. 
At the outset of his career Agathocles seems to have been associated 
with an oligarchic clique and it was only when the leaders of that group, 
Sosistratue and Heracleides, did not recognise his deeds of valour because 
of their jealousy(/9s''0.5 ) that he denounced their resolve to establish 
an autocratic government. 11 His knowledge of their intentions, which was 
proved accurate by the subsequent events, implies that he was at that time 
in their confidence. Being out of favour he left Syracuse but returned to 
help the democrats when they expelled the oligarchy of the Six Hundred from 
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the city. Some sort of reconciliation was then effected by the Corinthian 
commander, Acestorides, Agathocles being ordered to leave the city and the 
exiles being allowed to return. 12 Agathocles then gathered a large army in 
the interior and the Syracusans invited him back, no doubt through fear of 
further civil warfare, and appointed him general and guardian of the city. 13 
A To achieve his ambition and being greedy for power (et -7, 0171-7f A)v 
orowa-r-f4Ls) he created another army which was loyal to himself and attached 
to it all those who, because of their poverty and envy, had come to hate 
the powerful group. With their aid he massacred the oligarchs 14 and was 
2 'persuaded' to become 0,7d77" ° 'A"lie. Thus, although he attached 
to himself the poorer elements who were motivated by their social and 
economic distress and proclaimed himself as a champion of democracy, he was 
himself primarily motivated by personal ambition. 
In contrast to the motives of Hermocrates, Dionysius, Dion and 
Agathocles, the actions of the people in 404, 396, 356 and 346 B.C. reveal 
a different type of motivation. The uprising of the Syracusans in 404 B.C. 
was based on a desire to overthrow tyranny and restore the constitution of 
Diocles, 15 It was unsuccessful due to the disorganisation of the 
Syracusans and the further inducement to rebel in 396 B.C. was quickly 
silenced. 16 The main motive on that occasion was antagonism toward 
Dionysius' foreign and domestic policies. A similar type of motive, based 
on social and economic considerations, was at the basis of the opposition 
to Dion of Heracleides, Hippo and the Syracusans in 356 B.C. It too was 
short—lived since the Syracusans were helpless against Dionysius II's 
mercenaries and were therefore forced to concede to Dion whatever measures 
he saw fit to impose, in return for his military support. 
The exiles in 346 B.C., although desiring to be rid of tyranny were 
also handicapped by their lack of military force. They therefore appealed 
in the first instance to Hicetas at Leontini, and secondly to Corinth for 
help. The arrival of Timoleon and his subsequent flushing out of tyrants 
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from Sicily provided a brief respite from civil strife and a return to some 
form of moderate oligarchy or democracy. 17 This was again subverted by the 
manoeuvres of the group which came to be known as the Six Hundred who, 
being motivated by their own selfish desires and pursuing their interests 
at the expense of the poorer elements in the community created a large 
section of the population willing to accept and support Agathocles. 
The second group, those who sought to change the leader but not the 
constitution, namely Dion, Callippus, Hipparinus, Nysaeue, Dionysius II on 
his return to Syracuse, Hicetas, and possibly Deinocrates in his opposition 
to Agathocles, were more obviously motivated by personal ambition. All 
struggled for the honour and gain to be achieved through personal 
ascendancy and ruled by virtue of their mercenary forces in defiance of any 
legitimate constitutional position. In this, their approach was similar to 
that of Hermocrates, Dionysius I and Agathocles. 
In fact, the key role played by individuals in the civil disturbances 
at Syracuse from 415 B.C. to 305 B.C. and their limited aims, confirms 
Aristotle's assertion of the personal element in revolutionary motivation. 
B. Revolutionary Method 
The principal concern of those who wished to gain ascendency over 
those in power was the means whereby they could effectively displace the 
existing government. Their second concern was to acquire as much support 
for their own cause as was possible and consistent with the government that 
they intended to establish. The two principal methods in the area of means 
were propaganda and force. For support there was the range of family ties, 
friendships and clubs based on the group-mentality principle, the people as 
a whole in either a voting capacity or as a source of manpower, exiles, and 




The striking feature about revolutionary behaviour in Sicily was the 
lack of any positive programme on the part of the revolutionaries. In its 
place there was the prevalence of propaganda, the nature of which depended 
on the relative positions of the leaders and their opponents. 
The usual method was to discredit the existing government over its 
policies or their implementation, thereby causing the people to lose confi-
dence in it. It was a negative appeal, but successful nonetheless. It was 
by this method that Dionysius initially gained power. At the time of his 
rise, Syracuse was in a state of unrest due in part to the machinations of 
Hermocrates who, although having successfully discredited the character of 
the then leading general, Diodes, and caused his exile in 408 B.C., 18 had 
been unable to effect his own recall. On that occasion Diodes had been 
replaced by Daphnaeus and others who, although rich and prominent, were 
unable to gain popular support. With the Carthaginian invasion in 406 B.C., 
the military decision by the generals to evacuate Acragas supplied 
Dionysius with an occasion to discredit them. 19 The general mood of the 
Sicilians under the conditions of war at this time can be gauged by the 
fate of the Acragantine generals, four out of five of whom were stoned to 
death for their military decisions by the Acragantine assembly, held amid 
"great uproar and tumult". 20 
The atmosphere was thus favourable for antagoniam toward, generals 21 
and Dionysius tried to stir up the Syracusan assembly to violence against 
their generals. The mood of the assembly was not as intense as that at 
Acragas (nor was the effect of war so immediate upon them) and hence the 
procedure was more regular. But even though the presiding archons 
cautioned against such behaviour, threatening to impose a fine on those who 
22 	. created an uproar, this was bypassed by Philistus' offer to pay any amount 
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• of such fines. Dionysius therefore continued to make general accusations 
against the generals together with emotional appeals against the most 
renowned citizens, from which group these generals came, and advised that 
the generals not come from the more renowned citizens but from those 
favourable to the populace. He also maintained that the renowned had 
23 contempt for the citizens. 	Thus a purely military failure became super- 
seded by vindictive appeals on class grounds. The whole tactic rested on 
the unfounded belief that the less wealthy could improve their position by 
electing generals who were opposed to the rich and that because the 
existing generals were renowned and wealthy they were therefore less 
patriotic in their conduct of war. 24 
Thus by playing on popular sympathies and prejudices Dionysius 
succeeded in having the generals dismissed and new ones chosen. He himself 
was of course among those elected. Since these new generals had not been 
elected on the basis of a positive programme they were not allied by a 
common bond or policy. No doubt they were not from the most influential 
groups, 25 but there was no way that Dionysius could control the re-election 
and hence he had no guarantee that his new colleagues would succumb to his 
wishes. He therefore began a campaign of non-cooperation with them and 
spread rumours of their collusion with Carthage. That such rumours found 
widespread credibility (although Diodorus maintained that the respectable 
citizens did not believe them) 26 attests to the fact that unpatriotic 
behaviour was all too common. 27 The attack was made more open and both the 
generals and the local magistrates were accused of neglect. 28 What exactly 
the generals could have done in their short term of office is not clear and 
hence the accusations are of a general kind, except the supposed overtures 
made to Dionysius by Himilcon. 29 
By a dramatic resignation and the lodging of formal accusations 
Dionysius succeeded in having himself elected general with supreme powers. 
All this he had achieved within the framework of the constitution. The lack 
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of any real substance in the accusations was the probable reason for the 
postponement of the trial of the alleged traitors. 30 The purpose of 
discrediting the archons was to counteract any initiative on their part, a 
necessary step since they had the power to convene the assembly and may 
well have done so in Dionysius' absence. 
By using similar tactics as Hermocrates Dionysius succeeded, due in 
part to the different conditions but also to the influential support he had 
and his ability to convince the people that he was working on their behalf. 
But the tactic of discrediting the government was a particularly dangerous 
one when achieved, as in Dionysius' case, on very slender grounds. As 
G.C. Field remarked, "one thing that strikes anyone •... is the extra-
ordinary sense of insecurity which all public men, orators and generals 
alike, must have felt. Hardly anyone of prominence escaped trial at some 
time in his career, and few avoided condemnation either to payment of a 
heavy fine, to exile, or even to death". 31 When the attack was on military 
grounds it was even more dangerous since it implied that the accuser could 
and would do better. 
Dionysius himself was accused of failure with the evacuation of Gela 
in 405 B.C., but the disaffection was restricted to the cavalry. 32 Again 
in 397/396 B.C. with the advent of a further Carthaginian invasion, 
Dionysius' position was threatened. On the strength of a Syracusan naval 
victory in 396 the people began to agitate against Dionysius, especially 
since the war situation meant that they had their arms back. 33 Although it 
had been a naval victory, the centre of opposition was again the cavalry 
from which the spokesman against Dionysius, Theodorus, came. He used the 
popular propaganda about ancestral freedom and the loss of the ancient laws 
followed by specific accusations about Dionysius' land settlement, his 
plundering of temples and his use of mercenaries. 34 He maintained that 
Dionysius had exiled men of property and had remarried their wives to 
slaves and "mixed—up" men, a reference no doubt to Dionysius' land reforms 
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and extensions of citizenship. 35 Most prominent of all was the attack on 
Dionysius' war policy both in the previous war and the new one. 
Theodorus' confidence was based on the fact that the people had 
weapons and on what he believed to be allies from Greece and the 
Peloponnese. But he overstepped the mark for Pharacidas, the Lacedaemonian 
sent with reinforcements from the Peloponnese, maintained, and rightly so, 
that he had been dispatched to help the Syracusans and Idonysius against 
the Carthaginians, not to overthrow the rule of Dionysius. Interestingly 
there was the expectation that Sparta would interfere and her reputation 
after the Peloponnesian War had shown that in many cases she did. 36 As the 
mercenaries also rallied around Dionysius the situation was saved for him 
and he dismissed the assembly. 
The call to preserve freedom had been part of Theodorus' attack and 
it is this aspect of propaganda that was often prominent, particularly on 
the part of those who opposed a tyrant. Dion claimed to be bringing the 
Syracusans their freedom, and so did Timoleon whose appointment by Corinth 
was in support of exiles, not of the recognised government of Syracuse. 
In various ways Dion had tried to influence the running of 
Dionysius II's government prior to his return from exile in 357 B.C. When 
Dionysius II took over the tyranny in 367 B.C. Dion sent for Plato, hoping, 
it would seem, to influence the tyrant's mind. The attempt had a fair 
chance of success since Dionysius II had been indulged in his youth and 
badly reared37 but nevertheless had a capacity for learning. 38 In fact 
Dion's sending for Plato makes no real sense unless Dionysius II was back-
ward in purpose and capable of being influenced by philosophical and 
educational means, these means in this context being regarded as a type of 
propaganda. The attempt failed, partly due to the counter-propaganda of 
the opposing group who pressed for and gained the recall of Philistus, 39 a 
keen supporter of tyranny, and partly because of Plato's own attitude. For 
as Grote remarked, "Not only did Plato decline entering upon political 
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recommendations of his own, but he damped, instead of enforcing, the 
positive good resolutions which Dion had already succeeded in infusing". 40 
In fact he seems, with the often found egotism and arrogance of the 
intelligent, to have proposed that nothing short of a complete and lengthy 
re—education was possible. 41 This was hardly a practical remedy for the 
situation at hand. 
While Dion was in exile, Dionysius II invited Plato to Sicily, 
presumably since he hoped to dissuade Dion from any further political 
activity against him. 42 While Plato was there in 361/360 B.C. Dionysius II 
sold Dion's property, thereby making his exile complete. The diplomacy 
with Plato had in fact failed and Plato could well be regarded as 
advocating dangerous attitudes and policies. Not that the people generally 
would be affected by Plato's ideas, despite Plutarch's assertion that they 
were filled with great hope. 43 If the common people knew anything at all 
about Plato's ideas, a fact in itself highly unlikely, they certainly would 
not have favoured the elitist concepts embodied in them. But he may well 
have been influential with certain groups. His followers were certainly 
guilty of undercover work while they were at Syracuse, for Speusippus 
sounded out popular opinion to report it later to Dion. 44 Since he could 
hardly have approached random people in the street it is tempting to think 
that he contacted known associations or clubs which he believed would be 
favourable to Dion's cause. It would seem then that Dion was working 
subversively before the final rift occurred with the sale of his property 
and the remarriage of his wife. 
When Dion returned from exile he claimed to be bringing freedom to 
the Syracusan people and on the strength of that call many of the rural 
Syracusans joined 1thm 45 and on entering the city the renowned and 
cultivated men welcomed him. He entered with his brother Megacles and a 
bodyguard of one hundred mercenaries and on the basis of his claim to be 
freeing the people from tyranny was elected general with full powers 46 
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along with Megacles and in conjunction with twenty colleagues, ten of whom 
were among the twenty—five exiles who returned with him. 	twenty 
seem to have been nominal only and Megacles was very much overshadowed by 
his brother. The nature of the election as transmitted in the sources 
reflects the general propaganda in favour of Dion and against Dionysius II 
for in Plutarch the people vote "in their joy and affection" and in 
Diodorus, "with one voice". 48 
But although Dion claimed to be freeing the Syracusans he in actual 
fact did very little to effect this. 49 What he seems to have meant by 
freedom was freedom from Dionysius, and while keeping control of the 
government in his own hands, he did nothing to establish an effective 
government in Syracuse as can be seen in the chaos that occurred after his 
death in 354 B.C. 
Dion's lack of positive programme was the foundation upon which 
opposition to him was based. Shortly after his arrival into Syracuse 
rumours started to the effect that the Syracusans had merely exchanged a 
stupid and drunken tyrant for a watchful and sober master. 50 The 
allegation was made by a certain Sosis who also claimed to have been 
attacked by Dion's mercenaries. Although Sosis was proved to have lied, 
there were many who shared a resentment of what they believed to be "dire 
acts of tyranny" 51 and hence a person, known for his "baseness and 
impudence" as Scisis was, was given credence in the first place. 52 Sosis 
was in fact a brother of one of Dionysiusl bodyguard, planted it would seem • 
to create factionalism. It worked because of Dion's highhandedness and it 
was this autocratic behaviour that Heracleides used as a basis for his 
opposition." 
At the end of the Fourth Century B.C., Agathocles combined the two 
claims of protecting the cause of the people and giving the Syracusans 
their freedom to effect his rise to power. As a supposed supporter of 
democracy he was elected general and protector of the people. 54 In that 
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capacity he was able to allege that he was being plotted Against "because 
of his sympathy for the common people". 55 By so doing he precipitated the 
street revolution against oligarchs in 317 B.C., after which, on calling an 
assembly, "he proclaimed that he was restoiing liberty undefiled to the 
people". 56 By a feigned reluctance to have command, just as Dionysius I 
had staged his dramatic resignation, he succeeded in being elected 
7y  It was only at that stage it would appear, that he 
promised to abolish debts and redistribute land to the poor. 57 
Thus the attempts to attain power were justified in terms of 
propaganda and not of positive programme. This propaganda was either 
negative in nature or offered nothing specific in relation to the problems 
of Syracuse other than the most immediate concerns; in the case of 
Dionysius I the positive aspect was the implied ability to deal with 
Carthage, in the case of Dion, the abolition of the tyranny of Dionysius II, 
and in the case of Agathocles, the restoration of the democracy after the 
rule of the Six Hundred. 
(b) Availability of Arms and Manpower  
Any revolutionary change or government established extra—constitu-
tionally required force or the threat of force. In Greece in the Fourth 
Century B.C., since the individual was required to supply his own armour, 
there was a potential supply of manpower from the citizen body provided 
that the propaganda proposed was sufficient for them, or sections of them, 
to believe that they ought to support the particular cause advocated. Two 
factors played a large part in gaining the allegiance of citizen troops. 
These were success as a military commander and the offer of increased pay. 
Such allegiance could come from either the other commanders or from the 
body of troops as a whole. 
In the case of Hermocrates, on hearing of his banishment along with 
the other Syracusan generals in 410 B.C., 58 a banishment caused by their 
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political opponents in Syracuse but made on the pretext of failure in the 
Peloponnesian War, the captains, maritime soldiers and pilots stood by him 
and offered to resist the appointment of new generals. 59 The specification 
of Hermocrates' supporters implies that the mass of rowers were not so 
favourably disposed toward him. 60 In the event the offer of support was 
rejected and Hermocrates sought the help of Pharnabuzus. Nevertheless, the 
captains took an oath that when they returned to Syracuse they would see to 
it that these generals were recalled from exile. 
The ever—present threat of war with Carthage or the existence of war, 
accentuated the problem of the relationship between a commander and his 
troops. The successful pursuit of a war (either defensively or aggressi-
vely) necessitated a strong single commander who could pursue a consistent 
policy. Such a position was, however, one which could enhance the status 
and power of the particular general for the allegiance of the soldiers 
tended to be toward the general in the first instance and Syracuse 
secondarily. It was fear of this possibility that motivated Dion's 
opponents prior to his exile. For Dion, by virtue of his wealth and 
position had offered to furnish fifty triremes to fight Carthage, or 
negotiate a peace with them and this, as Plutarch maintained, caused envy 
and hatred. 61 It was obvious to them that Dion, with such a force, could 
hold Syracuse to ransom if he so desired, or could use that power to effect 
a change of government from Dionysius II to one of his own nephews who were 
half brothers to Dionysius. 
It was the allegiance of the army that Dionysius I depended upon and 
he gained it in the first instance by increasing their pay. The two 
thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry who went with him to Gela in 
406 B.C. were promised double the pay which the city had determined, the 
extra amount being paid by Dionysius from the confiscated possessions of 
the rich exiled or killed Geloans. 62 On returning to Syracuse he had a 
decree passed which also doubled the pay of the mercenaries. 63 
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The citizen army was not, however, a stable one for maintaining 
personal ascendancy, nor was it a most suitable one for prolonged warfare, 
since its allegiance was dependent on the commander retaining his elected 
position and of there being no opposition spokesman to change its ideas. 
Since the army had a vested interest in the running of the city there was 
always the danger that it would turn against its leader. Thus, in 404 B.C., 
after Dionysius had concluded peace with Carthage, the hoplite branch of 
the army took the opportunity of Dionysius' expedition against the Siceli 
to revolt, and having slain Dionysius' commander, sent for help from the 
exiled cavalry at Aetna. 64 They also sought and gained the support of the 
Messenians and Rhegians. 65 The Syracusans put a price on Dionysius' head 
and promised citizenship to any mercenaries that cared to desert. Some 
accepted the offer. Dionysius, being besieged on Ortygia, came to an 
agreement with the Syracusans that he be allowed to depart by sea. 
On coming to this agreement the Syracusans seem to have disbanded. 
They had apparently constructed engines to destroy Dionysius' fortress but 
no use of these was made. 66 There was a real difficulty in keeping such a 
popular movement together for any length of time and although they had 
elected generals from the men who had slain Dionysius' commander, there was 
a lack of any real cohesion exemplified further in the fact that the 
cavalry force from Aetna was discharged. Thus Dionysius, having made 
secret negotiations with the Campanian mercenaries on the island and being 
reinforced by the arrival of another three hundred mercenaries was able to 
restore his position at Syracuse, especially since the Syracusans were 
engaged in cr-n/ols over the policy of maintaining the siege or abandoning 
the city. After a victory in battle, Dionysius sensibly restrained the 
mercenaries from any unnecessary slaughter. The remaining seven thousand 
Syracusan revolutionaries fled to Aetna.° Dionysius was able to take 
Aetna without much difficulty and the exiles then fled to Rhegium. 68 
Profiting from this experience, Dionysius took possession of the arms of 
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the Syracusans. 69 Henceforth they were armed for battle at a fixed point 
from the city and relinquished their arms at that point before returning to 
the city.70 
Dionysius in fact created a huge arsenal of equipment. As Parke 
noted, "Some details of its contents have been preserved: 140,000 shields, 
with daggers and helmets (...) of an equal number; and breastplates of all 
varieties and finely worked, more than 14,000 in number. The details given 
by Diodorus are interwoven with a vivid narrative, in such a way as to 
suggest that the source must be an eye-witness of these preparations, 
i.e. Philistus". 71 In this way Dionysius had access to a ready supply of 
arms whereas his internal opponents were weaponless. 
As a result of this centralization of weapons, Dion found it 
necessary to bring weapons with him when he sailed against Dionysius II in 
357 B.C. These weapons were distributed among the Syracusans as far as 
possible, the remaining Syracusans equipping themselves as best they could 
from makeshift arms. 72 
Because of the precarious nature of the relationship between the 
general and the citizen force, recourse was made to the use of a personal 
bodyguard and the employment of mercenaries. Dionysius, in his rise to 
power, had worked to a large extent through the constitution but he 
realized that an assembly that was fickle enough to exile the supporters of 
Hermocrates in 408 B.C. and then recall them in 406 B.C. was obviously not 
a body to depend upon. Its support was valuable for his initial subversion 
but for his position to be unassailable he needed a more secure foundation. 
Thus he sought to acquire a bodyguard but since he could not rely on the 
citizen body as a whole to vote for it he ordered all men under forty years 
of age to gather at Leontini with their arms. Leontini was chosen since 
it was at that time "full of exiles and foreigners" who would desire a 
"change of government". 73 
Diodorus claimed that "the majority of the Syracusans would not even 
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come to Leontini". 74 It is difficult to see what he could have meant by 
this for presumably the citizens had to obey their general in military 
matters, particularly since Dionysius wase -f7r's '' 2-"'"(/‘-'-99. I there-
fore take this to mean that since the sections of the population not in the 
hoplite divisions were excluded as were those over forty years of age who 
may well have held more conservative political views, the number who 
actually went to Leontini was small in comparison to the total Syracusan 
citizen population. On the old pretext of having been attacked Dionysius 
called an assembly. 75 This assembly would not have been the Leontines since 
they were exiles and foreigners, but would have been that section of the 
army assembled there. In this limited assembly he was voted a bodyguard of 
six hundred whom he personally selected from those present. There was some 
opposition to this rash move in the form of a suggestion that the 
Syracusans be given an equal number of guards, but this suggestion was not 
upheld. 76 .Dionysius selected a thousand men as a bodyguard. 
With a bodyguard of citizens loyal to himself and the goodwill of the 
mercenaries who were faithful to whomsoever gave promise of secure employ-
ment, Dionysius was able to secure himself on Ortygia, thereby utilising 
the geographical peculiarity of Syracuse to further strengthen his 
position. 77 The use of a bodyguard was not confined to tyrants. Dion, on 
his arrival at Syracuse had a personal bodyguard of one hundred men and 
Heracleides was also voted a bodyguard on his arrival. Dion kept his body-
guard until his death as can be deduced from the fact that his assassins had 
to be recognized to gain admission to his house. 
More widespread than the use of a bodyguard and increasingly impor-
tant in the Fourth Century B.C. was the use of mercenaries to gain power. 
Hermocrates in 410 B.C. gathered together mercenaries to accomplish his 
restoration to Syracuse by force. 80 The attempt failed because Hermocrates 
arrived in Syracuse without the main body of his forces and therefore was 
defeated by the Syracusans. 
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Dion and Heracleides, in a similar situation to Hermocrates, 
employed mercenaries from Greece in c. 360-357 B.C. 81 The mercenaries were 
hired for Dion's personal service and not on the pretext of liberating the 
Syracusans for it appears that they were hired without knowing their 
destination. 82 Thus they were loyal to Dion and not to a cause. The 
rallying point was Zacynthus and from there Dion sailed with eight hundred 
to a thousand mercenaries. 83 Heracleides, either as part of a strategy, 
or because of disagreement with Dion, sailed later. 84  He brought a further 
fifteen hundred mercenaries with him. 85 As well as being used in attempts 
to overthrow governments, they were also used to maintain them. In this 
latter capacity they were used by Dionysius I in what was probably the 
largest standing army of the time. 86 
If the mercenaries provided a source of manpower they also had their 
own inherent problems. Many were adventure seekers with the accompanying 
mentality. As such they were prone to looting and violence. Dionysius 
realized this for he dispatched the Campanian mercenaries who had helped 
him regain control in 404 B.C. after he had paid them. The move was 
justified in view of their treacherous actions at Entella where they slew 
the men who admitted them and married the wives. 87 
The violence of mercenaries was a new feature and is often commented 
on as such. During the factionalism that resulted in the withdrawal of 
Dion and his mercenary troops to Leontini in 356 B.C. the Syracusans do not 
seem to have been able to establish a disciplined armed force. Consequently, 
on Nypsius' arrival with food and money for the besieged forces of 
Dionysius II on Ortygia, despite a naval victory by the Syracusans, the 
mercenaries on Ortygia were able to break through the siege wall and pour 
88 into the city. 	The resulting violence was recorded by Plutarch : "For it 
was the sack of the city that was now going on, its men being slain, its 
walls torn down, and its women and children dragged shrieking to the 
acropolis, while its generals gave up all for lost and were unable to 
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employ the citizens Against the enemy, who were everywhere inextricably 
mingled with them". 89 
A greater problem with the mercenaries was the question of payment. 
In the absence of a successful war the maintenance of mercenaries was 
difficult in an economy based on fluctuating annual returns. When pay was 
not forthcoming the mercenaries became a formidable threat. In 396 B.C., 
after the Carthaginians had retreated, the mercenaries under the leadership 
of Aristotle pressed for payment. 90 Obviously the pay had fallen into 
arrears and was used by the mercenaries as a pretext for expressing general 
discontent with Dionysius I. Dionysius grabbed Aristotle and said he would 
send him back to Sparta for trial, something he could hardly have done if 
Aristotle were merely seeking his right of pay. For Dionysius, 
disaffection among the mercenaries was dangerous lest they should ally 
themselves to the Syracusans. The incident with Aristotle was probably 
related to the disaffected mercenaries whom Dionysius had got rid of during 
the Carthaginian war a little earlier. 91 On this occasion Dionysius 
quelled the discontent by giving the mercenaries land grants in Leontini, 
having removed the Leontines to Syracuse before the war. 92 
The need to pay mercenaries was no doubt the reason for the many and 
varied attempts of Dionysius to raise funds. The spoils of war and the 
confiscation of land from exiles went part of the way but he had to resort 
to many irregular methods. There were various forms of taxation; the 
direct property tax which it would appear amounted to 20% per annum93 and 
indirect taxes as in the case of the women who had to pay a fixed amount to 
the temple in order to wear gold 94  and the tax on the ownership of cattle 
and sheep. 95 He also had Imposed levies for specific purposes, as in the 
case of money to build a fleet. 96 Finally, there were the various temples 
he plundered or borrowed from. 97 
Dionysius 1 9 by virtue of his position, was able to finance his 
production of arms and in one way or another deal with the !problem of 
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paying his mercenaries. For commanders who lacked the resources of 
Dionysius the problem was far more acute. In 356 B.C. the Syracusans as a 
whole were short of immediate funds 98 and since the engagements Against 
Dionysius II's forces were at that time largely being conducted at sea, 99 a 
decree was passed to the effect that Dion's mercenaries not be paid. 100  It 
would appear that the mercenaries that had come with Heracleides now joined 
the forces of Dion for the proposal was backed by Heracleides in an attempt 
to remove the source of Dion's power. The mercenaries rallied around Dion 
and moved to Leontini where they were welcomed. 
As mentioned above, land was sometimes granted in lieu of pay and so 
was the offer of citizenship. This seems to be the point of the offer of 
equal civic rights made to Dion's mercenaries by the Syracusazis. 101 But 
such compensations brought further problems. Citizenship immediately gave 
the ex-mercenary a vested political interest in the running of the city and 
hence he became the same as the citizen soldier, and the grants of land 
gave the mercenary something worth fighting for as distinct from allegiance 
to his employer. Dion was able to capitalize on this latter point when he 
entered Syracuse in 357 B.C. Dion was able to take the fortress on Epipolae 
since he had spread the rumour that he was going to attack Leontini and 
Catana first and hence the mercenaries at Epipolae deserted their commander, 
Timocrates, and went to defend their land. 102 
The mercenaries had in fact become a force of their own and thereby 
created a new factor in the instabilities of the Fourth Century B.C., 
particularly in situations where there were several possible employers, or 
where the lack of a strong leader left a power vacuum in which the various 
armies of mercenaries, headed by mercenary leaders, fought for control 
among themselves. This factor had become evident in Dionysius II's time 
and as Parke noted, "Dionysius II's relations with his mercenaries were 
unsatisfactory, and this consideration must have helped to inspire Dion and 
Heracleides with the idea of returning by force and expelling the tyrant". 103 
64. 
The problem became prominent in the years following Dion's assassi-
nation. Callippus had in fact been able to conspire against Dion since 
Dion had not only become alienated from the Syracusans but. had also, it 
would seem, been displaced by Callippus in the allegiance of the 
mercenaries. Callippus had many accomplices, among them some of the 
mercenaries. 104  Callippus was not able to take over smoothly from Dion for 
there was confrontation between his forces and the faction consisting of 
Dion's friends. The latter were defeated and fled to Leontini. 105 
Callippus retained control for only thirteen months for the Dionysian 
family returned with troops and took advantage of Callippusl absence at 
Catana to wrest control of Syracuse from him. 106 
In quick succession the rule was assumed by Hippaxinus (353-351) and 
Nysaeus (351-347), both of whom were Dionysius II's half brothers and 
Dion's nephews. Hipparinus it would appear was assassinated while drunk 107 
and Nisaeus was expelled from Ortygia by Dionysius II 108 who re-established 
full control of Syracuse so that the distinguished citizens had recourse to 
Hicetas who was then ruling Leontini. They approached Hicetas since they 
"felt confidence in one who was a Syracusan by birth and possessed a force 
that was able to cope with that of Dionysius". 109 
The result of the ten years since Dion's return was disastrous for 
Syracuse and for Sicily. Factions were numerous; Dion's friends, 
Dionysius II's group, briefly Hipparinus and Nysaeus, Hicetas and his group, 
and all had their mercenary followers. Hence the advice in Plato's Eighth 
Letter that the contending parties ought to combine as the threat of 
Carthage and the possible barbarization of Sicily was imminent. 110 The 
proposal for the three heads of the various groups to combine ill was 
impracticable in view of the now bitter rivalry, but the principle of a 
strong accepted ruler was sound as the arrival of Timoleon proved. '112 
The general result of the period was the devastation of Sicily as a 
whole, the problem being further exacerbated by the mercenary forces who 
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were out of work and willing to support any who promised pay. 113 It seems 
that none of the contending parties could number a sufficiently over -
whelming mercenary force to gain control and they all lacked the support of 
the citizens. 
(c) Speed,  Secrecy and Personal Violence  
The recourse to speed was noticeable in groups who believed that 
quick decisive action would result in a successful change of government. 
Dionysius I had used the military failure of the generals at Acragas as a 
basis with which to attack the wealthy generals, thereby gaining ascendancy 
himself. In turn, the wealthy used the occasion of Dionysius' evacuation 
of Gela in 405 B.C. to express their discontent. To them, no doubt, his 
despotism was an affront for not only was their own power curtailed, but it 
was replaced by one who was not of the most distinguished families. The 
demonstration was initiated by the cavalry returning from Gela, their 
general dislike of Dionysius having been inflamed by the evacuation. Their 
action has the appearance of a momentary impulse. They entered Syracuse 
ahead of Dionysius, outraged his wife and ransacked the place in a burst of 
futile revenge. 114 Perhaps they genuinely thought that Dionysius was 
deserting to the Carthaginians 115 for apart from seeing to it that the city 
gates were closed they took no real precautions in anticipation of his 
arrival. The people generally were not aroused, probably since the cavalry, 
being among the wealthy, could not rely on their support. After all, the 
people had voted the extraordinary powers to Dionysius in the first place. 116 
Dionysius, on entering Syracuse, killed a few of them and the remainder 
fled to Aetna. The whole action failed since it had been ill-conceived. 
It had in fact been a reaction to a particular situation and had not been 
pre-planned or organised with a view to gaining wide support for their 
opposition. 
A similar spontaneous act as the result of a specific incident was 
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evident in the Syracusan agitation against Dionysius in 396 B.C. On that 
occasion, Theodorus, the spokesman for the Syracusans, used a naval victory 
by the Syracusans during Dionysius' absence to stir up the Syracusans 
against Dionysius. 117  By that time however, Dionysius was far more power-
ful and the failure of the Spartan commander, Pharacidas, to support the 
Syracusams seems to have decided the issue. The Syracusams were in fact 
disorganised and seem to have hoped that Pharacidas would provide the focal 
point for their opposition. 118 
The often mentioned speed with which Dion overthrew Dionysius II is 
not in the same category as the above examples. It is true that he moved 
swiftly from Heracleia Minoa to Syracuse, but the expedition had been 
planned for two or three years and was not unexpected, for although 
Dionysium II was away in Italy at the time, he had left a naval detachment 
under Philistus to intercept the expedition at Iapygia. 119 Because of this, 
the expedition had avoided the coast and sailed through the open sea and 
had been blown off course. 
Allied to the tactic of speed was the necessity, in some cases, for 
secrecy. Hermocrates was secretly admitted to Syracuse, but owing to lack 
of support failed in his attempt. 120 The possibility of groups within the 
city working secretly to plan to overthrow the government (with or without 
outside help) was a factor of which the various leaders were keenly aware. 
Thus the many stories of Dionysius I's fears of plots. 121 Apart from his 
bodyguard, fortress on Ortygia and his disarming of the citizens, his 
methods of security were varied, including a network of both female and 
male spies122 and extraordinary security checks such as the story of his 
testing of the triarchs to ascertain which of them obeyed him 
unquestioningly and which did not. 123 
It was precisely such fears that helped Dionysius II to decide to 
exile Dion. Philistus, one of Dionysius' advisers, alleged that Dion "had 
been in conference with Theodotes and Heracleides concerning a subversion 
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of the government". 124 Dion himself, when established in Syracuse, was 
aware of the possibility of opposition growing against him in secret and it 
was this fear that enabled Callippus to succeed. The stories of Callippus' 
actions are presented to show Dion's nobility and gullibility but the fact 
emerges that Dion had recourse to the use of undercover agents for 
Callippus "was authorized to meet secretly with whom he would and talk 
freely with them against Dion, in order that no lurking malcontents might 
remain undiscovered". 125 Callippus was thus placed in an ideal situation 
to discover the extent of the support upon which he could rely and to 
obtain suitable people to effect Dion's assassination. 126 
Dion's death was also an example of the belief that the removal of a 
person or persons by violence could solve the political situation. This 
was in fact a false belief for while it temporarily weakened a faction, in 
the absence of a positive programme of reform, it did not come to terms 
with the underlying problems which had caused the general discontent. It 
removed the person in power but not the basis upon which such power rested 
or the cause for that power's existence. Thus Callippus replaced Dion as 
leader of Syracuse 127 and was in turn replaced by Hipparinus, Nisaeus and 
Dionysius II. Dionysius II was himself displaced by another single ruler, 
Timoleon, though in that instance, not by personal violence since Dionysius 
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seems to have come to some agreement with Timoleon. 
Violence was not only used against those in positions of authority. 
Dion had used a similar tactic when he had caused Heracleides to be 
murdered128 and it was in part that murder which had led to Syracusan 
discontent with Dion, for Heracleides had been the chief opponent of Dion 
and had, on occasions, worked for the interests of the general populace. 
Earlier, Dionysius I had removed his opposition by effecting the deaths of 
Daphnaeus and Demarchus. 129 But he saw to it that they were denounced as 
traitors and that their deaths were the result of a vote by the assembly, 
thereby at least giving a semblance of justice to his action. 
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In the main, the actions based on spontaneity and personal violence 
achieved no real stability and those which involved secrecy were hampered 
by the very nature of their operation for they were restricted to 
relatively few persons and hence could not necessarily have the guarantee 
of wide support or acceptance. The motives of those engaged in - this- type 
of activity tended to be personal and had as their aim personal ascendancy 
rather than the welfare of Syracuse. 
2. Support 
(a) Group and Family Associations and Loyalties  
A primary source of support for those seeking to take over a govern-
ment or to keep control of the existing government was the range of personal 
friendship ties. These were informal in nature and structure, but since 
they were based on similarity of ideas and attitudes could be used for 
political ends if necessary. 130 
In a system dependent on voting such groups vied with each other for 
the support of the people and tried by their arguments, put forward by 
their best speaker, to persuade the people to adopt their viewpoint. Also, 
no doubt, less creditable means were used such as stacking the assembly or 
coercing it by the presence of force. 131 Dionysius I, once he had become 
general, used such means and the ratification of Dionysius II's position 
was done by an assembly which only had the power to say yes to what was 
alrearly a 'fait accomplP. 132 
But even in an open assembly there were groups who were constantly 
trying to gain ascendancy over their rivals -. The whole debate between 
Athenagoras and Hermocrates before the Athenian expedition of 415 B.C. 
centred around the political attitudes of the two men. Much of Athenagoras' 
attack on Hermocrates' proposals was based on the fear that any extra-
ordinary measures taken because of the need for increased security may have 
led to an oligarchic take—over. 133 The fear makes no sense unless 
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Hermocrates had a band of followers ready to support him in his efforts to 
gain political power. 134 Even after his banishment there was still a group 
of Hermocratean supporters in Syracuse with whom he was in contact when he 
returned to Sicily and it was this group who opened the gates for him in 
his attempted coup d'etat in 408 B.C. 135 
Similarly, Athenagoras must have had a group of supporters in 
415 B.C. He was not only the leader of the demos but also had the most 
influence by his power of persuasion. 136 The debate over preparations for 
the coming Athenian invasion had become a political argument between two 
factions, so much so that one of the generals proposed that no one.else 
ought to speak to the assembly and that they should not be making-attacks -
upon each other but should confine themselves to the point at issuei ---nambly 
the security of Syracuse. 137 
Throughout the war with Athens there was a faction in Syracuse in 
contact with the Athenians and it was on the strength of their advice that 
Nicias counselled non-withdrawal before Demosthenes' arrival. As Plutarch 
commented, "For not a few of the men of Syracuse were in secret communi-
cations with Nicias. They urged him to bide his time, on the ground that 
even now they were worn out by the war and weary of Gylippus, and that if 
their necessities should increase a little, they would give over alto-
gether". 138 They were in contact with Nicias again after the Athenian 
defeat on Epipolae and again Niciaa refused to abandon the siege of 
Syracuse since he had confidence in what they had told him. 139 Hermocrates 
was able to capitalize on Nicias' Syracusan contacts after the final 
Athenian naval defeat by sending a messenger, ostensibly from Nicias" 
friends, who counselled Nicias to postpone his withdrawal. 140 
In 412 B.C., in Hermocrates' absence, Diodes and his colleagues 
were able to gain ascendancy over the assembly to effect constitutional 
changes which made the government even more democratic. 141 The most 
notable change seems to have been the introduction of lot for the election 
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of magistrates, thereby removing the reliance on influence and campaigning 
to secure election. Diodes was also instrumental in securing Hermocrates' 
banishment. Hermocrates' supporters do not seem to have had( the general 
support of the people. Hermocrates was aware of this himself, 143 and hence 
even though he was able to secure Diodes' condemnation he was unable to 
obtain his own recall. 144 
The political function of friendship ties was not always linked to 
loyalty to a particular individual. As Connor remarks in relation to ties 
at Athens, "Through friendship, the man who did not pursue an active 
political career might yet have some say in the decisions of his city. The 
state itself could also benefit. Friendship ties would provide it with 
some stability and continuity that might otherwise be lacking when the 
boule went out of office at the end of the year and a totally new one, 
chosen by lot, came into power. The poliCies espoused in the previous year 
might be carried on by men who were friends of the original formulators, 
and thus knew intimately the background of the proposals". 145 
Such continuity also existed within groups planning to take over the 
government. Thus, although Hermocrates failed, Dionysius came forward as 
leader of the remnant of Hermocrateans, not all of whom had been 
banished. 146 Although the external situation was more precarous when 
Dionysius rose to power and he was able to use that fact to his advantage, 
other factors were also involved in his success. In the first instance 
there was the consolidated plan of his immediate supporters who were 
prepared to play a subordinate role. That they did not fight among them-
selves for leadership was a factor that contributed to their success. Why ,  
however, did they choose Dionysius? In the case of Hipparinus, the motive 
is clear. Although influential, he had squandered his fortune and hoped to 
regain it by supporting Dionysius. 147 But Philistus was in no such circum-
stances and this leads one to conclude that the wealthy clique that backed 
Dionysius did so for a particular reason. I believe the reason can be 
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found in Hermocrates' failure. Hermocrates was not popular with the people 
and hence his surviving supporters looked for someone who would be. Since 
Philistus was wealthy enough to withstand any fine that the presiding 
archons could impose on Dionysius for creating an uproar, 148 Dionysius was 
able to slander the generals in the interest of advancing his own cause. 
Secondly, Dionysiva was able to gain the confidence and credulity of 
the populace. Since he was not classed among the most wealthy and distin-
guished he was able to smear with impunity such sections of that group as 
held power. Thus he was elected to the position of general on the basis of 
his supposed affinity with the interests of the populace. One of Dionysius' 
first actions as general was to effect the recall of exiles, among whom 
were those of his friends who had been involved with Hermocrates in 
408 B.C. 149 
Allied to friendship ties were family ones. Marriages could 
strengthen an existing friendship.jor, in the case of a judicious marriage, 
increase the number and range of supporters. Thus Dionysius cemented his 
friendship with the Hermocrateans by marrying Hermocrates' daughter and 
after her death, allied himself to Hipparinus' family by marrying that 
man's daughter, Aristomache. 150 In this way Dion was connected with the 
ruling family, a connection which was further enhanced by his niece, 
Sophrosyne being married to her halfbrother DionysiusII, and Dion's own 
marriage to his niece, Arete. 151 
As a result of these close ties, Dionysius I left a delicate 
situation when he died in 367 B.C. According to Plutarch and Nepos, Dion 
had wished to confer with Dionysius about dividing his kingdom among 
Aristomache's children (whom presumably he thought he could guide) which 
would have increased his own power and influence. 152 The move was 
unsuccessful but nevertheless Dion was still in a powerful position since 
he had training in governmental procedure in a way in which Dionysius II 
had not. Later, when the rift between Dionysius II and Dion was complete, 
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Dionysius compelled Dion's wife to be remarried to Timocrates, a loyal and 
close follower, thereby severing the closeness of the family tie between 
Dion and himself. 153 
The ties of friendship and family not only meant numerical support 
but also the elevation of friends to positions of honour and power. 
Dionysius I justified Hipparinus' support by restoring his wealth and 
increasing it with gifts to Hipparinus' son, Dion. 154 Dion enjoyed the use 
of this wealth even while in exile, until c. 360 B.C. when Dionysius II 
confiscated Dion's property, an act which he justified by maintaining, on 
the ground of family relationship, that he was Dion's son's trustee. 155 
Dion's position at Syracuse had been the result of his father's connection 
with Dionysius I. Hence he was a trusted friend and adviser to Dionysius 
and was obviously foreign diplomat for him, arranging all-important 
business with the Carthaginians. 156 
Naturally, Dionysius arranged it that relatives or close friends 
held the principal commands. Philistus, like Hipparinus, was rewarded for 
his support. He was made commander of the garrison that guarded the 
citadel, a position he held for a long time. 157 Likewise, Dionysius' 
brother, Leptines, was commander of the fleet until 390 B.C. 158 when the 
position was put in the hands of his other brother, Thearides. Thej;rides 
was also sent with much ostentation to the Olympic Games of 388 B.C. as 
Dionysius' representative and it was that occasion that provoked Lysias' 
invective against Dionysius. 159 
If they became suspect for any reason he just as naturally relieved 
them of their commands. Thus Leptines was relieved of command for pursuing 
a policy contrary to Dionysius' wishes 160 and later, in 386 B.C. both he 
and Philistus were banished since Leptines gave one of his illegitimate 
daughters to Philistus in marriage without having consulted Dionysius. 161 
Leptines was reconciled to Dionysius and was recalled to Syracuse a year 
later where he married Dionysius' daughter and was made commander of land 
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troops. 162 Philistus was recalled by Dionysius II in 367 B.C. 163 
Even under tyrannies coalitions of friends continued to work in 
their own interests. The whole conflict that ended in Dion's banishment 
was between Philistus and his supporters and Dion and his friends. 
Philistus was successful and that success was due in part to his allegation 
that Dion "had been in conference with Theodotes and Heracleides concerning 
a subversion of the government". 164 Even after Dion's exile the coalition 
of friends continued to operate for when Heracleides was allegedly 
implicated in the trouble with the mercenaries c. 361/360 B.C., Theodotes 
and a certain Eurybius tried to mediate on his behalf. They were 
unsuccessful and Plato's involvement with them led to Dionysius.,II's 
assertion that Plato could not be a friend to both him and. Theodotes' 
165 group. 
Dion in fact kept contact with his friends in Syracuse when he was 
in exile. He also acquired new ones from his association with the 
Academy. These new friends were a source of both moral and active support. 
Speusippus worked for Dion's interests when he was at Syracuse in 361/360 
B.C. 166  and some members notably Callippus and the seer Mites were part 
of the expedition of 357 B.C. It was Dion's alienation from his friends 
that in part motivated his later assassination. 167 The Academy was not a 
political group as such, but as Gouldner remarked, "Far from politically 
uninvolved .... Plato's Academy seems to have contending, politically 
animated factions within it; far from politically uninvolved, members and 
students of Plato's Academy are engaged in the most desperate forms of 
politics — they teach themselves the postgraduate seminar in politics : 
military coups, espionage, intrigue, duplicity and assassination". 168 
In the long term, the existence of rival groups, 
structured, was not conducive to a lasting stability. 
worked primarily in their own interests and not for the 
Syracuse. 169 When those interests were compatible with 
albeit loosely 
The various groups 
general welfare of 
those of Syracuse, 
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as in the case of Dionysius I, who promised to solve the problem of the 
Carthaginians and did, stability resulted. When the interests were not 
those of Syracuse, the personal interests came first. In effect this was 
the case with Callippus' action for by the murder of Dion a power vacuum 
resulted and instability arose as a result of the rivalry of the various 
groups who wished to fill that vacuum. 
Moreover, the ties of friendship were not static but had the 
capacity to change with different circumstances. Dionysius I's friends 
were loyal to him and this, combined with his tight control of the armed 
forces, enabled him to retain control. Dion however, was not able to 
command a similar loyalty and he failed as a result of his alienation. So 
too, when two powerful groups existed the support of one led to the 
alienation of the other. This was the problem that Dionysius II faced and 
his support of Philistus and his friends was at the expense of Dion's 
group. This was the first stage in the series of events that led to 
Dionysius II's first expulsion. 
Furthermore, the links by marriage could be altered by death or 
divorce. In the case of family bonds, while they could create a strong 
bond of loyalty, they also contained the potential for bitter family feuds 
and rivalry as in fact occurred after Dion's death when Dionysius II was in 
opposition to his half-brothers, finally assuming power by expelling 
NYsaeus in 347/346 B.C. 
(b) Use of the People  
The populace as a whole was used for support either by manipulating 
its voting capacity, or more directly by numerical support for a cause. 
That they often responded readily attests to the fact that they felt that 
real problems existed and that these problems would be solved by supporting 
a particular person whom they believed would improve their position. Their 
at least tacit support was necessary for the smooth operation of the 
government or for the successful transference of power, and it was the lack 
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of this that had resulted in the failures of Hermocrates, the cavalry in 
opposition to Dionysius, Dion and the oligarchic Six Hundred. 
The people were called in on various pretexts, often of the most 
general kind. Dionysius I had gained support by an effective use of 
duplicity. The Syracusan government at the time was democratic, but 
D- lonysius treated it as if it were an unpopular oligarchy. 170 Eventually 
he was successful in having himself elected cr -r p7y or .(01,-„ga7,..„0.171 The  
problem of this position was that it does not seem to have had a time limit 
imposed for there was no such qualifying clause as 'until the end of the 
war with the Carthaginians', which was, after all, the reason for the 
extraordinary command. Presumably the position was subject to review 
annually, but once a bodyguard had been voted, albeit by a later stacked 
assembly at Leontini, there was very little the people could do to force 
Dionysius to relinquish command. In fact, according to Diodorus, the 
Syracusans repented their elevation of Dionysius after that assembly had 
adjourned, 172 but before another assembly was convened Dionysius had 
secured his bodyguard. 
Once Dionysius was in control the people were dependent on a spokes-
man who could put forward their interests or co-ordinate them in concerted 
action. The inability of the people to initiate independent action for any 
length of time was the reason for Dionysius' success in quelling the only 
serious opposition from the people in 404 B.C. 173 After that, Dionysius 
had little trouble in suppressing any opposition as he did with the trouble 
in 396 B.C. when Theodorus spoke out against him. 174 He then seems to have 
courted the people's goodwill for "he won the favour of the multitude by 
kindly words, honouring some of them with gifts and inviting them to 
general banquets". 175 When Dionysius II assumed control he was accepted by 
the Syracusan assembly without opposition. Dionysius I had in fact gained 
the support of the people and had continued to enjoy it due, no doubt, not 
only to his largess, but also to his moderate nature and ladk of excesses 
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and violence. 176 
The problem of the general elevated by the people continued to 
threaten the stability of Syracuse. Dion in this context was just another 
side of the same coin. Having gained the support of the country people 
around Syracuse and the welcome of the citizens in Syracuse, both he and 
his brother, by virtue of their role as liberators of Syracuse were 
elected generals with absolute power. Twenty others were chosen to be 
their colleagues, although in what capacity is obscure. 177 From the 
subsequent events it appears that their position was very much a 
subordinate one. 
But without having taken Dionysius II's stronghold, Ortygia, Dion 
had to be careful to retain the support of the people and his problems in 
this area illustrate the precarious nature of support by the people and the 
extent to which the people were persuaded by what they were told. They 
were always liable to be influenced by counter-propaganda. Dionysius II 
was aware of this and hence he tried, when he was besieged on Ortygia, to 
undermine the people's faith in Dion. This he did by means of a subversive 
letter to Dion, supposedly from Dion's son, Hipparinus. 178 The manoeuvre 
was successful for the people became suspicious of Dion and his family 
connections with the tyrant. 
It was at this point that Heracleides arrived with reinforcements 
for the revolutionaries and the whole question of the allegiance of the 
people became highlighted for they now had an alternative leader. His late 
arrival was attributed by Diodorys to a delay through storms, but by 
Plutarch to a quarrel between Heracleides and Dion back in the 
Peloponnese. 179 Whatever the reason, they soon quarrelled in Syracuse and 
the quarrel was over command. 180 Heracleides' arrival was a threat to Dion 
since the people "at once turned their eyes towards other leaders". 181 
Heracleides was originally a friend of Dion, 182 but it would appear that 
the friendship was by now rather strained. It is difficult to assess 
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Heracleides' position accurately for the sources are generally pro—Dion and 
hence Heracleides suffers by comparison. Although Plutarch acknowledged 
his military capacity he qualified it by saying that he was "irresolute, 
fickle and least to be relied upon in an enterprise involving power and 
glorr• 183 This assessment may well have been the result of attempts by 
pro—Dion sources to justify his murder for from the time of his arrival 
until his death he was quite resolute and consistent in his opposition to 
Dion, although his activities'were limited because of Dion's tight control 
over affairs, a control which he appears to have had no intention of 
relinquishing. 
The whole problem seems to be that Heracleides was popular with the 
people in a way that Dion was not. Heracleides was, in fact, a man of 
great . distinction184 and "had no less influence with the aristocrats than 
Dion and by them he was unanimously chosen to command the fleet". 185 
take this to mean that he was their candidate for the position, for it was 
the people's confidence in him that resulted, according to Plutarch, in 
their calling an assembly of their own and choosing Heracleides to be 
admiral. 186 Moreover, the people believed that Heracleides was free from 
any aims at tyrannical power187 and hence they preferred him to Dion. Thus 
the people tried to initiate action of their own and in so doing tried to 
show the dependence of leaders on their support. 
Dion's reaction was both immediate and unreasonable. He could not 
forbear to share the command188 and he complained that he would no longer 
be 0-7/47yes.odro/90arwp if he had to relinquish the naval command. 189 
There was no logic in this assertion for Dion was supposed to be sharing 
absolute power with Megacles and was assisted in some way or other by 
twenty colleagues. But these were probably supporters or followers of Dion 
in a way that Heracleides was not. At Dion's instigation the Syracusans 
reluctantly revoked the command and then he himself called an assembly and 
appointed HeraCleides admiral and persuaded the people to let Heracleides 
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have a bodyguard like his own. 190 What in effect Dion did was to make it 
clear that all appointments were to be subject to his approval, that 
Heracleides was to owe his position to Dion's favour, and that the assembly 
was not to take independent action. 
Heracleides however, due to his influence with the people, was able 
to oppose Dion's supremacy. Through the agency of Hippo three popular 
measures were proposed and passed : a land redistribution, a measure to 
deprive the mercenaries of their pay, and a proposal to elect new generals. 
Twenty-five generals were elected, Heracleides among them. 191 Since 
Dionysius II had left Ortygia, leaving his son in charge, it would seem 
that Heracleides and the other generals felt that they could maintain the 
siege merely with the support of the citizens and hence continued employ-
ment of the mercenaries was unnecessary. 192 But the citizen force was 
badly disciplined and ill-organized and as a force, in the absence of a 
strong single authority, they were particularly vulnerable to the more 
experienced professional mercenaries still on Ortygia. Dionysius' 
commander, Nypsius, was able to break through the siege wall, pour into the 
city and wreak havoc on the virtually defenceless citizens. 193 
The Syracusans were then forced to seek help from Dion again. There 
was, however, dissension within Syracuse for although the cavalry and "more 
respectable citizens" urged Dion to come back, the generals maintained that 
the situation was under control and that Dion's help was not needed. 194 
Due to the perilous situation created by the attacks of Nypsius' troops, 
the Syracusans were forced to admit Dion and his mercenaries to drive 
Nypsius' forces back to the garrison. 
Dion was again elected er7.elyos au-rem/0/747i a command which 
originally included both land and sea forces but, since this was opposed by 
the sailors and day-labourers, Dion was forced to yield command of the sea 
to Heracleides. 195 Since many of these men would have been the rowers of 
the ships, together with the fact that they may well have commanded a 
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majority in the assembly, Dion was forced to concede the issue, particu-
larly as Dionysius' forces were still on Ortygia and a disaffected navy 
would have swung the balance in Dionysius' favour. On the matter of land 
redistribution, an issue which did not directly affect the military 
situation but did affect the class structure, Dion was firm and he repealed 
the earlier decree despite the displeasure of the people. 196 
The rivalry continued, the 'better class of Syracusans' maintaining 
that Heracleides was in collusion with Dionysius II, while the sailors and 
soldiers with Heracleides when he was stationed at Messana believing that 
Dion intended to make himself tyrant. 197 The situation became somewhat 
critical with the people in Syracuse running short of provisions when the 
two groups were reconciled by the Spartan adventurer, Gaesylus. Part of 
the compromise was the discharge of the fleet "since it was of no use, 
while it involved great outlays for the crews, and caused dissension among 
the commanders". 198 With a concentrated effort on the siege of Ortygia, 
Dionysius II's son, Apollocrates, was forced to, come to terms with Dion, 
abandon the citadel and its arms, and sail across to Italy. 
After the expulsion of Dionysius II's forces the relationship 
between Dion and the people worsened. Nepos claimed that Dion "distributed 
among the soldiers the property of those who were opposed to him", 199 and 
it would appear that he had to resort to such confiscations to meet 
expenses. This would have become necessary since there was a shortage of 
money as the Syracusans had been unable to pay the mercenaries earlier and 
had, in part, disbanded the fleet as an economic measure. Moreover, 
Plutarch, who made a point of applauding Dion's way of life, mentioned that 
he was generous to his allies, particularly his Athenian associates, and to 
his mercenaries, to an extent that was "beyond his resources". 2  
Not only did Dion not relinquish his extraordinary command, but he 
also tried to keep control of the government and influence the Syracusan 
way of life. On the level of everyday life he was anxious to curb the 
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Syracusans who were apparently given to excess licence and luxury; 201 and 
in regard to the government, he felt himself to be in a position whereby he 
could invite men to attend the council, an issue upon which Heracleides 
seized. Such highhanded behaviour, together with the failure to demolish 
the fortifications on Ortygia exacerbated the relationship between Dion 
and other Syracusans and the murder of his rival, Heracleides, was keenly 
resented. 202 Consequently, Callippus became confident that he could 
replace Dion. 
In general, the people could be swayed by emotive appeals on class 
grounds, fear of the closeness of war, which resulted in their granting of 
extraordinary commands, fear of replacing one tyrant with another, the 
latter fear being all the more valid, given the political situation of the 
first half of the Fourth Century B.C. As a group they needed a leader 
either to advocate their cause or to organize them for military action. As 
such they were subject to the pressure of the most powerful commander or 
the most persuasive speaker, often responding to what were immediate 
situations. These leaders did not necessarily work in the interests of 
Syracuse as a whole, but rather in the interest of their own position and 
power. Without a leader who was backed by force, but willing to work in 
their interests, there was very little the people could do and any 
spontaneous uprising or independent action was shortlived and bound to be 
unsuccessful when opposed by a commander with mercenary forces. 203 
(c) The Role of Exiles  
Exile was a convenient method for one group to get rid of any leader 
or group that appeared to be too powerful. The alternative method, death, 
was not always possible unless the leader could gain a conviction on the 
basis of alleged treachery as did Dionysius I against Daphnaeus and 
Demarchus or was ruthless and powerful enough to silenceopposition by 
wholesale slaughter, as did Agathocles. Exile, however, produced a group 
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of people who had cause to resent their city and who were willing to regain 
their status by effecting an overthrow of the government that had banished 
them. 
For co-ordinated action, exiles needed two things, a leader and a 
base from which to operate. Hermocrates, by establishing himself at 
Selinus in 409 B.C., created such a base. 204 From there he was able to 
ravage the Carthaginian territory in Sicily (Hannibal's main forces had 
returned to Carthage) thereby gaining prestige for himself, and by 
returning the bones of the dead Syracusans who had fallen at Himera, 
embarrassing the Syracusan generals who had neglected to do this. He was 
also able to keep in contact with his friends in Syracuse who, when other 
means of diplomatic intrigue had failed, were able to open the gates for 
him. His base was also the focal point for such Sicilians as had been left 
homeless by the Carthaginian invasion and no doubt for other Syracusan 
exiles as well. In all, he gathered a force of six thousand, of which only 
one thousand were mercenaries. 205 
Similarly, the cavalry who opposed Dionysius I in 405 B.C., 
established themselves at Aetna 206 when they were exiled and from there 
went in support of the people's uprising in the following year. On the 
failure of that uprising, some seven thousand Syracusans joined the 
cavalry. 207 Dionysius offered them lenient terms and some returned, but 
many remained at Aetna waiting for the opportunity to go against him. 
Dionysius was able to take the place without too much effort in 403 B.C. 208 
and the exiles were forced to flee to Rhegium where they continued to try 
and influence that government in its anti-Dionysian policy. 209 To 
forestall the use of Aetna as a refuge, and to increase his security on the 
island, Dionysius planted an outpost there. 
The disinclination of Dionysius II to have a powerful or influential 
exile in opposition to him was, I believe, the reason for the vagueness 
about Dion's departure. 210 I would contend that he was politely invited to 
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leave indefinitely. Aelian simply stated that he was driven out, 211 but 
Plato asserted that Dion was plotting against the tyranny 212 and this is in 
agreement with the account in Plutarch. 213 But the pretext seems somewhat 
obscure. That Dion had advised the Carthaginians to deal through him 
together with Dionysius II hardly seems treasonable, particularly if Dion 
still held the position of foreign diplomat as he had done under 
Dionysius I. 214 
If, as Plato asserted, 215 Syracuse was in a state of (776te1s at that 
time, then Dion's removal makes more sense. The statement is also 
confirmed by Plutarch's remark that the Syracusans were cheered by the 
expectation of some revolutionary action when they heard of Dion's 
departure , 216 indicating that the rift must have been well known, as well 
as Dionysius II's attempt to make light of the incident. Dionysius could 
not afford to take the risk of possible subversive action on the part of 
Dion, nor, it would seem, could he. alienate Dion's influential connections 
by a formal exile. 
I would assert, therefore, that the letter to Carthage was merely a 
—pretext which was stretched to gain his point in the absence of the 
necessary solid proof of the suspected underground activity. Removing Dion 
removed the key to a potential supply of force for any opposition, for not 
only was Dion able to afford to equip forces himself, there was also the 
possibility of Carthaginian support since Dion had the goodwill of the 
Carthaginians. No doubt it was in the interests of Carthage to have a 
Syracuse weakened .by civil strife or a government sympathetic to 
Carthage. 217 It also removed a powerful person who had close ties with the 
tyranny and may well have supported the claims of Dionysius I's other 
sons. 218 
After his departure, Dion had adherents in Syracuse who sent him his 
revenues and "other things", 219 and in view of these connections, 
Dionysius II felt compelled to counsel Plato to urge Dion not to seek to 
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v€0u-r-rfilet/ while in Greece. 220 The official reason for Dion's departure 
was, of course, different and came in the form of a public statement that 
Dion had merely gone on a journey. This was an attempt to allay the fears 
of Dion's relatives and to quell the unrest of some of the court. To 
confirm this view Dionysius II sent Dion two ships with some of his wealth 
and allowed the revenues of his property to be sent to him. 221 
There was also an element of secrecy about the circumstances 
relating to Dion's actual departure. 222 It was a hushed up affair and it 
was this, I believe, that led Diodorus to report the story that Dion left 
of his own accord in fear of an impending accusation. 223 The departure of 
the two vessels with Dion's possessions was, however, no secret and these 
left after Dion's departure. Since Plutarch mentioned that these ships 
were in the command of Dion's kinsmen it was presumably at this stage that 
224 Dion's brother, Megacles left. 	More important was the connection 
between Heracleides and Dion's exile. They had obviously had close contact 
in Syracuse otherwise there would have been no point to the accusations of 
Philistus. 225 I will not deal here with how Heracleides came to be with 
Dion in Greece, 226 but obviously the two worked together in Greece and the 
return to Sicily was a joint venture, in theory at least. 
While in Greece Dion took the opportunity to promote his cause by 
gaining the goodwill of the Greek cities, including the Spartans, who made 
him a citizen, a rare honour on any occasion and not one in keeping with 
the spirit of their alliance with Dionysius. 227 In effect, Dion's actions 
in Greece were regarded as subversive and it was as a result of those 
actions that Dionysius began to fear Dion's popularity and therefore 
stopped sending him the revenues from his property. Much of Dion's 
prestige and influence had been the result of the status he had acquired 
from the use of the wealth derived from that property. When Dionysius 
confiscated and Bold Dion's property he made Dion publicly and formally an 
•exile. 228 
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The conduct of Dion in Greece showed what an influential exile could 
do. Nevertheless, the force that Dion took with him to Sicily was compara-
tively small. 229 Significantly, very few of the Syracusan exiles joined 
him. 230 Dion arrived at Minoa and by marching overland to Syracuse was 
able to enlarge his numbers from people from the surrounding cities, as 
well as from the country folk of Syracuse. 231 
At the end of the Fourth Century B.C. the opposition of Deinocrates 
to Agathocles showed what a large co-ordinated body of exiles could do to 
hamper the effectiveness of the government. On this occasion, although the 
core of his followers were Syracusans, his numbers were swelled by exiles 
from other Sicilian Greek cities, exiles who had also been displaced by 
Agathocles. The exiles also had the support of the Carthaginians. 232 The 
coalition was created in 312 B.C. and it was as a result of a severe 
reverse from this coalition, together with the loss of control of Sicily 
with the exception of Syracuse, that Agathocles conceived of his plan of 
carrying the war into Africa. 233 
The coalition in Sicily remained in force until 309 B.C., when the 
death of the Carthaginian general resulted in a division of the forces. 
Acragas then briefly took up the cause of Sicilian freedom, possibly with 
the intention of gaining control herself 234 and the condition of Sicily was 
sufficiently unsettled for Agathocles to feel compelled to return to Sicily 
and leave his son in charge of the African forces. 235 On the death of the 
Acragantine general, Xenodocus, in 307 B.C. Deinocrates, with his band of 
exiles, again led the forces opposed to Agathocles. 236 
The situation became all the more serious when one of Agathocles' 
generals, Pasiphilus, having heard of the revolt of Agathocles' Ifrican 
army in Libya, deserted with his forces to Deinocrates. 237 Agathocles was 
forced to negotiate with Deinocrates 238 who was by then commanding a force 
of twenty thousand soldiers and three thousand cavalry and had gained 
control of several cities in Sicily. 239 Although initially unsuccessful in 
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his overtures, it would appear that some agreement was reached between the 
two men, for in 305 B.C. Agathocles successfully defeated Deinocrates' 
forces, only a fraction of which were actually involved in the fighting. 240 
After that defeat, the effective opposition of exiles to Agathocles' rule 
was quelled. 
In the absence of wealth or sufficient numbers, exiles could and did 
gain the assistance of other powers willing to reinstate them in the 
interest of gaining a hold over Syracuse. Some Syracusan exiles were with 
Nicias on the Athenian expedition and gave him advice about the topography 
of the place: "Some Syracusan exiles who were with them had told them of a 
piece of ground near Olympeium, which was the place they did occupy in the 
end since it was a position where the cavalry could do then no harm to 
speak of". 241 
Dion not only gained moral support from the Greeks for his return, 
but was assisted by the Carthaginians, for although they gave no active 
support, the commander at Minoa allowed Dion to march through his territory 
and agreed to send the surplus weapons and armour on after him, thus 
allowing Dion to make a swift march through Sicily. 
The cities of Sicily were possibly havens for Syracusan exiles and 
their capacity as such may well have determined Dionysius I in his policy 
of planting mercenaries at Catana, Sicels at Naxos242 and of giving the 
lands of Leontini in lieu of payment to his mercenaries. The exile would 
use such places as a base from which to harass the government at Syracuse. 
At the very least the fact that Greek cities were independent units and 
prepared to harbour exiles favoured the cause of revolutionaries. For as 
Balogh noted, while revolutionaries knew the risk they ran by plotting a 
change of government, "it was only necessary, if such a plot ended in 
failure, to reach the border, and it would be fairly possible to lead a 
satisfactory, though non—political life elsewhere". 243 
Certainly the exiles who established themselves at Aetna had to be 
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expelled and once Dionysius I had control of Eastern Sicily, Rhegium 
offered asylum to exiles from Syracuse and the other Sicilian cities. 244 
One of the exiles, Heloris, they chose to be their general to lay siege to 
Messana and they settled the Naxians and Catanians at Mylae. 245 Neither 
plan was successful, except in that it drew Dionysius' attention to Italy 
once more and hence he attacked them in 393 B.C. and again in 390 B.C., 
finally taking the place in 388/387 B.C. 
To gain support for a cause, the recall of exiles was sometimes 
advocated. One of Dionysius' first acts in 406 B.C. was to do this. These 
were men whom the democracy had exiled and included those involved with 
Hermocrates' abortive coup. The returning exiles owed their reinstatement 
to Dionysius and would therefore be ready to support him. Dionysius II, 
when he assumed the rule, also recalled the exiles, possibly as a popular 
measure and possibly in the hope that factional strife would cease. 
Thus, while exile was used as a means of getting rid of opponents 
and was therefore an attempt at stability, at the same time it created a 
body of malcontents who were willing to support whomsoever recalled them or 
who were prepared to effect their return by overthrowing the existing 
government. 
(d) Allies and the Extent of Outside Intervention  
In support of their cause revolutionaries often sought help from 
other powers. This support could either be a tacit one insofar as other 
cities provided a refuge for exiles, or it could be active in that they 
provided manpower and arms for the revolutionaries. The four most obvious 
areas for support were the Greek cities of Sicily and Italy, the native 
population on the island, the major powers of Mainland Greece, and Carthage. 
(i) Greek Cities of Sicily and Italy  
There was a duality in the relationship between Syracuse and these 
cities. Just as the government in Syracuse wished to have governments in 
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these cities which were favourable to their own, or were prepared to accept 
Syracusan overlordship, particularly under such strong rulers as Dionysius T 
and Agathocles, so too, the cities themselves (or elements within them) 
were prepared to support revolutionaries, not so much because of political 
ideology, but because they hoped that the overthrow of the particular 
government at Syracuse would mean a loosening of Syracusan dominance and, 
at times, of gaining their own autonomy. In the period in question here, 
the principal cities in Sicily who were prepared to support revolutionaries 
were Leontini, Messana and Acragas. 246 
Leontini, being close to Syracuse geographically and possessing a 
strategic position overlooking the corn-producing Leontine plain, was the 
most affected by Syracusan affairs. Her independence had been threatened 
by Syracuse in the last quarter of the Fifth Century B.C. It was probably 
fear of Syracusan dominance that had led to the renewal of her alliance 
with Athens in 433 B.C. 247 By 427 B.C. she was at war with Syracuse and 
appealed for help from Athens. 246 Although that help was given the result 
was inconclusive. It would appear that Leontini was at that time 
democratic, but with a strong oligarchic party opposing them for when in 
c. 423 B.C. a decision was made to enrol new members as citizens, the 
oligarchs appealed to Syracuse and Syracuse, not averse to using the 
internal situation at Leontini to further her own expansionist aims, drove 
the common populace out of the city, but then transferred the oligarchs to 
Syracuse, made them Syracusan citizens and Leontini became Syracusan. 249 
A little later some of the oligarchs returned to Leontini and, on 
being joined by the scattered populace, kept up a war against Syracuse, 
establishing themselves in one part of the town, but Leontini proper 
remained Syracusan. It was these exiles who appealed to Athens in 416 
B. C . 250 v 	On the Athenian withdrawal, Leontini no longer had any semblance 
of independence and it can be assumed that the opposition of the exiles 
was flushed out. It was spoken of as an outpost (600 ,7/ov) of Syracuse 
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when Dionysius went there to acquire his bodyguard. 251 Its status was, 
however, a precarious one, for it was always capable of pursuing a policy 
in opposition to Syracuse. 
In 406 B.C. its population became further diversified when the 
refugees from Acragas were settled there 252 and it must have been at this 
point that the Leontines in Syracuse revolted and returned to their own 
city. 253 Its independence and autonomy was granted in the peace made 
between Dionysius I and the Carthaginians in 405 B.C., but it must have 
remained opposed to him for he campaigned against it in 403 B.C., and 
finally removed the inhabitants from there to Syracuse. 254 In 396 B.C. the 
city was given to Dionysius' mercenaries. 255 Nevertheless, it continued to 
be a base for revolutionary activity. In 356 B.C., on Dion's arrival in 
Sicily, it revolted from Dionysius II 256 and it provided a refuge for Dion 
and his mercenaries when they fell from favour with the Syracusan 
populace. 257 The people of Leontini, descendants of Dionysius I's 
mercenaries, were sympathetic to the cause of the mercenaries and granted 
them civic rights. At a meeting of allies (*.‘.-X04), presumably those 
allied against Dionysius II, the Syracusan action was denounced. 258 
In 353/352 it continued to harbour political refugees for the 
friends of Dion, having been unsuccessful against Callippus, fled there. 259 
When Dionysius II regained Syracuse in 346 B.C., the "best and most noble" 
of the Syracusans went to Hicetas who had by then made himself tyrant of 
Leontini. They chose Hicetas as their general and it was from Leontini 
that they appealed to Corinth for help. 260 Hicetas then used Leontini as a 
base for operations against both Dionysius II and later, Timoleon. When 
Timoleon transplanted the population to Syracuse, 261 he presumably 
resettled it with new colonists, after which it seems to have ceased 
playing an active political role for it was not prominent at all in the 
coalitions supporting or opposing Agathocles. 
Messana was also prepared to support the cause of Syracusan exiles 
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or revolutionaries. In 404 B.C. they responded to an appeal from the 
Syracusans when they revolted from Dionysius 19 sending, together with the 
Rhegians, eighty manned triremes. 262 What exact action they were involved 
in is not known, but presumably they left after the Syracusans had given 
Dionysius permission to sail away, for the three hundred mercenaries who 
came by sea to help Dionysius had no difficulty in landing at Syracuse. 263 
Messana was ,often a refuge for exiles. It was these exiles who 
prompted the Messanians to make the abortive expedition with the Rhegians 
against Dionysius in 399 B.C. 264 In the following year, Dionysius gained 
their goodwill by granting them a large tract of land on their borders. 265 
During the subsequent war with Carthage, the city was razed to the ground, 
after which Dionysius re—established the place with a population of one 
thousand Locrians and four thousand Medmaeans. 266 This was a population 
favourable to himself and he further secured the place by planting a 
garrison there. From the story in Polyaenus it appears that he worked 
together with a section of the Messanian population and that he created and 
abetted a situation of t,"92‘ 07f upon which he could capitalize. 267 
But such loyalties were not long—lived. In 357 B.C. the Messanians 
helped Dion in his overthrow of Dionysius II 268 and they provided a base at 
which Timoleon's forces could land in 344 B.C. After the expulsion of the 
tyrant Hippo by Timoleon, the Messanians regained their autonomy and once 
again harboured exiles so that later Agathocles was forced to take action 
against them. 269 Agathocles finally forced them to expel the Syracusan 
exiles and to receive back their own exiles, 270 men who were antagonistic 
to the Messanian government and who would, at the very least; weaken the 
place through internal dissension. He also killed those known to be 
opposed to his rule. 
Acragas was also a strong supporter of Syracusan exiles. In 357 
B.C., together with the Geloans, Camarinaeans and Messamians they aided 
Dion in his march to 8yracuse. 271 Forty years later they provided a haven 
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for the large number of Syracusans who fled from Agathocles' revolution. 272 
From Acragas, the exiles organised a war against Agathocles and were joined 
by Gela and Messana, 273 peace being made at the instigation of the 
Carthaginians. 274 
Of the cities in Italy, the two who were the most embroiled with 
Syracusan and Sicilian affairs were Locri and Rhegium. Locri remained a 
faithful ally of the Dionysii until the slaughter of Dionysius II'sfamily 
after he had returned to Syracuse in 347 B.C. Rhegium, on the other hand, 
was constantly anti-Syracusan in general and anti-Dionysian in particular. 
During the Athenian invasion she had been pro-Athenian and after the rise 
of Dionysius she had been prepared, together with the Messanians, to help 
the people of Syracuse against him. 
In 398 B.C. Rhegium rejected the alliance implied in the marriage 
proposal of Dionysius 275 and in 394 B.C. offered asylum to all those 
expelled from Sicily by him. 276 Under the leadership of the exiled 
Syracusan general, Heloris, they attacked Messana, but after a series of 
campaigns against them Dionysius took the city in 388/387 B.C. 277 The city 
was refounded by Dionysius II and became a convenient base at which 
Timoleon could land and helped him to elude the Carthaginians and cross 
into Sicily. 278 
(ii) The Native Population of Sicily  
Of the native population, the Sicels had the most potential for 
involvement in Syracusan affairs. The Sicans remained a scattered 
population in the western section of the island and showed little interest 
in the Greek cities at all. The Elymians, mainly at Segesta, although 
being partly responsible for bringing in the Athenians and the 
Carthaginians at the end of the Fifth Century B.C. for support in their 
territorial disputes with Selinus, likewise showed little interest in 
Eastern Sicily. 
The Sicel centres of the inland and those who were subject to 
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Syracuse could, however, be approached for support against the Syracusan 
government. 279 In the advent of foreign invasion, steps were taken by the 
Syracusans to secure their loyalty. 280 It was part of Alcibiades' plan to 
form alliances with the independent Sicels and to detach the,others from 
Syracusan subjection. 281 Some joined the Athenians, 282 but others sided 
with Gylippus. 283 This difference of policy among the Sicels reveals.that 
they were by no means a cohesive body. In the Fourth Century B.C. the 
independent Sicel towns played little part in the conflicts over Syracuse. 
Dionysius I had conceded their independence in his treaty with Carthage in 
405 B.C. 284 Later he conducted campaigns against them and secured their 
loyalty by a network of garrisons. But he was also careful to cultivate 
their friendship. This he did by his lenient treatment of them as at 
Enna285 and by granting them territory as in the case of the territory of 
the Naxians which he gave to the neighbouring Sicels when he destroyed 
Naxos. 286 
But there was no active attempt to enlist the support of the Sicels 
in domestic conflicts. Some are mentioned as having joined Dion and some 
were involved with Timoleon on his arrival in Sicily. 287 Presumably some 
were also among the men of the inland towns who supported Agathocles, 288 
but by then the Sicels had become very much Hellenized and since the whole 
of the eastern area had received an influx of Greek settlers after 
Timoleon's victory, the distinction between Greek and Sicel had became 
negligible. 
What is more surprising is the lack of positive action on the part 
of those Sicels who had been subject to the Syracusans. Although the 
treaty of 405 B.C. had secured Sicel independence one would reasonably 
expect that those living within Syracusan territory would have remained in 
a subordinate position. That there was no agitation from them in the 
internal conflicts in the Fourth Century B.C. inclines me toward the 
/289 attractive suggestion made by Mosse 	that it was in fact these Sicels who 
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were referred to in the complaint by Theodorus when he said that Dionysius 
had given the wives of banished nobles to slaves. 290 They were also the 
same group that had become New Citizens at the beginning of his rule, 291 
and must be distinguished from the usual type of domestic slave who was 
freed during a time of crisis to help fight the Carthaginians but was 
returned to his master once the danger had passed. 292 
(iii) Mainland Greece  
The two main cities of Greece, Athens and Sparta, were not concerned 
with the internal politics of Syracuse in the Fourth Century B.C., and 
neither helped Syracusan exiles nor the Syracusan government in any 
official capacity. In the case of Sparta, she morally supported the 
tyranny of the Dionysii, allowed mercenaries to be recruited from the 
Peloponnese, and occasionally sent captains to help them. 293 In return, 
the Dionysii helped Sparta with whom they had an alliance. 294 It was in 
fact Sparta's non—action against Dionysius I to which Lysias drew attention 
in his Olympic oration. 295 
The Athenian attitude was a little more complex. Shehlad been 
willing to form alliances with the cities in Sicily and as Westlake 
remarked, at the time of the Peloponnesian War the Athenians "welcomed the 
opportunities afforded by these alliances to establish their influence 
firmly in Sicily and to curb the increasing power of the Syracusans, who, 
it was believed, might well send naval and financial aid to the Dorians of 
the Peloponnese". 296 However, it must be remembered that the Athenian 
expedition of 415 B.C. was not primarily aimed at disrupting the Syracusan 
political situation, but rather at securing Sicily under Athenian leader-
ship. That Nicias later had contact with a certain group within the city 
was typical of Greek strategy. 297 The Athenians had been called in by 
other Sicilian cities hostile to Syracuse, they had not been called in By 
an internal faction within Syracuse, and despite Alcibiades' assertion, the 
93. 
Syracusans remained remarkably united, and under the leadership Of 
Gylippus, successfully defeated the Athenians. 
In the Fourth Century B.C.,' Athens, like Sparta, recognized the 
Dionysii as the government of Syracuse, finally securing an alliance with 
them in 368/367 B.C. 298 The actions of those of the Academy who supported 
Dion were not reflective of official Athenian policy. In fact, the 
embarrassment of Plato about the part played by members of the Academy in 
Dion's expedition accounts for the apologetic nature of the Seventh Letter 
in which he was at pains to show that he was basically neutral in the 
matter and that the actions of Callippus in Syracusan politics were neither 
a reflection on the Academy nor on Athens. 299 
However, Corinth, as the mother city of Syracuse, was a natural 
place for appeals to be sent. But this does not mean that such appeals 
were always acted upon. The response of Corinth to the Syracusan appeal 
for help against the Athenians had been as much a response to anti-Athenian 
sentiment as to pro-Syracusan feeling. 300  Moreover, it was a response to 
the Syracusan government in its fight against external aggression and was 
not related to Syracusan domestic politics. 
In the Fourth Century B.C. we hear of two appeals made by Syracusan 
exiles to Corinth; the first from Dion in 358/357 B.C. 301 and the sedond 
from the exiles stationed at Leontini in 346 B.C. 302 In the first instance, 
as far as we know, there was no response, but in the second there was. 
This shows an inconsistency in Corinthian policy which is not readily 
explainable. A review of the circumstances surrounding the two appeals is 
necessary. 
When Dion made his appeal, the position of the Dionysii was well 
established and had been so for almost fifty years. Furthermore, the ties 
between Corinth and Syracuse were not particularly strong at that time, nor 
indeed after Timoleon's expedition, and consisted mainly of the formal ties 
between the mother city and its colony. 303 The lack of response to Dion's 
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• appeal and his expedition 3" is indicative of Corinth's neutrality of 
attitude and Plutarch, when writing about the appeal made in 346 B.C., had 
no real foundation for praising the city's hatred of tyranny, 305 nor did 
Diodorus when he claimed that "the Corinthians concluded that it was only 
right to assist people who were offshoots of themselves". 306 They had 
certainly shown no such inclination before. The presence of Nicoteles, the 
Corinthian, as a leader of the rebellion in 404 B.C. 307 is in no way 
indicative of official Corinthian support and as Talbert remarked, "there 
is no evidence to support Stroheker's presumption that Nicoteles was sent 
out by Corinth, like Timoleon".r . 
But in 346 B.C., the Corinthians did respond. to the appeal from 
Syracusan exiles. I would suggest that the reason for the support forth-
coming on this occasion can be found in the different circumstances 
surrounding the appeal. In this instance, Dionysius II had only just 
resumed power after ten years of political instability at Syracuse. His 
government was not as firmly established by tradition as it had been in 358 
B.C. Secondly, there was the possibility of using Carthage's rearmament in 
Sicily as a pretext for sending Corinthian help. This, however, raises the 
vexed question of the purpose of Timoleon's mission. 
The earliest reference to Timoleon's mission, in Aristotle, implies 
that the nine triremes engaged the Carthaginians and the inference is later 
made by Aelian, 309 with the result that the impression is gained that the 
Corinthians sent aid since the Syracusans were attacked or threatened by 
the Carthaginians. Part of this impression may have been the result of a 
confusion between Timoleon's difficulty in eluding the Carthaginians at 
Rhegium and some supposed action at Syracuse. That the expedition was 
directed against the Carthaginians is further substantiated by the state-
ment of Plutarch that the appeal was prompted by fear of the Cartha-
ginians. 310 But as Westlake noted, Plutarch's statement is modified by the 
end of the sentence where it is inferred that assistance was sought against 
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tyrants. 311 Westlake further showed that the latter view was presupposed 
elsewhere and underlay the whole narrative of Plutarch. In support of this 
assertion he mentioned Hicetas' comment that the Corinthians need not come 
to Syracuse since he had formed an alliance with the Carthaginians against 
Dionysiva II; 312 the fact that Andromachus of Tauromenium was described as 
one who co-operated with the Corinthians in liberating Sicily, 313 obviously 
from tyrants; and that the distrust of Timoleon because of Callippus and 
'Pharax suggests that, like his predecessors, Timoleon had been sent out to 
eradicate tyranny. 314 To this evidence I would add the fact that Timoleon, 
on arrival in Sicily, did not advocate combined action against the 
Carthaginians, despite the fact that they had tried to hinder his arrival, 
but instead, responded to an appeal from a section of the population at 
Adranum and then concentrated his action against Syracuse. It was only 
after Hicetas began to use his Carthaginian alliance to the full that the 
question of Carthage assumed importance. 
Thus I would agree with Westlake that the cumulative evidence as 
against the comment by Plutarch, shows that Timoleon was sent in response 
to an appeal against tyrants in general, and Dionysius II in particular. 
The evidence of Nepos315 and Diodorus316 further points in this direction. 
Finally, as Westlake also noted, the prime movers of the appeal were the 
aristocratic Syracusan exiles, and the main qualification for Timoleon's 
appointment was his supposed hatred of tyranny. 317 
The actual support given by Corinth was only minimal and this can be 
explained by the fact that Corinth had not significantly revived after the 
Peloponnesian War. 318 Corinthian aid consisted mainly in providing a 
general, helping him to recruit mercenaries, and providing him with ships. 
As Westlake astutely remarked, "When Timoleon sailed for Sicily, he was no 
more than a commander of mercenaries, dispatched with the not very 
enthusiastic blessing of the CorinthiaW. 319 Moreover, the purpose of 
Timoleon's mission was left vague most probably because it was, indeed, a 
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vague one. The possibility of a Carthaginian War and the unsettled nature 
of Sicily as a whole meant that Corinth was able to send help without 
appearing to interfere in the domestic situation at Syracuse. This 
explains, in part, the sending of assistance in 346 B.C. when she had not 
done so in 358 B.C., but the actual reason for intervention at all must 
remain an enigma. 320 
But it did show that Corinth had the potential to aid exiles and was 
appealed to for help in that capacity. But with the exception of the 
Corinthian support in sending Timoleon, the mainland cities of Greece 
either supported (or at least recognised) the established government at 
Syracuse or took no active part in the internal politics of the place. 
(iv) Carthage  
In the case of Carthage, a distinction needs to be made between the 
effect of the presence or threat of Carthaginian power and actual real 
involvement by Carthage in Syracusan politics. 321 
Her principal concern in the first half of the Fourth Century B.C., 
as in the Fifth, was the protection of her interests in the western half of 
Sicily. Admittedly the invasion that resulted in the destruction of 
Selinus and Himera in 410/409 B.C. showed an increased aggression, but 
after that aggression, Hannibal returned to Carthage and disbanded his 
large army. It was only after Hermocrates' incursions into Carthaginian 
territory that Carthage launched a further expedition into the Greek sector 
of the island and destroyed Acragas and Gela. The various subsequent wars 
conducted by Dionysius I against Carthage only resulted in changes in the 
border between the Carthaginians and the Greeks, and after the conclusion 
of the war begun in 383 B.C. 322 when Carthage gained Selinus, Heraclea 
Minoa, Thermae as well as that portion of Acragantine'territory west of the 
River Halycus, the resulting situation which left one-third of the island 
to Carthage remained stable, with the exception of short-lived changes, for 
a century. 
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More important was the effect the presence of Carthage had on the 
Syracusan political atmosphere. The Syracusan generals of 406 B.C. were 
x- 	323 accused of treachery (WP'-°"6( ) 	due to their failure at Acragas, a 
charge which Dionysius capitalized on by having the generals deposed. 
Likewise he spread rumours about supposed collusion between his own 
colleagues and Carthage. 324 Despite the vagueness of these allegations and 
the absence of tangible proof, the prevailing mood was sufficiently electric 
and the faith of the Syracusans in the patriotism of their leaders 
sufficiently low for Dionysius to be elected o. 7.<7770$ 
Such tactics could of course be used against Dionysius himself and 
there were various rumours that he was in collaboration with the 
Carthaginians and that he did not wish to end the wars with them since it 
enabled him to retain his command. Such suspicions came to a climax in 396 
B.C. when Theodorus accused Dionysius of deliberately prolonging the war 
and of avoiding decisive action. 325' There is no need to believe Theodorvs' 
words, but they serve to illustrate the extent to which the question of 
Carthage could be used for political purposes. In this instance Dionysius 
was powerful enough to withstand the charges, but in the time of 
Dionysius II, Dion was not so fortunate. Dion was exiled on the pretext of 
collusion with Carthage, for he "had written to the Carthaginian officials, 
urging them, whenever they should treat with Dionysius for peace, not to 
hold their interview without including him, since he would help them to 
arrange everything securely", 326 According to Timaeus, as reported by 
Plutarch, Dion was then accused of conspiracy (0-uve4) with the 
Carthaginians and sent from Sicily. 327 Dion was certainly on friendly 
terms with the Carthaginians since he had been diplomatic ambassador to 
them under Dionysius I and had presumably continued in that office under 
Dionysius II. But to make Dion's offer evidence of treason seems 
exaggerated. The real motive for his exile must be found elsewhere, 328  but 
his connection with Carthage was thought to be a reasonable excuse for that 
exile. 
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On his return to Sicily, Dion landed at Heraclea Minoa and was 
received by the Carthaginian commander who was a guest—friend of his. 329 
The policy of Carthage at this time is clear. Though she gave no real 
active support, she gave moral support, for the commander allowed Dion to 
march through his territory and was prepared to arrange for Dion's surplus 
armour to be sent after him. 330 
During the first half of the Fourth Century B.C., then, Carthage did 
not actively involve herself in Greek politics, but her presence was used 
by Syracusan politicians in the furtherance of their own interests. After 
Dionysius II's first expulsion much of the Dionysian empire collapsed and 
the Greek cities became truly independent, although many fell prey to one 
or other of the military adventurers who set themselves up as tyrants by 
force. Carthage was again not involved, but as Warmington noted, "the way 
was open for Carthage in the following generations to intervene in the 
internal affairs of the Siceliot cities at the request of Greek 
politicians". 331 The key feature to note is that it was 'at the request of 
the Greek politicians'. For what became a new policy on the part of 
Carthage seems not so much a change on the part of Carthage as a readiness 
to utilize the opportunities offered to them by the Greeks. The Greeks 
themselves no longer felt the hesitancy of using Carthaginian support that 
had been prevalent in the Fifth and early Fourth Centuries B.C. 
Hicetas was the first to actively bring the Carthaginians into the 
arena of Syracusan civil disturbances. This he did in c. 346 B.C. for 
support in his attempt to wrest Syracuse from Dionysius II. The sources 
are contradictory about the initiator of the alliance between the two. 
According to Plutarch, Hicetas had been secretly negotiating with the 
Carthaginians while ostensibly supporting the appeal made by the exiles to 
Corinth. 332 In the account of Diodorus, it was the Carthaginians who 
approached Hicetas. 333 Despite Plutarch's bias against Hicetas as yet 
another foil for the "good" Timoleon, I am inclined to accept his account 
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in this instance since the initiative in the Syracusan campaign remained 
with Hicetas, the Carthaginians only coming in when asked to do so by him. 
For before Timoleon's arrival, while Hicetas besieged Dionysius II on 
Ortygia, he ordered (e/dAtc/r) the Carthaginians to see that Timoleon did 
not land in Sicily. 334 
Carthaginian interest in the matter is difficult to ascertain. 
Talbert believed that it was probably since she feared that Timoleon might 
have some influence on the situation in Sicily and might therefore disrupt 
the plans that had been made with Hicetas. 335 But as Westlake had remarked, 
"It is difficult to believe that the Carthaginians felt their interests to 
'be seriously endangered by the despatch of an obscure Corinthian at the 
head of a few hundred mercenaries". 336 But it was important to Hicetas and 
possibly the Carthaginians honoured their alliance with him since he had 
made certain concessions to them. 
After Timoleon's successful arrival, Hicetas' alliance assumed more 
importance, but once again the initiative lay with him as to the extent 
with which he would use Carthaginian aid. In 343 B.C., after Dionysius II 
had come to some agreement with Timoleon, but before his departure to 
Corinth, Hicetas "found fault with himself because, when so large a force 
of the Carthaginians was at hand, he was using it in small detachments and 
secretlY, as though he were ashamed of it 	 he therefore called in Mago 
their general together with his whole armament". 337 The result was the 
occupation of the Great Harbour by• a huge Punic Fleet. 338 But what must at 
best have been an uneasy coalition broke down, particularly due, it would 
seem, to the fraternisation between Hicetas' mercenaries and the mercenaries 
of Timoleon. 339 This was a sufficient pretext for Mago who had "long wanted 
to go away", and his fleet departed, having accomplished nothing. 340 
The Carthaginians were no longer involved in Syracusan affairs and 
Timoleon was able to defeat Hicetas, once Hicetas had lost his Carthaginian 
support. 341 After the Battle of the River Crimisus, the Carthaginians were 
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more interested in forming coalitions of the tyrants of the Greek cities 
against Timoleon and a powerful Syracuse. These were led by Gisco and 
after some successes 342 peace was made with Timoleon. 343 
But the Carthaginians had now become a potential ally for discon-
tented factions of Syracuse. The exact nature of their involvement in the 
disruptions that led to the rise of Agathocles is, however, difficult to 
assess since the principal source, Diodorus, is extremely compressed, the 
events being crammed into his narrative of 317 B.C. At the outset of the 
trouble, the Carthaginian general, Hamilcar, was prepared to use such 
forces as he already had in Sicily to aid the Syracusan oligarchs who had 
been expelled from Syracuse by the Syracusans. 44 It was this coalition 
that must have led to the Syracusan election of the Corinthian general, 
Acestorides, who in an attempt to avoid er-A(0-'s within Syracuse, exiled 
Agathocles 345 who, because of his hostility toward the oligarchs, would 
have been a hindrance to any reconciliation between the Syracusans and the 
Carthaginian-backed oligarchs. Although Diodorus does not expressly say so, 
there is the strong implication that the ensuing peace made with the 
Carthaginians was made on the condition that the Syracusans received back 
their exiles. 346 
The power of Carthage had thus been the means of shifting the 
balance in the domestic affairs of Syracuse. Warmington suggested that 
Carthage preferred the oligarchs since they were less prone to war, at 
least in Sicily, since they had the most to lose by it. 347 But if this 
were the Carthaginian preference it is difficult to reconcile with the 
alleged collusion between Hamilcar and Agathocles in 317 B.C. Agathocles, 
after his expulsion by Acestorides, had gathered together an army in the 
interior and "after he had become an object of dread, not only to his own 
allow citizens but also to the Carthaginians, he was persuaded to return 
to his own city". 348 Unfortunately, Diodorys does not mention who did the 
persuading. Moreover, Agathocles would hardly need to be persuaded to 
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return to Syracuse. What was more likely was that the Syracusans had to be 
persuaded to accept him back. I would suggest that Agathocles was granted 
some sort of immunity in return for which he took an oath not to do any-
thing against the Syracusan people. 349 The mediator between them would 
seem to have been Hamilcar. 350 No doubt Hamilcar was wary lest the disrup-
tions in the interior of Sicily spilled over into the Carthaginian section 
of the island. It must have been a similar concern which prompted him to 
act as mediator between Agathocles and the Greek cities in opposition to 
him in 314 B.C., an act for which he was later condemned by the 
Carthaginian government since the treaty concluded was favourable to 
Agathocles. 351 
Hamilcar's motive, then, seems to have been to establish peaceful 
conditions both within Syracuse and throughout the rest of Sicily, and he 
consequently allied himself to whichever of the contending Syracusan 
factions helped him to secure that. 352 But by 314 B.C., Agathocles' power 
had become so strong that the Carthaginians condemned Hamilcar for his 
involvement with him. 
Thereafter, the fear of Agathocles' power was sufficient to induce 
the Carthaginians to support those Syracusans in opposition to him. What 
the Carthaginians did not want was a strong Greek Sicily in opposition to 
them. Accordingly, when Deinocrates, in 312 B.C. appealed for aid 353 they 
first responded with a show of strength with such ships as they already had 
in Sicily354 and then followed this with the launching of the full scale 
operation of 311 B.C. 355 Deinocrates and the Carthaginians co-operated 
until 309 B.C. when, on the death of the Carthaginian commander, the two 
armies separated. 356 After Agathocles made peace with the Carthaginians in 
306 B.C., 357 they took little interest in Syracuse until after his death in • 
289 B.C. when dissensions in Syracuse again saw them acting as mediators. 358 
On the whole, Carthage showed little interest in Syracusan politics, 
but in the second half of the Fourth Century B.C. responded when assistance 
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was requested, preferring however to act as mediator, except when a 
particularly strong leader threatened their interests. In such a case, she 
formed a coalition with Syracusan exiles and other Greek cities who were 
also opposed to Syracusan control. 
Thus, while outside powers did not actively promote erwa-vs , they 
were sometimes prepared to capitalize on it should it arise. The whole 
situation was somewhat circular, for because they responded at all, 
subversive elements were more ready to show their hand. 
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CHAPTER THREE : POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND Tab ROLE OF THE LEADER IN SYRACUSE, 
415 - 305 B.C. 
Civil disturbances and revolts, however seemingly necessary, were 
difficult to carry out successfully. This leads one to the conclusion that 
people only resorted to such methods of change when less violent avenues of 
change were denied them. Coupled with this was the belief that the govern-
ment was failing to satisfy the needs of those who resorted to violence. 
Thus, although the impetus of revolutionary behaviour lay with the 
revolutionaries, part of the responsibility for the revolutionary situation 
and the outbreak of active conflict must be found in the performance of the 
particular government of the time. 
One would expect that such a failure in government was the result of 
an inability to cope with some environmental change, but this was not 
necessarily the fundamental basis in a politically conscious community such 
as the Greek World. In fact, Aristotle saw that a fundamental basis for 
the desire of men for change lay in the view of how men thought their 
community ought to be governed., Of course, men's political awareness of 
such facts may in itself be the result of environmental factors. The 
different views of equality and inequality were such that a government that 
catered for such differences could not be achieved except where there were 
no distinctions in wealth and social stanAing. Where thaPIP distinctions 
were present, as they were in the Greek World, there arose a feeling on the 
part of a section of the community that they did not have a share in the 
government in accordance with the fundamental assumption that they held on 
equality, one section believing in numerical equality, the other in 
equality according to worth. 1 
Thus, no matter what the political system adopted in the Greek 
polis, it held within it the seeds of instability, for its acceptance 
depended on one's viewpoint. But the mere existence of such a condition 
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need not have led directly to change : the two different attitudes could 
have existed in a state of healthy conflict by stimulating new ideas 
instead of being mutually destructive. If the existing government, albeit 
based on the viewpoint of a section of the population, satisfied the needs 
of those with a different viewpoint, as the tyranny of Dionysius I success-
fully did, then the opponents had no need to resort to a change of govern-
ment to gain their ends, except where political ideology was felt to be a 
strong principle and this was rare. Opposition was usually based on the 
feeling that the existing government was not catering for all the needs of 
the community. 
Such a situation provided, given the right conditions, a basis upon 
which factions arose and factional conflict occurred. That they occurred 
at one specific time.and not at another was the result of specific 
conditions that highlighted the underlying differences in the community and 
gave rise to the desire for conflict. Among the seven principal causes of 
civil strife given by Aristotle, 2  gain, honour and insolence were all based 
in a failure in management on the part of the rulers, and excessive 
prominence, fear and contempt were a failure on the part of the government 
in its relationship with those whom it ruled. 
This failure of the rulers reveals the fact that the power system 
depended on the willingness of the society to entrust the running of the 
government to those who were in charge. As Aristotle pointed out, "The 
point is that if the constitution is to have a good prospect of maintaining 
itself, it must be such that all sections of the community accept it and 
want it to go on". 3 Thus the success of the government was dependent on 
the extent to which it could satisfy the needs of the community and keep 
the confidence of those it governed. In practice, this meant the ability 
to act (or appear to act) on behalf of the diverse sections of the popula-
tion, those who were rich, the poor, those with oligarchic sentiments and 
those who favoured democracy. 
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While this was true of most Greek cities, the problem was more acute 
in Syracuse in the Fourth Century B.C. since there was no firmly established 
nobility and the wealthy or distinguished families did not have the weight 
of historical tradition on which to base their claim to superiority. 
Hence, also, the lack of claim on the part of revolutionaries to be 
restoring the ancestral constitution. 4 The problem was further aggravated 
by the phenomenon, established by the tyrants of the Fifth Century B.C. of 
transferring huge masses of the Sicilian population from one place to 
another. 5 This, together with the greater extension of citizenship created 
instabilities not experienced in Greece Proper. 
With such a diverse population the tendency existed to look for a 
strong, single commander, either in the belief that he would solve the 
underlying problems created by such a population, or when the threat of a 
Carthaginian war necessitated a general in whom the people had confidence. 
On the psychological level, a single ruler was a person to whom all 
sections of the population, regardless of their origins, could look with 
esteem and respect. The personality of the leader was therefore important 
if he were to maintain his position. 
But although there was a fundamental need for a powerful head, in 
opposition to this was the fact that such elevations were either extra-
ordinary or extraconstitutional and were usually resented because of this. 
There was a basic weakness in the constitution since it could neither 
prevent the rise of the single ruler nor provide an adequate legal basis 
for his power. 
Diversity of the Population 
As Alcibiades mentioned in his speech in 416 B.C. advocating the 
Sicilian expedition, "The Sicilian cities have swollen populations made out 
of all sorts of mixtures and there are constant changes and rearrangements 
in the citizen bodies". 6 Alcibiades, of course, was arguing that the 
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Sicilians would not therefore be very zealous in the defence of their 
cities, a mistake as it happened, and though his information was largely 
coloured by the transplantations of the first half of the Fifth Century, in 
423 B.C. the powerful citizens of Leontini had been incorporated as 
citizens of Syracuse: Although they subsequently left, such a movement 
could not but have had unsettling effects. 
By playing on the division between the rich and the poor, a division 
which existed despite the increased democratic nature of Syracuse after the 
defeat of the Athenians, Dionysius succeeded in gaining power. Once in 
power, he not only redistributed the land, giving allotments to the poorer 
citizens, but also enrolled as citizens some of the manumitted slaves. 8 It 
• would seem that he created a new class system, albeit with a strong 
military flavour, the common citizens being given a sense of equality 
beneath the superstructure of military control. It was this new system 
that led to the temporary opposition to him in 404 B.C. on the part of the 
people of Syracuse, who promised citizenship to such of Dionysius' 
mercenaries as would join them. 9 Dionysius had little trouble regaining 
control and then sought the goodwill of the people with his programme of 
fortifying Syracuse. 1° 
A further objection against Dionysius I was raised in 396 B.C.,this 
time to the fact that Dionysius had given "the wives of the banished in 
marriage to slaves and to a motley throng together with the fact that "he 
put the weapons of the citizens in the hands of barbarians and 
foreigners". 11 The first complaint was no doubt a reference of Dionysius' 
extension of the citizenship and his inclusion of some slaves in that 
extension. What he had in effect done was break down the exclusiveness of 
citizenship and, by marriage arrangements, dispel the barrier between old 
and new citizens. 
In the second case, although he had not given the mercenaries 
12 citizenship, since he had disarmed the citizens and relied largely on the 
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use of mercenaries for the defence of the city, he undermined the position 
of the citizens. For the citizens' claim to political privilege rested 
largely on the fact that they were able to defend the city, the oligarchs 
favouring the view that since the wealthy were able to afford to furnish 
the cavalry, triremes and hoplite armour they should rule, and the 
democrats believing that since they manned the navy they should also have 
political rights. In fact the increased democracy in the time of Diodes 
was the consequence of the fact that the Syracusan navy had played a major 
part in the defeat of the Athenians. 13 
Dionysius I continued his policy of increasing the population of 
Syracuse by infusing new blood into it, theAhhabitants of Caulonia and 
Hipponium being moved there in 389 and 388 B.C. respectively. 14 The 
cosmopolitan nature of Syracuse and the lack of cohesion under a central 
leader was the cause of the successful take-over by Callippus once the 
people had lost confidence in Dion. Plutarch, commenting on Callippus' 
plot noted that Callippus was encouraged by the fact that many of Dion's 
friends had been killed by war, that since Heracleides' death the 
Syracusans were without a leader, and that Callippus himself was in favour 
with Dion's soldiers. 15 
After Dion's death, Syracuse was controlled by successive rulers who 
were supported by their mercenary forces, the citizen population having no 
say in the matter until the exiles at Leontini appealed to Corinth in 346 
B.C. In general, the population at Syracuse had become seriously depleted. 
Together with many of the Greek Sicilian cities, the city was destitute of 
inhabitants and the country districts neglected and uncultivated. 16 The 
general poverty of the time was evident in the problems Timoleon faced in 
paying his mercenaries. Some he sent into the Carthaginian zone on a 
plundering expedition, 17 others deserted before the battle at the River 
Crimisus partly because of lack of pay, 18 and apart from allowing three days 
for collecting booty after the victory, he left his mercenaries to plunder 
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the region agan. 19 In Syracuse itself, money was gained by reselling the 
houses and the sale of public statues. 20 
The Syracuse that Timoleon took over in 343 B.C. "had not citizens 
enough, since some had perished in wars and seditions while others had gone 
into exile from tyrannical governments". 21 Many it would seem had sought 
refuge in the garrisons around the country, once the strongholds of 
Dionysius II, but now either neglected or in the hands of Timoleon. 22 In 
fact, although the population was believed to have exceeded one hundred 
thousand at the death of Dionysius I, it had dropped to a figure scarcely 
above ten thousand. 23 Because of this Timoleon undertook a programme of 
colonisation. 
At first the colonisation programme was not particularly successful 
for the larger number of colonists must have arrived after the conclusion 
of peace with Carthage in 339 B.C. In the -initial stage it would seem that 
five thousand went from Corinth, including the Syracusan exiles, followed by 
another five thousand which would give Plutarch's figure of ten thousand. 24 
The Corinthians aided the return of the exiles by providing transports, 
convoys and leaders. Furthermore, the discrepancy between Diodorus and 
Plutarch on the time of the proclamation for colonists can, I believe, be 
resolved by placing the proclamation for the exiles on Timoleon's gaining 
Syracuse, but the general proclamation to all Greeks, after the Battle at 
the River Crimisus, when reconstruction of the area was beginning. 25 
The appeal was more successful in Sicily and Italy which together 
contributed fifty thousand settlers, making a total of sixty thousand. 26 
Not only was Syracuse itself repopulated but also the outlying areas. 
Centuripae was probably settled, for its inhabitants were granted Syracusan 
citizenship when it was freed from local tyrants, 27 as was Agyrium which 
received ten thousand settlers. 28 The towns of Aetna (which had been rid 
of the Campanian mercenaries), Adrantm, Centuripae, Enna and Morgantina 
(presumably in the area) all issued coins and enjoyed prosperity at this 
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time. 29 The support which they subsequently gave to Agathocles suggests 
that they contained a large number of immigrants hostile to the Syracusan 
30 nobles. 
"Since all the colonists were apparently given Syracusan citizenship, 
whether settled at Syracuse or elsewhere, the Symatheus basin was now 
largely peopled by citizens of Syracuse." 31 Timoleon also transferred the 
people of Leontini to Syracuse and presumably sent new settlers and 
Syracusans there since the place continued to exist. 32 Additional settlers 
were also sent to Camarina. 33 This trend was carried out throughout Sicily, 
Acragas and Gela being repopulated with people from Velia. 34 
The new settlers recultivated the land and a surplus obviously began 
to amass for trade resumed. 35 To confirm this new prosperity Diodorus 
mentioned the building programme at Syracus e . 36 In fact one of the advan- 
tages of this new influx of colonists must have been the great deal of 
money brought in by them which served to boost the economy. 
But this infusing of new blood was not without its problems. Not 
only was the population of a very mixed nature but it was also spread over 
a large area with the result that most of those who nominally belonged to 
the Syracusan assembly lived too far away to have been able to attend 
meetings except on rare occasions. Significantly, Timoleon's funeral was 
delayed a few days to enable those in the countryside to attend. 37 Thus 
the assembly at Syracuse must have been an unrepresentative body, dominated 
by those in Syracuse for there does not appear to have been any regional 
representation. 
This lack of regional representation was a factor upon which 
Agathocles capitalised in his rise to power. The men of Morgantina and 
other cities of the interior supported him since they were nunceasiziglSr, 
hostile to the Six Hundred who had been members of the oligarchy in 
Syracuse and hated the populace in general because they were forced to 
38 carry out its orders". 	Thus, Timoleon's colonisation programme and the 
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infusion of new elements into the community, while promoting economic 
progress, did not successfully create stability. 
The Role of the Single Leader 
With such a diverse population the trend existed to look to the out-
standing man who seemed able to co-ordinate the diverse interests. The 
unsettled nature of the Syracusan concept of leadership is seen in the 
nature of their office of the Board of Generals. What little we do know of 
this office indicates a lack of established numbers, the numbers 
fluctuating from time to time. 39 Given this lack of tradition surrounding 
the Board there was a tendency to entrust command, especially when an 
emergency situation arose, to a single commander rather than the 
collective body of generals. 
At the time of the Athenian expedition this practice was already 
apparent. The normal number of generals at that time was fifteen, but in 
the summer of 415 B.C., after some Athenian successes, Hermocrates 
counselled limiting the number of generals and giving them unrestricted 
power, while the assembly was to swear an oath to them. 40 In the interest 
of increased military efficiency he removed the necessity to consult the 
assembly on matters of strategy. The number chosen was three, possibly as 
a safeguard Against one commander assuming too much power. The three 
chosen were Sicanus t Heracleides and Hermocrates 41 and +110y . took  office at 
the end of the term of the regular generals. 42 The assembly, however, 
still retained the right to prolong their appointment or dismiss them, for 
in the following summer of 414 B.C., after further lack of success, attri-
buted in part to bad luck, but also to a suspicion of betrayal on the part 
of the generals (a groundless one it would seem) it deposed the generals 
and chose another three. 43 
This general distrust continued despite the Syracusan victory over 
the Athenians, for Hermocrates and his colleagues, on the pretext of their 
lack of success in the Aegean 44 were banished at the instigation of 
Hermocrates' then political rival, Diodes. Such changes were obviously 
not conducive to consistent military strategy and what was badly needed was 
an outstanding general who could maintain power despite opposition and was 
not subject to the continual pressure of maintaining office. 
This problem of strong centralised control was temporarily solved 
during the Athenian invasion by the arrival of Gylippus from Sparta. 
Gylippus had the prestige of Sparta to support his role as leader and since 
his appointment had nothing to do with Syracusan politics his command was 
not subject to annual renewal by the Syracusans and he was able to 
co-ordinate the Syracusan forces unhampered. Since he did not owe his 
position to popularity among the Syracusans he could, and did, enforce 
discipline. His extraordinary position gave him respect since he was 
obviously free from self-interest in Syracusan politics and from any 
suspected collusion with the Athenians. 
However, Gylippus' actual position was never clearly defined. 
Alcibiades had advised the Spartans to send a general who would not only be 
in charge of the Spartan contingent but would take over command of all the 
Syracusans and their allies, something which appears to have been parti-
cularly necessary since the Syracusan generals were having difficulty in 
gaining the full support of the Syracusan populace in the war effort. ° 
Although Thucydides' words are ambiguous as to whether he was sent in 
command of the force from Greece or as a commander for the Syracusans, 46 
when he joined forces with the Syracusans in Sicily he immediately acted as 
supreme commander and was accepted as such. 47 It was not necessary to 
confer an official Syracusan office upon him. His position was purely 
military, being the co-ordinator of the armed forces. He was quickly able 
to organise the Syracusan defences and prevent the blockade of Syracuse, so 
that, despite minor reverses in battle, he was still respected. 
Thereafter, as Gomme pointed out, Gylippus was in charge of the land 
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forces while the Syracusans controlled the naval action and as "the 
Syracusans gained confidence in their fleet, and the combination of 
military and naval operations became increasingly important, the authority 
of Gylippus diminished and by the time of the final defeat, the retreating 
Athenians were harried by 'the Syracusans and Gylippus". 48 In the 
accounts of the treatment of the captured Athenian generals and other 
prisoners Gylippus was subordinate to the decision of the Syracusan 
assembly, but was able to voice his opinion. 49 
No matter what the exact nature of Gylippus' position in Sicily he 
was able, , in the first instance, to co-ordinate the Syracusan forces without 
opposition and he remained a focal point throughout the campaign both for 
his military skill and for his ability to uplift the morale and confidence 
of the Syracusans. As Plutarch remarked, "that the whole achievement of 
deliverance was his, is the testimony not only of Thucydides, but also of 
Philistus, who was a Syracusan and an eyewitness of the events". 50 
Throughout the Fourth Century B.C., with the exception of the years 
337-317, Syracusan history was dominated by the individual leader. This 
was done either by the seizure of power and maintaining of it unconstitu-
tionally or by the appointment of an extraordinary command. In the latter 
area, Timoleon's appointment was both similar to that of Gylippus and 
significantly different from it. It was similar in that he was an outsider 
appointed by a city in Greece, in this case Corinth, to help co-ordinate 
the Syracusans, but it was different in that his mission was not at the 
request of the government of Syracuse but was in response to an appeal from 
exiles. More importantly, at some time in Syracuse he must have been made 
an official Syracusan officer as distinct from a Corinthian aiding the 
Syracusans, and his sphere of operation was not limited to the military 
field. 
When the exiles of Syracuse appealed to Corinth for help in 346 
B.C. 51 the Corinthians voted to send help and looked for a commander. 
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According to Diodorus the exiles actually asked for "as general, a man who 
would administer their city and curb the ambitions of those who aimed to 
become tyrants". 52 Timoleon was chosen, his chief quality being his  
supposed hatred of tyranny. 53  Exactly what orders were given to Timoleon 
we do not know, and Corinth would not have been able to impose a general on 
the Syracusans, particularly in response to exiles. Plutarch emphasized 
the democratic nature of both Corinth and Timoleon in order to attempt to 
give the impression that Timoleon was a popular choice, thereby concealing 
the fact that he was an unconstitutional, revolutionary leader at the head 
of a motley mercenary force when he first arrived in Sicily. As Talbert 
noted, "Until Dionysius had actually fallen, Timoleon can have had no 
legally justifiable position in Sicily; yet the confusion and disorder 
which prevailed in the island naturally made a legal justification of his 
presence quite unnecessary". 54 
The fact that Diodorus mentioned that Timoleon retired in 337/336 
B.C., after having been a general for eight years, has been used by some 
scholars to assert that Timoleon must have been appointed an official 
position in Corinth, Kahrstedt 55 believing he was made er,74.0-1yOS .40!0X?terAidi 
" 	 6 Huttl 5  and Berve57 opting for the ordinary position of general. But 
surely Diodorus' comment can be taken to mean no more than 'having 
commanded troops' and as Talbert stressed, the claim that it meant 'having 
been a general of Corinth' is rather farfetched. 58 
Indeed, there is no evidence that Timoleon held a Corinthian office 
when he went to Syracuse. Corinth reaped some benefits from the expedition, 
particularly since Timoleon needed an agent to help with his colonisation 
programme and to send, in the first Instance, military reinforcements, and 
later, experienced legislators, but as far as we know, the political links 
between Corinth and Syracuse remained as loose both during and after 
TiMoleonis time as they had been before the expedition. 
However, it does seem likely that Timoleon held an office at 
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Syracuse for part of his career. Plutarch's statement about Demaentus' 
accusation implied that Timoleon held a Syracusan office, and that he did 
hold one seems the only reasonable way of explaining how he effected a 
number of somewhat autocratic measures outside the military field. He is 
mentioned as having enlarged the citizen body, brought in new colonists, 
divided the land, organised the sale of all Syracusan property and trans-
planted the population of Leontini. 59 These were measures effected by a 
man with a great deal of authority, certainly more than that of a plain 
military command. If Timoleon had merely led troops he need not have held 
a Syracusan office, but could have acted in a similar capacity to that of 
Gylippus. But his sweeping civil measures can only have been carried out 
with official Syracusan authority. 
would maintain that further evidence of Timoleon's having held 
office can be found in the fact that so much is made of his resignation. 
As Plutarch mentioned, "he laid down office and command when he had over- 
thrown the unlawful rulers". 60 We do not know whether Timoleon was elected 
first for a year and then re-elected annually or whether he was elected for 
an undefined period. Again, the fact that he resigned would suggest the 
latter. The time of gaining his position would have been on the liberation 
of Syracuse, when a representative assembly could have taken place to effect 
the election61 and when, by his demolition of Or:tygia, he had shown his 
disinterestedness. 62 Before this, the Syracusans could not but have 
regarded Timoleon's position with suspicion for he may well have been just 
another of those adventurers from the mainland that had came to Sicily from 
time to time in the last fifty or so years. 63 
Even after laying down his official position, Timoleon's opinion was 
still sought and his advice adhered to." It would seem then that he also 
had Syracusan citizenship since that was a prerequisite for holding 
Syracusan office. Not only did he attend the assembly and speak in it but 
he was also attacked in it over his conduct as general. 65 That he was 
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referred to as Corinthian in the honorary decree passed after his death 
need not be significant; for even if he had become a citizen of Syracuse, 
he would still have been thought of by all as Corinthian for that was where 
he was born and had spent the greater part of his life. Furthermore, it 
was possible to hold citizenship of more than one place. 
The general diplomacy and tact of Timoleon as a leader was such that 
the Syracusans passed a decree that in the event of a war with foreigners 
(as distinct from with other Greek cities) the Syracusans would request a 
general from Corinth. 66 This was no doubt an attempt to deal with the 
problem of the successful military general who was able, having been 
granted extraordinary powers, to seize the government. The only time we 
know of the decree having been used was in 317 B.C. when Syracuse was at 
war with Carthage and Acestorides, the Corinthian, was elected general at 
Syracuse. 67 This safeguard was not, however, successful because Agathocles 
was able to rise to power through his own military skill. 
The use of an extraordinary office in order to gain power was the 
key feature in Dionysius' rise. In 406 B.C. the problem of the co-ordina-
tion of the Syracusan army became imminent 68 and Dionysius I accused the 
generals of incompetence in the defence of Acragas and supposed collusion 
with the Carthaginians. 69 He was successful because "the people, which for 
some time past had hated the generals for what they considered to be their 
bad conduct of the war and at the moment was spurred on by what was being 
said to them, immediately dismissed some of them from office and chose 
other generals, among whom was Dionysius, who enjoyed the reputation of 
having shown unusual bravery in battles against the Carthaginians and was 
admired by the Syracusans". 
Thus the successful commander needed both military skill and 
popularity. Due to this popularity, together with the blackening of his 
colleagues' characters, Dionysius I succeeded in having himself elected 
71 Cr.7)0°1 7710J 	7'"O ietd#1411) • 	The ease with which he achieved his aim reveals 
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the extent to which the faith of the Syracusans was invested in the 
individual rather than the collective group. By doubling the pay of the 
mercenaries, acquiring a bodyguard and establishing himself on Ortygia, 
Dionysius placed himself in a relatively unassailable position, a position 
he confirmed in the treaty with Carthage in 405 B.C. in which it was 
stipulated that the Syracusans were to be subject to him. 72  This was a 
cunning piece of strategy. Dionysius had been elected to a supreme 
position as the result of the need to deal with the war with the 
Carthaginians. Once peace was made the reason for his elevation would have 
been removed. What Dionysius succeeded in doing by means of the treaty was 
to imply that peace was only possible if the Syracusans continued to accept 
his overlordship. 
Dionysius' success illustrates the potential in a military situation 
for one man to stand out from his colleagues and subvert the constitution. 
The prestige he gained was sufficient to enable Dionysius II to assume 
control unopposed. When opposition to Dionysius II did occur it was again 
centralised in the personality of the individual. 
At the end of the Fourth Century B.C., despite the revised constitu-
tion of Timoleon, Agathocles rose to power in a similar way as had 
Dionysius at the end of the Fifth. But in this instance, it was not the 
threat of Carthage that resulted in Agathocles being granted an extra-
ordinary position, but rather as a result of the erned-IS in Syracuse itself. 
Agathocles, under the patronage of the wealthy Syracusan, Damas, whose 
widow he married on that man's death, had gained renown as a military 
commander, particularly after the Syracusan expedition to aid Croton in 
c. 320 B.C. 73 It would seem, as Tillyard pointed out) that "his chief hopes 
in these early years were for glory in war, and he was fortunate in finding 
a patron who could help him, for on the whole it would seem that the ruling 
oligarchy stood for the cause of the old burgess of Syracuse as against 
such newcomers as Agathocles".74 
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When he was refused preferment he retired to Italy, acting first as 
a mercenary at Tarentum and then leading the exiles who aided Rhegium 
against an attack by Sosistratus and Heracleides. 75 The thwarting of the 
ambition of Agathocles by the oligarchs, due to their exclusiveness and 
selfishness was politically short-sighted in the extreme for it created the 
situation where a capable (and as later events proved, popular) commander 
in opposition to them. 
After the oligarchic group at Syracuse was expelled, Agathocles was 
recalled and was foremost in the military operations against the exiles who 
were being supported by the Carthaginians. It was probably fear of this 
growing ascendancy that led to the Corinthian Acestorides, who had been 
elected general, 76 forcing Agathocles to leave the city. When peace was 
made with Carthage, Syracuse received the exiles back, 77 'possibly in 
accordance with a provision in the treaty. Since Agathocles had raised a 
formidable army in the interior, he also was allowed to return, provided he 
took an oath to undertake nothing against the democracy. 78 He was 
subsequently made general and 'protector of the peace' until harmony in the 
city was established. 79 Thus his dictatorship was limited and he appears 
to have had colleagues in office with him since he made the point later 
that he would not accept office if he were to be hampered by colleagues. 
Agathocles was, however, able to enrol whatever men he chose and for a 
supposed campaign against Erbita he enlisted all those who were most likely 
to favour his designs. 80 With such a body he effected a bloody revolution 
and purged the city of all those with oligarchic sympathies. 81 In the 
ensuing assembly he was elected o-ipecrlp 	y s ceera 47-11: 82 Agathocles, like 
Dionysius, succeeded because of his military strength and his popularity as 
a result of supporting the lower classes against the wealthy. 
But it was one thing to gain power and another thing to keep it. 
The successful leader needed to retain the loyalty of his troops, secure 
the allegiance of capable advisers and subordinates, secure the goodwill of 
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the people so that they wished him to continue in command, and reconcile or 
deal with any opposition. 
(a) The Leader of Mercenaries . 
Dionysius I's strength had been based on his mercenaries. In his 
rise he had been generous with their pay and they had stood in support of 
him against the people. 83 He used them in the first instance as part of 
his bodyguard, secondly for garrison duty in the places he annexed, 84 and 
thirdly for the pursuit of aggressive warfare either against Carthage or 
throughout Sicily and Italy. Where disloyalty was apparent he was quick to 
act, either by placing them foremost in battle 85 or, as in the most serious 
opposition led by Aristoteles, by settling them with land in lieu of pay. 86 
In general, Dionysius was a capable leader of mercenaries and was 
successful in his handling of them. In this he set the tone for the Fourth 
Century B.C. in Sicily. For, if the successful commander needed 
mercenaries, it was also true that they needed him to be sure of secure 
employment. 
By the middle of the Fourth Century B.C. the mercenaries had become 
a serious problem, both in Greece itself and in Sicily in particular, where 
there was the added problem that many were non—Greeks, which led to Plato's 
assertion that the island was becoming barbarized. 87 Such a diverse group 
needed particular skill to be successfully organised. Moreover, Greece 
seems to have got rid of its unwanted mercenaries by sending them westward. 
This was evident in the force that left with Timoleon, some of whom 
were the mercenaries who had taken part in the Phocian sack of Delphi. 88 
Plutarch maintained that he took these men in the absence of more suitable 
recruits, but this could hardly be the case for Timoleon sought troops 
after the Peace of Philocrates in 346 B.C. Isocrates, writing shortly 
after this peace, made it clear that there existed in Greece a dangerously 
high number of men willing to become mercenaries. 89 Therefore, if Timoleon 
had offered the usual low wage of the time, 90 he should have had no 
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difficulty in recruiting a force at a time when the supply exceeded the 
demand. Thus, either he did not offer a sufficient wage, or less 
disreputable mercenaries doubted his chances of success, or the Phocians 
were approached to conveniently get them out of Greece. Most likely it was 
a combination of these three factors, the lack of pay being offset by the 
prospect of booty. In Timoleon's time we hear that Phalaecus took his 
mercenaries, who could find no employment because they had plundered Delphi, 
from Corinth toward Sicily and Italy. 91 
Timoleon arrived at Tauromenium with a thousand mercenaries 92 and 
when Dionysius II surrended Ortygia he picked up a further two thousand. 93 
This was supplemented by a further two thousand infantry and two hundred 
cavalry sent as reinforcements from Corinth. 94 At the battle at the River 
Crimisus he also incorporated the forces of Hicetas in his army. To manage 
such a large body of men with different backgrounds required skill as a 
commander and the ability to pay. 
His skill as a commander was evidenced by his success on the island, 
but in the field of pay he was not quite so successful. After the capture 
of Syracuse a thousand men were sent into the Carthaginian zone for 
plunder95 and his only major trouble before the battle at the River 
Crimisus was largely due to arrears in pay. 96 Timoleon swiftly sent the 
rebellious mercenaries back to Syracuse to collect their pay. Similarly, 
where there was superstitution among the troops he skilfully turned it 
around to his own advantage. 97 
It was essential to hold the soldiers by the strength of one's 
personality, for the mercenary had little interest in any specific cause, 
something which was borne out by the fraternisation between the mercenaries 
of Timoleon and those of Bicetas at the siege of Syracuse. 98 
The allegiance of the mercenaries was particularly necessary in the 
event of an unsuccessful compaign. Callippus, after he had lost Syracuse, 
was later killed by some of his own mercenaries. The commander was apt to 
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be betrayed by his mercenaries if they felt that service to him no longer 
held the prospect of secure employment or bountiful rewards. Thus, the 
mercenaries of Hicetas handed him over to Timoleon in c. 339 B.C. 99  and 
those of Mamercus of Catena, a little later, deserted and handed the place 
to Timoleon. 1W In both these cases it was not Timoleon's cause that 
motivated the mercenaries, but rather the fact that he had been so success-
ful that they felt that their respective commanders faced imminent defeat 
in any case. 
A greater problem for the leader was the control of mercenaries in 
the absence of war. Dionysius II had trouble in this area since he neither. 
had the expansionist policy of his father, nor did he resort to temple 
looting so that he was hard pressed to pay his soldiers. To offset this he 
tried to reduce the wages of the older mercenaries 101  but they rebelled in 
their own interests and the attempt was unsuccessful. What they also did 
was to make it quite clear that whether Dionysius seriously wanted to 
resign the tyranny or not, as they believed Plato was inducing him to do 9 : 
they were not prepared to allow it since it would have meant unemployment 
for them. 102 Nevertheless, having the security of the settlement on 
Ortygia, they served him faithfully against Dion until Dionysius' son, 
Apollocrates was forced to surrender them to Dion and abandon the place 
because they had become mutinous through lack of food. 103 
Dion also had trouble in controlling his mercenaries, but in his 
case it seems to have been his personality rather than lack of security 
that caused their disaffection. Although they had stood behind him when 
the Syracusans had refused to pay them after his first entry in Syracuse, 14°4 
and saved the city after the counter attack of Dionysius II's forces, 105 
they became alienated from him after the surrender of Ortygia. Thus, 
despite the land grants they received, 106 many aided in his assassination1°7 
Timoleon was more successful in his handling of mercenaries after 
his campaigns had ceased. How he did this is largely a matter of 
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conjecture. It is possible that he used citizen levies after the battle of 
the River Crimisus in order to decrease the number of mercenaries. As 
Parke suggested he may also have granted land to those mercenalies who 
wished to remain in Sicily after their discharge. 108 It was certainly 
imperative that the large number of men should be expelled or given the 
land and security to become citizens. If they had been allowed to remain 
on the island without the means of earning a livelihood, they would have 
turned to brigandage or to supporting mercenary leaders in their seizure of 
Sicilian towns, as had happened in the years after Dion's death. Also, 
Demaretus and Deinarchus may well have taken a force back to Greece for 
both are heard of as serving with Philip and Alexander. '" 
But whatever methods Timoleon used, he succeeded in disbanding the 
huge mercenary forces, thereby removing the instability that such forces 
created. The next trouble we hear of in Sicily came from internal 
political conflicts and on that occasion Agathocles re—established a large 
mercenary force. 
(b) The Allegiance of Capable Advisers and Subordinates  
As well as being successful and popular himself, the single ruler 
also needed to have capable and faithful advisers, particularly when they 
commanded part of the army. A rebellious general could seriously threaten 
the position of the 	At the  niltaat -EharefrIva i the leader strove to 
become er-7477/es .wroiettridp and to be independent of any colleagues. Thus, 
Dionysius I, having achieved that position, then changed the commands of 
the military posts so that they were in the hands of his most faithful 
followers. 110 Likewise, Agathocles insisted that if he were to be 
/ crpars ..cdeo,99.47-AJ,9 he would not accept the position if he had to work 
with colleagues "for he would not consent as one member of the board to be 
held legally responsible for acts illegally committed by the others". 111 
This, of course, was a legal quibble. Not all generals were deposed 
because of the actions of some of them. It is clear from the account of 
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Hermocrates' exile that only some of the generals were exiled and after 
Dionysius I's first attack on the generals, the people only dismissed some 
of them. 112 Obviously, then some still retained their position despite 
Dionysius' harangue. 113 There is no evidence that this situation changed 
throughout the .Fourth Century B.C. and Agathocles' stipulation must be. seen 
as a means of obtaining sole command and of being able to choose his own 
subordinates. 
Not only tyrants, but their opponents also were careful about their 
colleagues and subordinates. Timoleon had a free hand in his selection of 
subordinates and he used capable mercenary leaders. As Talbert commented, 
"Despite the sources' lack of interest in Timoleon's subordinates it is 
clear that he had excellent lieutenants, either sent out to him (like 
Deinarchus and Demaretus) or presumably selected by 	In the 
cases where the commanders were sent to him he still retained the right, no 
doubt, to retain them or dismiss them if they were incompetent. His 
position was, however, exceptional, for as an outside liberator of Syracuse 
he was able to select his officers independent of any pyracusan elections. 
Dion had not had such an unrestricted scope, for having been elected 
cr.724b7(0S.cdroykrAT, together with his brother and twenty subordinates, 115 
his supremacy was later undermined when the Assembly chose Heracleides as 
admiral. 116  Dion opposed the election on the ground that it was contrary 
to his own position and made it quite clear that he wished to retain the 
right to approve of the appointment of any subordinates. 117 From the 
military point of view his opposition was justified since the subsequent 
rivalry between himself and Heracleides seriously endangered the concerted 
campaign against Dionysius II. 
When firmly established in power, tyrants made sure that their chief 
ministers and commanders were men whom they could trust. Their trust was 
gained either by substantial gifts of land or by kinship ties. In the case 
of land grants, Dionysius I distributed the best Syracusan land to his 
123. 
friends and high officers and established other friends and some 
mercenaries in the dwellings on Ortygia. 118 
More common, however, was the practice of securing loyalty by family 
connections. Dionysius made use of his brothers, Leptines and Thearides as 
well as his brother-in-law, Polyxenus. 119 Agathocles followed a similar 
policy. He left his brother, Antander, in charge of Syracuse when he 
campaigned in Africa, 120 and left his son in charge of the African army 
when he returned to Sicily. 121 
But when such advisers were disaffected or suspected of disaffection 
they posed a problem. Unless they were undoubtedly guilty of treason their 
death would create further trouble. The more usual solution was the 
verdict of exile, but this gave rise to the possibility that the exile 
would return and try to reinstate himself by force. In Dionysius' time, 
Philistus remained surprisingly loyal when in exile, but another friend, 
Heloris, who had been one of Dionysius' advisers when he was besieged by 
the Syracusans in 404 B.C., 122 after being banished, led the forces of the 
Crotonians and Rhegians when they were fighting against Dionysius. 123 
Fortunately, these were external wars and Heloris' activity was confined to 
Italy and did not affect the internal situation at Syracuse. 
Dionysius II was not so successful in gaining or controlling capable 
advisers. Having recalled Philistus, he was faced with the rivalry between 
Philistus and his friends and Dion and his group. In fact, Philistus' 
friends had advocated his recall for the purpose of counteracting Dion's 
influence. 124 Had Dionysius II been a stronger ruler he could have 
suppressed the rivalry or turned it to his own advantage, but since he was 
inexperienced he was heavily dependent on his advisers. Thus the potential. 
existed for the advisers to wield more power than the leader and hence 
rivalry for the chief position of influence was intense. 
Dion had apparently made his intentions quite clear from the outset. 
According to both Nepos and Plutarch, he had wished to confer with 
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Dionysius I about dividing the kingdom among Aristomaches' children, even 
though Dionysius II was the eldest son. 125 On the failure of that attempt 
he then tried to gain ascendancy in two ways. Firstly, he sent for Plato 
in an attempt to influence Dionysius II by philosophy, 126 and secondly he 
offered to use his wealth and position to settle the war with Carthage. 127 
It was this ascendancy which created envy and hatred among the other 
advisers and led to Dion's exile. What is clear about Dion's early career 
is the extent to which he was prepared to support tyranny so long as his 
own influence was assured. 128 
When Dion returned from exile to fight Dionysius, Dionysius did have 
loyal subordinates, but after the death of Philistus they do not seem to 
have been particularly capable. Timocrates had already failed to hold the 
fortress on Epipolae and had lost the rest of the city as well; and 
Apollocrates, although reinforced by mercenaries under Nypsius, was forced 
to abandon Ortygia. 
(c) Gaining the Goodwill of the People  
As well as leading mercenaries, having loyal subordinates and 
capable advisers, the leader had to gain and retain the goodwill of the 
people as a whole. There is a degree of difficulty in assessing the extent 
of acceptance of the individual leader by the masses due to the bias in the 
sources. The sources believed that tyranny was ."A cwia +. 1a+ 	44141 
people resented it. Conversely, Timoleon, since he expelled tyrants from 
Sicily was accorded lavish praise and written of as though he were a 
popular choice. Nevertheless, it is obvious that both Dionysius I and 
Agathocles were particularly successful in gaining the confidence of the 
people. Both set themselves up as champions of the democratic cause in 
opposition to oppressive oligarchic control, falsely in Dionysius' case, 
but with some degree of justice on the part of Agathocles. 
In the case of Dionysius I, even before he gained sole power he was 
popular, partly through his military skill and partly as a result of his 
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denunciation of the wealthy and renowned citizens. He knew how the people 
felt and "by suiting every word of his harangue to the people to the 
predilection of his hearers and his own personal design, stirred the anger 
of the assembly to no small degree. 129 Having gained their confidence, he 
was able to persuade it to recall the exiles, 130  dismiss his colleagues and 
elect him to sole command. 131  Thereafter, the assembly continued to meet, 
giving the appearance that the democracy was still intact, but Dionysius 
had assumed for himself the right to convene it. He made it appear as 
though the people made the decisions, and in the case of war or peace they 
still retained that right. This was particularly necessary if he were to 
have the support of the people in the event of war. Thus, when planning 
the war against Carthage in c. 398 B.C., he called an assembly of the 
Syracusans and urged them to make war on the Carthaginians. 132 The 
ultimate decision, and hence the responsibility, for the war thereby lay 
with the people. 
The power of the Assembly was one of the features of Timoleon's 
reformed constitution;, Throughout his Sicilian career he had been careful 
to win the support of the people. His demolition of the fortress on 
Ortygia, his redistribution of land and his colonisation programme were all 
actions which gained the confidence of the people. 
Precise knowledge of Timoleon's constitution is, however, limited. 
The ancient sources regarded it as a 'democratia' 133  and they give 
instances of decisions being taken by the assembly. Apparently every 
Syracusan citizen could attend, including the newly arrived settlers. 134 
The Assembly had participated in the auctioning of the statues, 135 had 
punished the wives, daughters and friends of Hicetas, 136 condemned 
Mamercus, 137 had voted that Syracuse should always employ a Corinthian 
general against people of another race, 138 and had passed the decree 
granting Timoleon posthumous honours. 139 It had a certain freedom of 
action as can be gauged by the attacks of the two popular leaders, 
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Laphystius and Demaenetus. 140 Their accusations indicate that not all 
sections of the populace were completely satisfied with Timoleon's 
constitutional arrangement. But his success reveals that a greater 
number were than were not. 
At the time of Agathocles, the Assembly appointed him '_8h4liarch 141 
and elected generals. 142 Agathocles denounced his opponents in the 
assembly143 and summoned it after his seizure of power. 144 Since the 
Assembly had the right of electing generals before the tyranny of the 
Dionysii and had it again in Agathocles' time, presumably they regained it 
under Timoleon. 
But the fact that the constitution was described as democratic and 
that decrees were made in the assembly does not necessarily mean that real 
power lay in that body for, as Finley noted, popular assemblies had 
145 continued to meet under the tyrants. 	It had operated under the Dionysii 
and not only did they have the right to convene it but they also exercised 
the right to dissolve it should it be troublesome. 146 Just how free the 
Assembly was in the time of Timoleon is difficult to assess. As Talbert 
remarked, "Plutarch's enthusiasm for Timoleon, combined with the latter's 
undoubted attempts to remove all signs of tyranny at Syracuse has created 
the misleading impression in the Life that Timoleon was a convinced 
democrat". 147 Timoleon himself, for example, continued to enjoy widespread 
civil and military powers until his resignation in 337 B.C. 
What Timoleon did do was to gain the support of the people for the 
actions he undertook. In the constitutional area these seem to have been 
done in two stages. Plutarch mentioned the reforms as having taken place 
after the capture of all Syracuse and before the battle at the River 
Crimisus and stated that Cephalus and Dionysius, simply termed lawgivers, 
. had come from Corinth to help in the work. 148  Dlodorus, however, placed 
one set of laws just after the capture of Syracuse in 343/342 B.C. and a 
further set some time after the battle at the River Crimisus. 149 Cephalus 
127. 
arrived for the second set, to preside over and set right or amend the laws. 
After the capture of Syracuse and Dionysius' departure, it is 
obvious that some constitutional arrangement would have been necessary, but 
with the threat of Carthage still imminent this must have been somewhat 
makeshift. Talbert suggested that it may well have been at this stage that 
the democratic constitution mentioned by both Plutarch and Diodorus was 
proclaimed. 150 Such a measure would have brought immense support and would 
also have provided a means for the official election of Timoleon to some 
Syracusan office. 
Accepting this supposition, Cephalus and Dionysius would have been 
summoned to make the temporary constitution more secure. Talbert believed 
that they were called from Corinth because of the historical link between 
the two places and added the point that they would be sympathetic to 
oligarchy. 151 This may well be the case, but I would stress that the 
primary reason for outside legislators was to remove this sphere of work 
from the Syracusans in order to avoid the possibility of any self interest 
on the part of any Syracusan legislators. The logical place to look for 
such persons was Corinth. 152 Although the proposed method of acquiring 
them was quite different, the need for a disinterested set of law givers 
was one of the principal recommendations of Plato's Seventh Letter. 153 
This second set of laws would be particularly necessary with the 
influx of new citizens which would only have reached its maximum after the 
defeat of the Carthaginians. 154 In this set of laws, Timoleon was 
mentioned as definitely drawing largely on the laws of ldocles. Much 
controversy has ranged about both the nature of those laws and the role of 
Cephalus, particularly in view of Diodorus' statement that Cephalus was not 
a law giver but an interpreter of the law "since men found the laws of 
Diodes, written as they were in an ancient style, difficult to 
understand". 155 
Some scholars have therefore asserted that the Diodes meant is an 
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otherwise unknown lawgiver of archaic times. 156 This requires a great deal 
of explanation as to why such a set of laws were never mentioned in earlier 
contexts in any of the extant sources. In view of the professed democratic 
basis of Timoleon's legislation it would seem likely that the Diodes to 
whom Diodorus referred was the Diodes who was a leader after the Athenian 
'expedition. The reforms made at that time were merely said to have been 
more democratic157 and hence much of the original legislation, in whatever 
wording it existed, must have been retained. Moreover, it seems reasonable 
to assert that, in the absence of use for sixty years, the laws, many of 
which would have been expressed in conventional legal usage, would have 
presented some difficulty. It was sufficiently difficult at least to 
justify Timoleon calling in a person who was ostensibly regarded as an 
interpreter of the laws but who in fact may well have reformed some of them. 
In this way Timoleon avoided incurring the resentment that Dion had incurred 
when he tried to bring in outside legislators. 158 
Thus, in his reconstruction of Syracuse and its constitution, 
Timoleon used tact and diplomacy, thereby retaining the goodwill of the 
people that he had gained when he first captured Syracuse. Timoleon's 
character and prestige were such that even after his resignation, and in 
part as a result of it, the people were prepared to willingly follow his 
advice. He had gained that prestige from his success in dealing with 
tyrants (a military prestige in fact) and from his fairness in dealing with 
the internal situation. 
The tyrants were no less careful to gain the people's confidence. 
Dionysius I, although he had successfully gained it through his military 
skill, ran the risk of losing it when he maintained his absolute position. 
On the two occasions when the people did challenge his position he showed 
moderation after he was victorious. After the uprising of 404 B.C., when 
the people were disorganised and fleeing, "not many of them, however were 
slain, since Dionysius, riding among his men, stopped them from killing the 
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fugitives". 159 Those who returned to Syracuse after the rebellion he also 
treated kindly. 160 Similarly, after the agitation of 396 B.C., Dionysius 
pursued a policy of winning the people with gifts and public banquets. 161 
Throughout his career, Dionysius showed moderation and according to 
Nepos was "free from licentiousness, extravagance and avarice, in a word, 
from all passions except that for absolute and permanent dominion". 162 
Instead he campaigned against Carthage, strongly fortified the city, and 
cultivated Syracuse as a centre of art and learning. Thus he won favour 
with the populace, and this was further increased by the fact that many 
were new citizens whose only real association with Syracuse was the fact 
that Dionysius had put them there. 
Agathocles similarly courted the favour of the masses. After his 
attack on the wealthy in 317 B.C., he "showed himself affable to the common 
people and won no slight popularily by aiding many, by encouraging no small 
number with promises, and by currying favour from all with philanthropic 
words". 163  He was also careful not to offend the Syracusan sense of 
freedom, allowing the assembly to still meet and assuming none of the 
trappings of absolute power, not even a bodyguard. 164 During the Fourth 
Century B.C., in terms of popular appeal, Hipparinus, due to drunkenness, 
and Nysaeus, due to the assumption of regal habits and licentious practices, 
were singularly lacking. 165 But they only seem to have held Ortygia and 
were thus very much apart from the people with whom they had very little 
contact. 
In the absence of military skill, tact and personality, the leader 
was liable to lose the favour of the people and they were then prepared to 
support revolutions against him. When Dionysius II assumed control he did 
so unopposed but he was careful to have his position acknowledged by an 
assembly of the people. His appeal is difficult to assess since again the 
sources were biased and made much of his reversal of fortune and the moral 
lesson to be derived therefrom. 166 Despite this moralizing tendency it 
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does seem evident that Dionysius lost contact with the people since they 
were prepared to join Dion against him. 
Not that there was any really specific charge against him apart from 
the rather general one of an oppressive tyranny. In the first instance it 
would appear that he did not mingle with the people and win them by the 
strength of his personality as his father had done, but then neither did he 
mistreat them. 167 He seems to have done nothing at all, for although he 
encouraged philosophy and learning, the people in general gained very 
little from this. This would not have mattered if he had secured their 
goodwill in the area they did understand, military success. Personal 
popularity still depended largely on military prowess. But Dionysius II 
had no popular military campaigns and his policy in general was non—
aggressive and non—imperialistic , 'other than insofar as securing the 
territory that his father had gained. 
In a similar manner, Dion, although at first popular, lost that 
popularity when he failed to fulfill what he had ostensibly maintained was 
his purpose in opposing Dionysius II.. When he first returned the rural 
people were prepared to support him, despite the fact that they were 
unarmed. 168 The people in the city must also have been under suspicion of 
favouring Dion for we hear that Dionysius' commander, Timocrates, "took 
steps to prevent disturbances in the city". 169 What these measures were we 
do not know but they were obviously ineffective. Not only did aimocrates 
lose the city and the fortress on Epipolae 170 but was unable to break 
through to the garrison on Ortygia and fled in consequence. 
Timocrates' failure illustrates the problem of control without the 
willing support of the people, in the absence of a large standing army. 
Dionysius' main forces were in Italy at that time171 and it would seem that 
the skeleton garrison was sufficient to keep the unarmed Syracusans in 
check, but not so Dion's mercenaries supported by the people. With wide-
spread Syracusan support, the capture of Syracuse with the exception of 
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Ortygia, and a small but effective mercenary force, Dion was in a 
favourable position. 
However, he failed to retain that position, due largely to his 
failure to retain the goodwill of the people. Because of his past 
associations and relationships with tyrants he was held in suspicion. With 
correct handling this could have been overcome. But with the arrival of 
Heracleides and the subsequent rivalry between the two men; a rivalry which 
culminated in the murder of Heracleides; Dion became alienated from the 
people. 
Dion made the mistake of appearing very much like a tyrant himself. 
He retained a bodyguard, employed mercenaries, used undercover agents and 
kept control over the elections. The two most immediate issues that led to 
his final downfall were the failure to demolish Ortygia (the-visual 
representation of tryannical power) and his sending to Corinth for govern-
mental help without the consent of the people. The fact that the second 
issue was held against him whereas fifteen years later Timoleon succeeded 
with a similar proposal points to the difference between the two men. 
Timoleon was careful to court the people's favour. He did demolish the 
fortifications on Ortygia and he was tactful in his use of Corinthian 
legislators. 
Dion however, remained aloof from the people, acting on his own 
initiative and presenting the people with decisions after those decisions 
had been made. As Plato had advised him, "do you also bear in mind that 
you are thought by some to be unduly wanting in affability, so do not 
forget that successful action depends on pleasing people, whereas arrogance 
is next neighbour to isolation". 172 Whether this particular advice was 
actually given to Dion by Plato or was written at some later time, it is 
indicative of the sort of warning that could have been given by an astute 
political person. Dion's failure to heed such advice resulted in 
alienation at first, and then assassination.173 
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Thus the successful Syracusan leaders in the Fourth Century were 
those who could combine military expertise with the ability to win the 
confidence of the people, either by the strength of their personality or by 
initiating what the Syracusans believed to be fair and just measures. When 
the people lost confidence in the government they either agitated against 
it or, more usually, readily supported other leaders against it. 
(d) The Ability to Deal with Opposition  
Incidents of or7,54-'s and ;c'ido- "0417s from subordinate commanders, 
relations or the people as a whole, although disruptive, were not totally 
disastrous if the government was strong enough to deal with them. The 
ability to suppress any opposition was vital to the leader's continued 
success. 
At the outset of their careers, Dionysius and Agathocles both 
forcibly removed those who were opposed to them. Dionysius I arranged it 
so that his chief opponents, Daphnaeus and Demarchus were condemned 174 and 
he was quick to use force against the uprising of the cavalry in 405 B.C. 175 
and of the people in 404 B.C. 176 albeit moderately in the latter cases. 
Thereafter he pursued a policy of reconciliation in Syracuse, merely 
directing his attention against dissident exiles at Aetna and elsewhere. 
As Diodorus remarked about him on the occasion of his double marriage in 
200 T1 0 	"he now renounced the opp'ave aspect of his tyranny ; and 
changing to a course of equitable dealing, he ruled over his subjects in 
more humane fashion, no more putting them to death or banishing them, as 
had been his practice". 177 
Agathocles was even more ruthless in his approach. After he had 
been made 'protector of the peace' in 317 B.C. 178 and had acquired an army 
of his own choosing, he summoned Diodes and Peisarchus, the men regarded 
as leaders of the Six Hundred, and had them and their forty friends 
killed. 179 After that he engaged in the mass slaughter of the wealthy and 
renowned citizens with the result that, according to Diodorus, four 
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thousand were killed and a further six thousand fled into exile. 180 
Although Diodoruse numbers may well be exaggerated, it is obvious that 
Agathocles removed the bulk of any opposition, a precaution he further 
strengthened by lodging accusations in the Assembly against those who had 
some role in the Six Hundred. His method, although ruthless, was effective 
for the alternative of exile always created the possibility that the exile 
would return as Hermocrates and Dion had done and challenge the leaders' 
position. Both Dionysius I and Agathocles were concerned with those places 
which gave refuge to exiles, hence Dionysius' campaigns in Italy, 
especially against Rhegium, and Agathocles' problems with Acragas. 
Apart from the active use of force, other security measures could be 
taken. The principal one was the establishment of fortresses as Dionysius 
did throughout Sicily. Chief among these, of course, was the fortress on 
Ortygia at Syracuse. Having established himself there, Dionysius, 
"perceiving that the Island was the strongest section of the city and could 
be easily defended, divided it from the rest of the city by an expansive 
wall and in this he set high towers at close intervals 	He also 
constructed on the Island, at great expense, a fortified acropolis as a 
place of refuge in case of immediate need, and within its walls he enclosed 
the dockyards which are connected with the small harbour". 181 He further 
strengthened his position by building a second wall across the acroposis. 182 
It was there that he established a vast arsenal of weapons, 183 including 
those which he had confiscated from the Syracusans. 184 The fortress 
remained a central point for the leader's forces until it was demolished by 
Timoleon in 343 B.C. 
.From Ortygia troops could be sent against rebellious Syracusans. In 
404 B.C. it formed a rallying point for Dionysius I. His newly acquired 
Campanian mercenaries were able to force their way through to him and a . 
further three hundred mercenaries were brought to him by sea. 185 So too, 
Dionysius II's commander was able to sally forth into Syracuse from the 
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fortress and wreak destruction on the Syracusans after they had dismissed 
Dion and his mercenaries. 186 As well as a centre from which to send forces, 
its close proximity to the rest of Syracuse allowed the ruler to maintain 
an aura of authority. Although virtually impenetrable, it could be 
besieged as it was by Dion's forces when they starved Apollocrates into 
surrender, or it could be attacked from the sea with a sufficiently large 
force, which Dionysius II must have done when he wrested the place from 
Nysaeus in 346 B.C. 
The general impenetrable nature of Ortygia raises the problem of why 
Dionysius II finally surrended to Timoleon in 343 B.C. The surrender was 
obviously negotiated on the part of Dionysius as is evident by the lenient 
treatment of him later. But what could have induced him to surrender? As 
Westlake commented, it would have been uncharacteristic of him to surrender 
after the Battle of Adranum. The circumstances of his earlier life do not 
show him to have been a coward, whatever the hostile sources may say of him. 
When he had left in 356/355 B.C. he had taken the trouble to dispatch a 
mercenary force to help his son and it was only lack of supplies that had 
induced his son to surrender. 187 
There is no reason why he should have abandoned the place. It is 
possible that news from Locri discouraged him, but it is not quite clear 
when that occurred. 188 He may have suffered from shortage of food, but the 
blockade was not strict until the Punic fleet arrived, and even then 
Plutarch had Dionysius slip out and four hundred men slip in despite the 
blockade. Moreover, Dionysius certainly possessed ships with which he 
could arrange to have supplies brought in. In any case, there does not 
seem to have been an acute shortage of food until the year after Adranum. 189 
The times of Ldonysius' surrender given by Plutarch and Diodorun are 
both suspect. Plutarch claimed that it occurred immediately after the 
Battle of Adranum. 190 This is highly improbable. Timoleon had won only 
one victory, he was far from Syracuse, possessed small forces at the time 
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and very few allies; whereas Dionysius had the means of gaining food, two 
thousand mercenaries and the stronghold of Ortygia. He could have with-
stood a siege or sailed away, either of which policies would have been 
safer than trusting Timoleon, of whom he knew very little at this stage. 
Similarly, Diodorus' assertion that Dionysius was frightened into 
surrendering once Timoleon had taken over Syracuse from Hicetas is 
incomprehensible. 191 All that had in effect happened was that the city had 
changed masters from Hicetas to Timoleon. Dionysius' position on Ortygia 
was in no way affected by the change. 
The most likely time for Dionysius to negotiate with Timoleon was 
when Hicetas appealed for formidable reinforcements from the 
Carthaginians. 192 Dionysius must have then realized that he faced the 
prospect of being more overwhelmingly blockaded by sea as well as being 
besieged by land. In anticipation of this, and in return for aid and 
supplies coming into Ortygia, Dionysius must have agreed to admit 
Timoleon's forces, especially since Timoleon had by then gained Mamercus of 
Catena as an ally. It was from Catana that food was slipped into Ortygia. 193 
Thus, Dionysius came to some agreement with Timoleon because his situation 
on Ortygia was becoming extremely dangerous, particularly as he had no 
allies in Sicily or, after the Locrians had rebelled, in Italy either. He 
could not therefore depend on importing a regular supply of food. 
Timoleon would have gained from such an agreement also. Although he 
had defeated Hicetas at Adranum, to defeat Hicetas when supported by the 
Carthaginians was another matter. He also, no doubt, proclaimed that 
Dionysius surrendered to allay any suspicions on the part of his Sicilian 
allies that he was in collusion with the. tyrant. I would also postulate•
that Dionysius did not slip through to Timoleon's camp, as Plutarch 
believed, 194 but remained on Ortygia until Timoleon's capture of the whole 
of Syracuse in 343 B.C. This reconstruction removes the problem of 
explaining why Dionysius would be so stupid as to go to Timoleon's camp on 
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trust when he was far safer on Ortygia and of how Timoleon could explain 
the continued presence of Dionysius in his camp, for Dionysius certainly 
did not go to Corinth until 343 B.C. 195 
The combined action of Timoleon and Dionysius would also explain why 
Hicetas, after the Carthaginians left, withdrew from Syracuse with only 
token fighting. A token fight further explains the contradiction in 
Plutarch when he said that Hicetas was willing to hold the parts of 
Syracuse in his possession but, on the other hand, that Hicetas was quickly 
put to flight and that none of Timoleon's forces were wounded or killed. 196 
With Timoleon's capture of Syracuse and Dionysius' departure, the 
stronghold on Ortygia was demolished. Dionysius had been forced to 
compromise his position due to his lack of allies. 197 He was therefore 
unable to deal with the many forces opposing him except by coming to terms 
with one of them. 
But by far the best method of dealing with opposition, once in power, 
was to try to avoid it. This could be achieved at two levels. At the most 
rudimentary level was the ability to detect and deal with discontent before 
it became widespread. For this reason, both Dionysii as well as Dion used 
a secret service. It was the use of this service that helped to create the 
many stories about Dionysius Its attempts to discover plots, 198 his fears 
for his own safety and the precautions he took in that area. 199 
On the broader level was the use of tact and diplomacy to appease 
people and make them willing to accept single rule. Dionysius, after he 
had established his tyranny was careful to use discretion. Timoleon was 
particularly successful in dealing with people, showing political 
astuteness when he agreed that those who opposed him should feel free to 
express that opposition through the proper channels. 200  But it must be 
noted that he died shortly after his resignation201  and we have no means of 
knowing how long the Syracusans would have been prepared to accept his 
advice so willingly. 
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Thus the successful leader needed to retain military control, have 
faithful and loyal subordinates, win the confidence of the people, and be 
capable of dealing with any opposition. In this way he could retain power 
by the strength of his personality. But no matter how successful the 
individual was in these areas, the basic problem still existed that the 
single ruler's position was extraordinary or unconstitutional and was, at 
times, deeply resented as such. 
Constitutional Difficulties  
The major problem in this area was the failure of the constitution 
to provide for the phenomenon of the successful leader. There was no 
effective way of opposing a successful general backed by military forces, 
nor was there a clearly defined and regular position for him. 202 
After the Syracusan defeat of the Athenians, the constitution became 
more democratic. But the Assembly was at the mercy of the persuasive 
speaker. The way lay open for the leader who could convince the people 
that he was working in their interests. This Dionysius I was able to do by 
playing on their fear and distrust of the regular generals, in the face of 
the threat of Carthage. As Plato remarked in a letter ostensibly written 
to counsel the followers of Dion in 353 B.C., the Syracusans at the time of 
Dionysius fell under the rule of despots due to their 'unmeasured love of 
freedom'. 203 
This was indeed what occurred, for on the strength of a military 
failure (a failure not due to negligence or betrayal), and on the basis of 
unsubstantiated rumours, the populace .was , prepared to dismiss their 
\ generals and elect Dionysius Gr7.477yos ..rayoActor7. This was a dangerous 
procedure and Diodorus remarked that some later regretted the action, once 
the emotion of the moment was no longer felt. 204 It was further complicated 
by the fact that there was no means of making the general lay down his 
extraordinary position. Thus Dionysius I and Agathocles, once in power, 
retained their positions irrespective of the wishes of the people. 
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In the case of Dionysius, it cannot be determined for certain 
whether the position was originally held for an indefinite period, or 
whether the election was for one year, to be reviewed annually. 205 But 
even if the latter were the case, the ratification was only a formality as 
was obvious in the assembly that Dionysius II spoke before, after the death 
of his father. Since both Dionysii had a large mercenary force, the 
people would have realized the uselessness of voting them out of office. 
The case of the rule of Dion and Megacles, which merely filled a gap 
until proper elections were held, was an exceptional one. In their case, 
they were not re—elected when the elections were held. 206 It was only 
after the failure of the regular generals to counteract the forces of 
Nypsius that Dion was called in to help the Syracusans again. After being 
victorious, "Heracleides came forward with a motion that Dion should be 
chosen general with absolute powers by land and sea". The people agreed, 
on the condition that Heracleides retain the position of admiral, since he 
was "altogether more a man of the people than Dion and more under the 
control of the multitude". 207 
Usually, however, there was no time limit on such positions since 
the position was created to meet an emergency situation of indefinite 
duration. As Westlake commented, "Since unscrupulous dictators, such as 
Dionysius, were able to prolong their tenure of office indefinitely, no 
constitutional means of terminating a dictatorship appears to have existed, 
and the dictator was probably expected to lay down his office as soon as 
his special task was accomplished". 208 Dionysius' continuance in the 
position was a point seized upon by Theodorus in 396 B.C. when he concluded 
his harangue with the proposition that "if he is willing to lay down office 
of his own accord, let us allow him to leave the city with his possessions; 
but if he does not choose to do so, we have at the present moment the 
fairest opportunity to assert our freedom". 209 
The opportunity to which Theodorus referred was the fact that the 
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Syracusans had their weapons. It is therefore obvious that Dionysius could 
not be removed by constitutional means, especially since he had the power 
to dissolve the Assembly. Moreover, he had force to secure his position. 
In contrast, Dion retained his position when he was no longer acceptable, 
without protecting himself adequately against the anger which retaining his 
position incurred. Timoleon, on the other hand, resigned his position when 
his command was fulfilled, but there is no indication that he was under any 
constitutional obligation to do so. 
In general, however, when the Syracusans could see advantages gained 
by the rule of a capable commander, they accepted that rule. After 396 B.C., 
Dionysius I had no serious opposition. He was able to deal with Carthage, 
strengthen Syracuse and its hold over the rest of Sicily, and extend his 
influence into Southern Italy. This ascendancy of Syracuse, the result of 
Dionysius' policies, gave benefits to the Syracusans as a whole, and, in 
part, justified his continued position. In fact Dionysius succeeded in 
bringing to fruition what had been a trend in Syracusan foreign politics 
since the mid-Fifth Century B.C. In the latter half of the Fifth Century, 
Syracusan imperialist tendencies had become apparent. The defeat of 
Acragas in 445 B.C. was taken by Diodorus as marking the definite establish-
ment of Syracusan hegemony in Sicily, 210 a hegemony acknowledged by all 
other cities. And it seems probable, in view of her subsequent actions, 
that she aimed at something more than hegemony. 211 
Such a policy required capable and respected generals. Under the 
democracy there was a general distrust of generals and hence the Syracusans 
were inclined to change their generals frequently, thereby not allowing any 
one general sufficient time to implement policy or co-ordinate military 
strategy. This, together with the conflict between rival families, enabled 
one person to rise above the others if he should get the support of the 
people. The situation is illustrative of Aristotle's comment that "the 
greatest number of tyrants have risen, it may be said, from being demagogues, 
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having won the people's confidence by slandering the nobles". 212 
The same was true of the rise of Agathocles, but at that time the 
constitution seems to have been fluctuating between democracy and oligarchy. 
Whatever the constitutional arrangements made by Timoleon, and these 
included such democratic elements as the election of generals by the 
Assembly, 213 it is clear from Diodorus' account of the rise of Agathocles, 
that the sectional interests of the wealthy families had gained ascendency, 
in either an unofficial capacity as part of the numerous clubs which strove 
to acquire key positions in the State for themselves, or by the establish-
ment, for a short period of time, of the rule of Six Hundred. 
Much discussion about the Six Hundred centres around whether it was 
a political club or a constitutional council. 214 But the main point is, 
surely, that the two are not incompatible. It was a more organised and 
larger group than the usual political clubs, and possibly consisted of a 
union of several clubs, one of which was that to which Heracleides and 
Sosistratus were attached. It would seem reasonable to assert that they 
were a club, but at the time when they seized power, they ruled as an 
oligarchy. For this reason, Diodorus remarked that when those around 
Sosistratus were expelled, many others were also expelled "on the ground 
that they had been members of the oligarchy of Six Hundred". 215 
Further evidence that some oligarchy existed is seen in the fact 
that when these men were exiled and democracy resumed, a war arose between 
the exiles and the supporters of democracy, at which time Agathocles 
returned to Syracuse. After Agathocles' expulsion by Acestorides and his 
second return, Diodorys passed the comment that the various clubs were 
divided and "important differences existed, but the chief group opposed was 
the council of Six Hundred, which had directed the city in the time of the 
oligarchy 1 . 216 This, I believe, indicates that they had been an oligarchic 
Council, but that after that, they once again existed as a club in 
opposition to both Agathocles and some other clubs. The fact that 
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Agathocles gained support from people who were hostile to both the Six 
Hundred and the democracy further illustrates the difference between the 
Six Hundred and any democratic Council that may have existed. It is also 
noteworthy that Agathocles, after the revolution of 317 B.C., called an 
Assembly and lodged the accusation that the Six Hundred had brought the 
oligarchy into existence. 217 
What does emerge, despite the confusion of terminology, is the fact 
that the leading families were blind to the reality of the political 
situation. They obviously operated the constitution in their own interests 
and made no concessions to the people, particularly the poorer elements, 
nor did they conceive of anything like a system of reform that could have 
removed the sources of discontent. Because of their exclusiveness, 
Agathocles was able to rise to the position of tyrant with the claim that 
he was restoring democracy. 218 He was able to continue in power since he 
retained the confidence of the people (his executions were largely directed 
against the wealthy minority) and as a result of his military prowess 
against Carthage and throughout Sicily. 
But on the advent of a weak or passive ruler, there was no constitu-
tional safeguard to protect the position of the single ruler. Thus 
Dionysius II's policy of peace and non-imperialism lost him the favour of 
the masses and ultimately his position. On his first expulsion, there was, 
however, no constitutionally sound alternative as can be seen from the 
years of chaos that continued until Timoleon reorganized the constitution. 
But Timoleon was not able to solve the problem of the power of the sucCess-
ful general, nor the inclination of the Syracusans to entrust government to 
an individual. 
The only executive position (apart from the military ones) 
instituted by Timoleon, on which we have information, was the Amphipolia of 
Olympian Zeus. 219 It is not clear whether he elevated an existing 
institution or created a new one. The office was held annually, the years 
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being dated by the office. 220 The method of election was to decide by lot 
from candidates of three aristocratic families or classes, one candidate 
being chosen from each by popular vote. 221 
This office may have been a concession to the upper classes, but it 
clearly held little authority. It was possibly instituted to conceal where 
the real power lay, for it was a position of glory rather than one of 
political power. The office remained into Roman times, a further indication 
that it had no potent political force and despite the three and a half 
centuries of its existence, none of the Amphipoloi made a mark on Syracusan 
history. As Westlake noted, "the silence can hardly be accidental, for at 
times of unrest, such as that which preceded the tyranny of Agathocles, the 
Amphipolos of the year would surely have taken some action to maintain the 
constitution, had his powers been more than formal"? 22 
The Syracusans were not without some safeguards against the 
ascendancy of the single ruler, but these were ineffective. In the first 
instance they had recourse to fines against individuals who created an 
uproar in the Assembly. These the archon of the time had imposed on 
Dionysius I when he attacked the conduct of the generals. 223 The move was 
unsuccessful since Philistus was wealthy enough to pay any amount of such 
fines that the archon might impose. There was obviously no provision for 
dismissing a troublemaker from the Assembly and the fact that they thought 
the imposition of .a fine was a sufficient deterrent is probably indicative 
of the attitude that the:aemagogues who were most likely to stir up the 
Assembly were not from the wealthier classes and hence a fine would be 
sufficient to silence them. 
Another safeguard was the threat of exile, but this tended to be a 
weapon in the hands of politicians for the removal of their rivals. It is 
noteworthy, however, that even after Hermocrates succeeded in discrediting 
his rival, Diodes, the Syracusans would not receive him back "since they 
were wary of the daring of the man and feared lest, once he had gained a 
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position of leadership, he should proclaim himself tyrant". 224 But, of 
course, exile was only possible where the intentions of the individual were 
known or suspected beforehand. Once Dion had gained power in Syracuse, 
although the people suspected him of tyrannical intentions, they needed him 
and his forces to expel Dionysius II. Once he had established himself as 
ef-po.e-r7yes 4 0-4,9/9'-vrev," and retained that position indefinitely, they were not 
in a position to exile him. Exile had the added problem that the person 
exiled would effect their return by force. Hermocrates, the exiles at 
Leontini who appealed to Timoleon, Dion and Agathocles had all tried to do 
this, with varying degrees of success. 
The other attempted safeguard was to limit the office of general in 
a major campaign to a Corinthian. This decree was passed in view of 
Timoleon's honourable behaviour. 225 It would appear that it was a modifi- 
cation of an earlier law, mentioned by Diodorys in Theodorus' speech against 
Dionysius when Theodorus claimed that "The chief command must be given, 
according to the laws, either to citizens, or to the Corinthians who dwell 
in our mother city, or to the Spartans who are the first power in 
Greece". 226 Of the decree passed in Timoleon's time, we only hear of it 
having been used once when, during the factional strife that preceded 
Agathocles' dictatorship, Acestorides was elected general. 227 Although he 
was able to temporarily check the disturbances by ordering Agathocles out 
of the city and effecting the recall of the other exiles, he was unable to 
prevent Agathocles' return since Agathocles had an independent military 
backing. 
Thus, despite these various safeguards, single rulers were able to 
establish themselves in power and retain that power unconstitutionally. 
The lack of sufficient deterrents for revolutionaries was fatal in a 
community in which the nature of the government was a controversial issue. 
Without centralized forces, a government was unable to guarantee that the 
city was safe from insurrection. It was the ability to give that guarantee 
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that helps explain the prevalence of tyrants in• Syracuse. Unlike 
oligarchies and democracies, they successfully maintained their position by 
the threat of or use of force. 
But, the power of the tyrants of the Fourth Century B.C. was 
unconstitutional. This is evident from the bulk of the references to their 
position in the ancient sources. In the case of the two Dionysii, even if 
they were occasionally addressed as monarchs, they did not rule by virtue 
of monarchy as a constitutional position. Some scholars, by gathering 
together a few scattered references to the Dionysii as kings, have sought 
to maintain that the tyrants formally used the title of king. I will deal 
with the views of S.I. Oost since his article is the most recent to put 
forward this viewpoint. 228 
Oost considered that the best evidence for the use of the royal 
title is found in Lysias speech against Andocides, where Lysias speculated 
that an acquittal for Andocides might lead to him being elected king 
archon. 229 He then proceeded to point out that Andocides had flattered 
kings, but that Dionysius of Syracuse was not deceived by him. On the 
basis of this, Oost asserted that "we surely seem here to be dealing with 
an official and therefore religious title, not flattery or courtesy", and 
that we might well expect a remark that Dionysius was really only a tyrant, 
if in fact he did not bear the toyal title. 230 Oost believed that the 
implication was that the title was to be regarded in the traditional and 
sacred form of ancient Greek kingship. 
Oost has failed, however, to acknowledge the essentially rhetorical 
nature of the work and therefore of the presentation of the information 
contained within it. He is right in his assertion that it was not flattery 
or courtesy, but this does not mean that it ought to be taken as official 
and religious. The point that Lysias was making was the extent to which 
Andocides was known in the Greek world and to illustrate this he mentioned 
his contact with autocratic rulers, loosely grouping the lot under the 
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, 	/ title of facr/Acus . Specific detail on this point was not relevant to 
Lysias' purpose and the distinction between tyrant and king unnecessary. 
In fact, the grouping together of kings and tyrants as odious auto-
crats occurs elsewhere in Lysias. In his Olympic Oration he stressed the 
danger to Greece of the King of Persia and of Dionysius, referred to there 
as a tyrant. 231 The distinction was necessary in that instance since the 
invective was directed primarily against Dionysius, whose representatives 
were present at the games. Accordingly he pointed out Dionysiusl 
unconstitutional position by referring to him as a tyrant. 
If, as Oost believed, on the evidence of Oration VI, Dionysius I . 
assumed the royal title before c. 399 B.C. when that speech was 
delivered, 232 then it is necessary for him to explain why Lysias referred 
to Dionysius as a tyrant in his Olympic Oration of 388 B.C., or how 
Dionysius came to lose the title at a time when his power was both more 
secure and more extensive. Furthermore, Oost's claim that the use of 
1 	• Apeo-Otfos implied a reference to the traditional concept of kingship is 
based on a juxtapositioning of this reference with that to the Athenian 
king-archon. But the king-archon was mentioned as a position to which the 
impious Andocides may be elected and the consequent horror of all Greeks 
who came to attend the mysteries if they were to find Andocides in that 
position. It was then necessary for Lysias to show that the rest of the 
Greek world knew who Andocides was and thus the mention of Dionysius must 
be seen in the latter context only. 
One further speech by Lysias, the speech 'On the Property of 
Aristophanes', mentioned Dionysius and there he was merely referred to by 
name. 233 I maintain, therefore, that very little weight ought to be placed 
on the varied and loose terminology of an orator. Moreover, if, as Oost 
believed, the Athenians were aware of Dionysius' position as king, it seems 
extraordinary that they did not use that title in their decrees concerning 
him. 234 In thoset decrees it was the Athenians who wanted something from 
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Dionysius, not the reverse, so it is highly probable that they would have 
referred to him in the highest possible terms, and this would have been as 
a king, if it had been possible to do so. 
What he was referred to as in the decrees was archon of Sicily. 
This would appear to be a stroke of diplomacy and an attempt to explain 
Dionysius' power throughout Sicily. There is no need to believe r as did 
Beloch, that this was proof that the title was hereditary. 235 As Finley 
astutely commented, "Archon was a common title in Greek cities, among them 
Athens itself, designating the annually elected chief official, but the 
word almhad the generic sense of 'ruler" 236 Be also pointed out that 
Sicily was a geographical term and not a political one and for this reason 
the title should be seen as meaning the places over which Dionysius ruled, 
a phrase which is actually used in one of the treaties. This use of 
in the general sense of ruler also occurred in Diodorus. Theodorus, in his 
speech against Elonysius I urged that if Dionysius laid down his ,e./Xf of 
his own free will, he ought to be allowed to leave the city, and 
Dionysius II was said to have tried to came to terms with Dion in 356 B.C. 
by offering him half his 	and then the whole of it. Another wide 
term used by Diodorus was L1440-re .240 This word also had the general 
meaning of holding power and did not denote an official position as such. 
In the case of the Athenian decree of 368/367 B.C., in order to 
avoid the use of the word tyranny, yet make provision for the continuance 
of the treaty should Dionysius die, it was made binding to Dionysiusl 
descendants as well. Dionysius' tyranny had by then been operative for 
thirty eight years, it was known 'to be strong, and it was likely therefore 
that it would pass to one or other of his relations on his death. 241 I see 
no reason why "it is natural to connect such a provision with royalty" •242 
The only assumption that can be made is that it was assumed the Dionysiusl 
rule would be hereditary, not that it was necessarily royal. 
The other direct reference to Dionysius as a king occurs in 
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Polybius. 243 Polybius noted that both Agathocles and Dionysius became 
tyrants of Syracuse and were officially recognized as kings of the whole of 
Sicily. But, as Oost himself recognized, Polybius was "more heated in his 
opinion than is ordinslrily the case for he was engaged in polemical argu-
mentation" . 244 In such instances, Polybius was certainly-not free from 
error, and since he was praising these two men in contrast to the Egyptian 
Agathocles, his terminology was not meant to be precise, but rather 
illustrative. It is similar to his error when attacking Ttaaaus' alleged 
inaccuracy. At that point Polybius had Hermocrates . take part in the Battle 
of Aegospotami and thus share in the Spartan defeat of the Athenians 245 
when in fact, not only had Bermocrates been deprived of his command in the 
Aegean in 410 B.C., but had been dead for some four years when that battle 
took place. So much for Polybius accuracy when discussing his personal 
likes and dislikes. 
Oost also referred to the references to the regal attire and 
equipage of Dionysius I and Dionysius II. He cited the example of Bato of 
Sinope who mentioned a diadem, the purple, and other equipment of 
Dionysius. 246  However, he conveniently omitted the fact that the fragment, 
while mentioning such regalia, referred to Dionysius as a tyrant. Oost 
further mentioned the fragment of Duris. 247 This fragment mentioned a long 
robe and a crown of gold, together with a buckled mantle usually worn by 
tragic actors. Given Dionysius' interest in the theatre, such dressing up 
need mean no more than a predilection for fine clothing, with, of course, 
the feeling of magnificence and glory that was attached to it. It is not 
mentioned that these things were official symbols of office and in any 
case, such regalia was common to both tyrants and kings. Moreover, the 
mention of such clothing had a didactic purpose. It was thought to be 
extravagant in itself and even more so for one who was not actually a king. 
Thus Diodorus thought it praiseworthy that Agathocles, before he was a 
king, "neither assumed the diadem, nor employed a bodyguard, nor affected a 
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haughty demeanour, as is the custom of almost all tyrants". 248 
A similar viewpoint can be adopted toward the mention of Lionysiust 
royal equipage by Diodorus249 and the royal chariot Plutarch mentioned as 
/ being put at Plato's disposal. 250 In both eases the wordAcriAlAos need 
mean no more than courtly for tyrants, like monarchs, did have a court and 
the adjective was used to express the splendour, luxury and wealth of a 
court. To express such a concept, the authors could hardly say 9tyrannical 
equipment'. This, if it had any meaning at all, would be taken as 
referring to the tyrant's bodyguard and arsenal. 
The word igo-/A , /,0:5 . therefore, is appropriate in context but does 
not necessarily imply royal in the monarchial sense. The reference of 
Liogenes the Cynic to Aristippus as being Monysius' royal dog can be 
treated in the same way. 251 Furthermore, a comment made in an obviously 
satirical light can hardly have the weight of serious evidence. I have 
heard of the Prime Minister of Australia referred to as 'the little 
dictator', 'His Lordship' and even 'His Highness' in satirical pamphlets. 
Neither the authors of those pamphlets nor their readers would take any of 
such references to denote or indicate an official position. 
Cost correctly noted that the Raman authors quite commonly referred 
to both Dionysii as 'rex' or used related words. 252  Quite reasonably, he 
also asserted that it strains credulity to believe that all such references 
derive from the favourable account of Philistus. Besides the fact that the 
word tyrannus' was also frequently used, the works of Cicero and Nepos were 
concerned with moral and ethical considerations and the word 'rex' 
sufficiently odious connbtations to the prevalent Republican sentiments to 
suit the authors' purposes at the time in which they wrote. The word was 
used, therefore, not with care toward constitutional precision, but rather 
to engender a feeling of disapproval. Justin, writing some three centuries 
later, was notoriously loose in his terminology and can hardly be used with 
reliability on such matters. 
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Against these scattered references, Plato, Aristotle, Diodorus and 
Plutarch constantly referred to the Dionysii as tyrants and their rule as 
a tyranny, or they merely mentioned them by name. Oost himself recognised 
that tyrant and tyranny were the common reference, but to illustrate the 
extent of those references I have listed them below. 253 Polyaenus and 
Aelian, it might be noted, used similar terminology. 254 The sheer body of 
evidence that the rule of the Dionysii was recognised as a tyranny should 
be sufficient to dispel Oost's theory. 
Three minor points made by Oost also need to be considered. His 
assertion that Diodorus ai XIV 66.1 said that no-one would compare 
Dionysius with Gelo may mean that such comparisons may well have been made, 
putting the two on more or less the same footing, 255 has no weight as 
evidence of Dionysian royalty. Apart from the fact that the comparison is 
meaningless if Oost's claim for Gelo's royalty is not conceded, the words 
were put in the mouth of Theodorus who was being deliberately provocative. 
Moreover, if Oost's hypothetical comparisons had been made, they would most 
likely have been made on the basis that both Gelo and Dionysius were 
tyrants and both fought against the Carthaginians. 
Oost's conjecture that Diodorus or his sources may have carefully 
expunged a number of references to Monysius' royalty256 appears to me to 
be somewhat desperate. It arises from seeing more in the word Ago-/X/A4 
than is actually meant, as I have discussed above. If such a line of 
argument is to be indulged in, one could accuse Plutarch, because of his 
reference to Timoleon's resignation from therov.tpr4 of having expunged a 
number of references to Timoleon's monarchy, something no-one has seriously 
considered, since the context and narrative of Timoleon's career in Sicily 
make it clear that the word means sole command. 
\ 	> 	/ 
ccvAyThirdly, Oost found the appointment of Dion to 	7>'c q48  ' 8  
odd, "if for half a century the power of tyrants had been expressed through 
this nominal office". 259 I do not see why this should be odd at all. The 
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Dionysii had held office in defiance of the Syracusans, and I know of no 
other appropriate office to which Dion could have been elected by the 
Syracusans. The fact that the Dionysii had abused the position (as in fact 
Dion also did later), does not negate the validity or purpose of the office. 
There is then, no real foundation for Oost's view that the Dionysii 
were recognised as kings as well as tyrants. The position of the Dionysii 
was unconstitutional. The major philosophers and historians alike regarded 
them as tyrants. Whatever the Dionysii may have said about themselves on 
occasions, and this in itself is undermined by Cost's own acknowledgement 
that politicians frequently lie, 260 and however 'regal' their court, they 
were clearly not acknowledged as kings. 
Similarly, Agathocles was regarded as a tyrant and ( held position by 
virtue of his military strength and the nominal position of  
/ 
0(07-0,t,e.modp until c. 305 B.C. when, in imitation of the Hellenistic kings, 
he proclaimed himself king. 261 In contrast to Dionysius, Agathocles was 
recognised as such by other powers, and he used the title on the coins 
minted after his assumption of the kingship. 262 But the position was not 
made constitutional and after the murder of the younger Agathocles by 
Archagathus, Agathocles, just before his death, "declared that he restored 
to the people their self-government". 263 
In fact the whole problem of Syracusan politics in the Fourth Century 
B.C. was the bifurcation in attitude among the Syracusans toward the role of 
the single ruler. On the one hand, there was the deep rooted Greek fear of 
tyranny, and on the other, the Syracusan willingness to entrust the govern-
ment to a general with full powers, as they did to Dionysius I, 
Dionysius II, Dion, Timoleon (probably), and Agathocles. Diodorus noticed 
this when he said that "more than anywhere else this tendency toward the 
rule of one man prevailed in Sicily before the Romans became rulers of that 
island". 264 However, the continued ascendancy of each of these individuals 
was not given a corresponding constitutional legality. 
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CHAPTER FOUR : THh EFFECT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS  
In investigating the more general conditions that promoted 
revolutionary change it is necessary to distinguish between external and 
internal conditions. The major external condition that affected Syracuse 
in the period in question here was the existence or threat of war, 
principally with Carthage. The existence of war can be said to have caused 
revolutionary change insofar as a war produced precarious situations which 
made the internal decisions at Syracuse more crucial than they would other-
wise have been. In such cases, decisions were often made in the light of 
the nearness of armed forces or as a result of the competence or incom-
petence of those in charge of the war effort. Thus, war provided occasions 
on which military ability was used as a political weapon. It was just such 
a weapon that Hermocrates used Against Diodes, Dionysius used to obtain 
office, and Dion's opponents used to secure his exile. 
But the support for the instigators on such occasions came from 
groups who were already prepared to support one group Against another. What 
needs to be questioned is the reason for the existence of such sectionalism, 
for it was the existence of such rival groups that was a precondition of 
revolutionary change, irrespective of war or the possibility of one group 
obtaining outside assistance. It is this condition for revolutionary 
change which will be the main concern here. 
The motives attributed to the revolutionaries by Aristotle and 
Thucydides were all based on inequalities. 1  The basis of those 
inequalities needs to be reviewed in the light of what the revolutionaries 
hoped to change and why they thought it necessary to resort to arms or the 
threat of them in order to achieve their ends. 
On the simplest level, there were two factors - the two (or more) 
contending factions and the people as a whole, who might be initially 
ignored, but whose acceptance was necessary for any change to be effective. 
In all cases there was a belief on the part of the opposing factions that 
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they should rule and that they should have power. The existence of 
factions was a key feature in revolutionary change, for it was these 
factions who could use the people in a co-ordinated way. 
These factions were split over the question of different political 
ideologies, or over who should be in control of a particular ideology. 
Where the conflict was within a particular ideology, it centred mainly 
around the personal desire for power and most truly reflects personal 
motivations. This was evident in the conflicts between rival groups in the 
court of Dionysius II and in the fights that occurred in the years between 
his expulsion and his return. Where the conflict was between different 
ideologies it had wider implications concerning the socio-economic basis of 
those who were to control the government. Insofar as groups maintained the 
right to leadership on the basis of socio-economic elitism, this can be said 
to have engendered revolutions in a century when socio-economic conditions 
were undergoing considerable change. 
While the motivation of those who led revolutions was often of a 
personal kind, the support given to them by various sections of the 
population was usually given in response to socio-economic grievances. In 
this area there were two types of grievance. In the first instance, many 
revolutions were supported by those who wished to gain the political 
privileges which had been denied them because of their socio-economic 
status. The second type was a desire for a complete socio-economic change 
and was distinguished by the cry for abolition of debts, for redistribution 
of land and for economic-social equality. 2 
The General Socio-Economic Situation 
While not being a prime motive for revolutionary change, the fact 
that sharp divisions in wealth and social standing existed could be used by 
revolutionaries as a basis upon which to gain support for their cause. 
A. Fuks, in his various articles, argued that the consciousness of the 
division between wealth (7rX0■3-fe's ) and poverty 	) only became 
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really developed after the seventies of the FOurth Century B.C. 3 In the 
sense that these concepts became more prominent as distinct concepts after 
that time, particularly through the rise of unemployment and the creation, 
on the Greek mainland, of large numbers of rootless people, many of whom 
sought relief through mercenary service, his comment was valid. But when 
he sought to differentiate, albeit with allowances for the difficulty of so 
doing, between politically and economically motivated revolutions, he seems 
to have under-estimated the economic and social basis of political 
attitudes in both the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. 
In fact it was the existence of sharp social and economic divisions 
that enabled politicians to use the widening or lessening of the franchise 
as a political slogan. Statesmen were prepared to enlist an under-
privileged group to their side if it enabled them to secure their political 
position. 4 This is not to say that what the people believed they would get 
was what they actually did get, but the fact that they gave their support 
shows that they believed they would benefit from so doing. How illusionary 
this belief was will be dealt with later. What. is important to note here 
is that throughout the Fifth Century B.C. the poor, often equated with the 
many, were prepared to support those who who promised political privileges 
in the hope that this would bring them other privileges and that an 
antagonism existed between the rich and the poor, although it was not often 
expressed as such, but rather in terms of the political concepts of 
oligarchy and democracy. 
G.E.M. De Ste Croix noted this and his comments are worth quoting in 
full: "It is not legitimate to object that although the economic character 
of Greek party divisions is clear enough by Aristotle's time, the situation 
was not the same in the Fifth Century. In fact there is ample evidence to 
prove the existence of precisely the same general groupings, not only in 
the early Fourth Century, but also in the Fifth. Xenophon, for example, 
specifically opposes the terms "40$ and rAcwo-e21-1-t,- and defines the demos 
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(whose rule is r weipatA,‘) mot nv.7.-/s 77.1//10A ,71 and in the brilliant e 
little oligarchic pamphlet containing a fictitious conversation between 
Alcibiades and Pericles, incorporated in the Memorabilia, we find the 
,^ ruling power in a democracy, -7.0 )74,20s , opposed to (and conceived as 
tyrannising over) the owners of property. Similarly, the Oxyrhynchus 
historian, writing in the year 396, divides the Athenians into .97- il47 Fe 7; 
\ 	 / 	 reA\oL 	cis ovr,•tot lot ,w 0,0-/as 'Z and 0, / 	 r 	. For the Fifth Century 
we have a contemporary pamphlet, that of Pseudo-Xenophon (the "Old 
Oligarch"), which takes it for granted that the Greek states were deeply 
divided on social and economic lines into broad groups between which there 
existed a permanent and deep-seated antagonismu. 5 
At Syracuse, such divisions were firmly established by 415 B.C. when 
Athenagoras, as reported by Thuoydides, represented the alternative to 
democracy as rule by the owners of property. 6 A very basic, but sometimes 
overlooked point, is the fact that those who supported oligarchic control 
did so on the basis of a property qualification, extreme oligarchs 
advocating a high lower-limit for that qualification. Since ownership of 
land was a criterion for social and economic superiority, such a political 
belief was firmly based on a recognition of social and economic difference. 
Such attitudes resulted in antagonism toward and prejudice against 
the rich. These prejudices existed even when democratic rule enabled the 
less wealthy to exercise some political rights. Thus Dionysius I, in his 
rise to power, not only used the fact that the generals of the time had 
failed in their campaign Against Carthage, but also laid emphasis upon 
their social and economic standing. He lodged appeals against the most 
renowned citizens (twatone-roc) and advised the assembly not to choose 
generals from the influential ( 0c) citizens but from those 
favourable to the populace (c/1.7.600, maintaining that the renowned 
citizens had contempt for the general people. 7 In so doing he played upon 
popular prejudices and gained popular sympathy. In this way he succeeded 
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in having himself and other new generals elected and after further 
discrediting his own colleagues became general with full powers. His 
ability to secure his advancement by these means reveals the rift that 
existed between the rich and the poor in Syracuse and the readiness of the 
poor to elect a person who professed to be against the rich and socially 
superior. The ease with which he did this also shows the extent and 
intensity of that rift. 
The terminology used to describe the two groups is instructive. 
.Those who were En70-1,14071;47p c- and 	were opposed to those who were 
rrorl,de. In Diodorus' description, the effect of the rumours was great 
with the common crowd (i 	) but less with the respectable 
citizens (Wtro-vrevvc ) since they did not believe them. 8 Since some of 
the generals were relieved from office by the assembly, this indicates that 
the "common crowd" were far greater in number than the "respectable", 
"renowned" and "powerful" citizens. Dionysius further exploited the class 
divisions when he secured for himself a bodyguard from the "men without 
property". 9 
The opposing groups were believed to be in existence by the end of 
the Fifth Century B.C. and from the pamphlet of the Old Oligarch, which has 
been dated to the last quarter of the Fifth Century, 10 the terminology 
used to describe the two groups is apparent. There was the propertied 
class who were usually called oc.)97o --;-ac , but also oc gAoua'eoc) yzi44ecot 
0 \fly° c re/ tea r iv/ 	o c 	-nac ro 	14. c VC' s .7c  
"ro AA77,3-7-0 1/. Since these words were used more or less synonymously it 
shows that the wealthy and socially superior were equated with the few and 
that in terms of morality they were also regarded as better citizens. In 
r r- opposition to them were the poor, usually described as pc gbyrk er  
o as0Z. WI-evrYs 09"T"'"/) crr C.-(c) 	l/ / 	)‹coos_s) but also 	 .te o—ro ) 2A7P 190 / 
?14(, s • 1 1 
	
The correlation of 2.; 	S and 	 poverty is explicit in two 
passages where 9,6401 was opposed to .9C 07- A / \ .000-%0 c 12  and it is implicit 
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throughout. 13 There . was also the equation that the poor were many and that 
it was an evil thing to be poor. Such terminology was repeated in the 
extant sources on Syracuse in the Fourth Century. 14 That such terminology 
was also used by the Old Oligarch is evidence that it was prevalent in the 
time in question and was not the result of linguisitic usage that developed 
in accordance with the conditions under which the later authors (or their 
sources) wrote. 
One consistent feature that emerges is the fact that the wealthy 
were a minority and the poor were the majority. TheTleaders of the demos 
were nearly always members of the upper class or close to it 15 until, in 
Sicily, the time of Agathocles who, although the son of an obscure new 
colonist, was able to rally a sufficient force of poor citizens and 
mercenaries to overthrow the rich who held the power at that time. 16 
The relationship between the leaders and the more wealthy citizens 
meant the plight of the poor was rarely improved. For, whatever measures 
Dionysius took to relieve the situation of the poor, and these seem to have 
been considerable in the area of unemployment, 17 he himself remained allied 
to the influential group and he obviously restored Hipparinus' lost wealth 
since Dion was able to live in comfort. Dionysius' desire to link himself 
with the powerful clique at Syracuse is evident in his marriages, first to 
Hermocrates' daughter and thento Hipparinus'. 18 
Dionysius, however, did show some sense of social justice insofar as 
it was the wealthy who bore the brunt of his methods of direct and indirect 
taxation. By this means, as well as by looting of foreign temples and the 
spoils of war, he was able to finance his standing army, the refortification 
of Syracuse and his wars with Carthage. By the strength of his personality 
he was able to reconcile the paradox of being allied to the social elite 
with his supposed championship of the poor. 
But in a less popular person the duality of such a position was a 
danger. This was a problem faced by Dion in 356 B.C. His own wealth and 
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his connections with the wealthy group and in particular with the tyrant, 
alienated him from the group which had at first hailed him as the liberator 
of Syracuse. 19 Dion sought to free Syracuse from the tyranny but he was 
not in favour of a complete socio-economic revolution, Whereas many of his 
supporters, some of whom came_ from the country areas, envisaged just such a 
radical change. As A. Fuks noted, "The story of Syracuse in 356 B.C. is 
first and foremost a story of stasis - a struggle between Dion and the 
forces warring for the preservation of the existing socio-economic order 
and the forces striving to revolutionize it". 20 
Dion was in fact opposed to those who wished to restore a democracy 
of the kind that had existed before Dionysius I's time. His "intransigence, 
his haughty behaviour, his past connections with tyranny, his bodyguard - 
all these contributed to the feeling of the Syracusans that they might have 
exchanged 'a stupid and drunken tyrant for a watchful and sober . master". 21 
It was amid this feeling of distrust that the Syracusans looked to 
Heracleides as a leader and at some time after his arrival he took sides 
with the popular movement. This popular movement included the rural poor 
as well as the poor in the city. The latter group gained greater confidence 
after the defeat of Dionysius II's naval force since many of the poorer 
classes were those upon which the manpower of the fleet was based. 22 
After the naval victory and further dissension the forces of Dion 
were expelled, but the popular party was hard pressed to retain control 
against Dionysius II's commander, Nypsius, and felt it necessary to ask for 
further assistance from Dion and his mercenaries who were then stationed at 
Leontini. But when a respite occurred following Nypsius' initial attack, 
/, the popular leaders (0,/-*A,ryck) began again to counsel against accepting 
Dion's help and accordingly new messengers were sent to Dion, some coming 
from the generals themselves, forbidding his advance. Significantly, the 
cavalry and more respectable citizens (r470) acted independently and 
urged Dion to hasten his return to the city. 23 The issue was resolved when 
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Nypsius launched a further attack and Dion's help was essential to avert 
the complete destruction of the Syracusans. 
On resuming power Dion was forced to make concessions. Although he 
was at first elected general with absolute power by land and sea, 24 a move 
favoured by the aristocracy, the opposition from the "sailors and day 
labourers" forced him to yield command of the sea to Heracleides. The 
rivalry between the two opposing groups, Heracleides and the naval forces 
and Dion and the land forces, continued until the fleet was disbanded 
"since it was of no use, while it involved great outlays for the crews, and 
caused dissension among the commanders 	26 
The lack of any social or economic policy on the part of Dion shows 
that his real concern was not the condition of the people. 27 The 
opposition that grew up against him was largely due to a divergence of 
interest between himself and those whom he claimed to be liberating. As 
A. Fuks astutely noted, "the populace welcomed Dion as a saviour and chose 
him 'strategos autocrator' of the Syracusan democracy. But the liberation 
from the tyranny was regarded by the demos as only the first step on the way 
to freedom. The next step they hoped for should have been liberation from 
want and poverty...". 28 The people in fact were not so much motivated by 
opposition to tyranny as such, but rather by the desire to alleviate their 
economic distress, which they believed necessitated a 'change of government. 
But Dion had no such economic and social aims., The economic and 
social situation remained basically the same and Dion sav to it that the 
political one did also. Whatever the stated aims of Dion are in the 
tradition, 29 they were not carried out. They are, however, indicative of 
his general position. The key features of those aims were just laws and 
rule by a minority. The advice given in Plato's Seventh Letter at 337B2.ID, 
which was supposedly in accord with Dion's ideas, was strongly elitist in 
nature. It made the unfair correlation of social standing and wealth with 
intelligence and fairness. The men who were supposed to be the only ones 
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capable of forming and administering the laws were "men who are, in the 
first place, old, and who have wives and children at home, and forefathers 
as numerous and good and famous as possible, and who are all in possession 
of ample property". 
It can be seen from such beliefs that there was little real concern 
for economic and social inequalities. In Dion's case, there was not even a 
real move toward just laws. Admittedly he was only in control of Syracuse 
for less than two years, but there is no indication of any activity apart 
from sending to Corinth for advisers. All he actually achieved was to 
alienate the poorer since their plight was not improved in any way and the 
richer through his self will and aloofness and his ambition to "curb the 
Syracusans who were given to excess, license and luxury". 30 Furthermore, 
by placing himself in the key governmental position, Dion had prevented the 
•operation of the normal processes of government, through whioh some of the 
problems may have been solved. His failure to solve adequately the 
constitutional question led to the chaos of the decade after his death, a 
chaos which further ruined Syracuse and Sicily economically. 
Dion is perhaps the most obvious failure in this area, but in general, 
the alignment of those in power with the socio-economic elite and their' 
failure to solve the problem of the poor, particularly in relation to 
•changing conditions, was the cause of the frequency with which civil 
disturbances occurred in the Fourth Century B.C. 
The Widening of Privilege and the Change of Values  
The economic and social changes of the Greek World in the Fifth 
Century B.C. had brought about an increase in international outlook which 
undermined the economic social, psychological and moral security of the 
inward-looking polls with its aim (however idealistic that aim may have been) - 
of self sufficienOy. In Syracuse, the wars with the Athenians and the 
Carthaginians stressed this tension by demanding international commitments, 
but they were by no means its cause. 
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Whether over a matter of foreign alignment or not, there were, 
within most Greek cities, a variety of individuals or groups who had not 
only differing, but opposite viewpoints on policies, privilege and the 
welfare of the state. These viewpoints not only existed side by side but, 
in a community where censorship was rare, were freely expressed in speech 
and action, tempered only by vague laws such as the one at Athens with 
which Socrates was charged, 31 and supposedly by the constitution. Both 
these underwent changes in the interests of those in charge of government, 
and the constitutional weakness that existed insofar as there was no 
provision that could establish a constitution that included the rival 
claims of the oligarchs and democrats meant that a significant number of 
people in each community were living under a system which they did not 
uphold. This in itself was not dangerous. There would be very few govern- 
ments (if any) that could effect a constitution that was satisfactory to all 
its citizens. The danger lay in the evenness of the split among those who 
had the potential to exercise political control and in the fact that they 
were prepared to resort to arms to achieve their ends. 
Political subversion was also prominent in speech and in the 
literature. That Athens allowed such criticisms of political policy( as 
seen in Aristophanes' plays and the speeches of the orators may be 
admirable in terms of freedom of speech, but it also provided the means for 
the expression of subversive attitudes. Because of the potential for 
literature to undermine the government, Dionysius I seems to have had some 
form of censorship. This would seem to be the point of Aelian's comment 
that although Dionysius promoted tragedy he did not like comedy. 32 In like 
manner, he curbed freedom of speech by having a well developed network of 
spies. 33 Such a system must have continued under Dionysius II and there is 
the statement by Plato that even when he and Dion talked directly to 
Dionysius they had to be careful not to express their advice openly but to 
"put it in veiled terms".34 
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The problem that was created socially with the emergence of 
democracy and democratic thought was the tendency, as the Old Oligarch 
complained, to remove the distinctions between classes, distinctions which 
had been the basis of polis society and continued to be so. However much 
modern critics might praise the democracy of Periclean Athens, it was still 
the men of wealth and influence who were in control of the government, the 
difference being that they were dependent on the vote of the people for 
their position. This was also true of the democracy at Syracuse at the end 
of the Fifth Century B.C. Daphnaeus and Demaretus, the generals ousted by 
Dionysius, were both men of wealth and influence. Dionysius himself, 
initially gained his position by the consent of the people. This, however, 
was a dangerous body, for its support was not always forthcoming. 
Therefore, there were many influential men who did not want to take 
the risk. Dionysius I realised this and was careful to back his elected 
position with military forces that were dependent on him. But in general, 
those who maintained the right to exclusive control . naturally resented the 
power of an assembly to decide which of those of privilege or influence 
should be in power. It did not mean that the oligarchs abused the people, 
.they merely felt that the people had usurped its natural domain. The claim 
of the oligarch was based on his belief that since he contributed more to 
the wealth of the state he thought that he should have more control of the 
government. With the decline in class distinction this position became 
increasingly more difficult to maintain. 
The decline in class distinctions was accompanied by a change in 
values. The inherent feature of the civil strife within the Greek 
communities was the shifting of allegiances in the community. These 
allegiances became cemented in the political associations and clubs. 
Individuals became more organised in pursuing their own interests and took 
their norm as the norm for the state, and judged their opponents according 
to their norm and not according to any absolute criteria of the state. 
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This was seen in the methods of dealing with defeated opponents. These 
were often charged with treason or conspiracy as were Daphnaeus and 
Demaretus. In some cases the formality of a charge was not considered 
necessary. In this way, Dion, since he expected Heracleides to oppose his 
measures, "yielded to those who had long wished to kill him, but whom he 
had hitherto restrained; so they made their way into the house of 
Heracleides and slew him". 36 Dion was later himself killed in the 
interests of political expedience. 
In the last quarter of the Fourth Century B.C. Agathocles' 
revolution was primarily directed against his political opponents, many of 
whom were killed during the street fighting, while others escaped death by 
going into exile. 37 Because rival groups acted according to their Own 
standard, in a situation of civil strife disintegration occurred in every 
area of the wide field of previously accepted standards of action and 
thought. 
The whole situation was exacerbated by the psychological 
expectations of the individual about his place and value in the city. 
A.W. Gouldner noted that to gain fame and esteem, the qualities regarded as 
the most worthy, individuals had to enter a contest system in which they 
were victorious over others, particularly over their equals. 38 It was for 
this reason that Aristotle laid such stress on honour as a cause of civil 
strife. 39 
Prestige was gained primarily in the military field. A strong 
tyrant, like Dionysius I effectively blocked this area of personal advance-
ment to all but his closest friends and relations. Hence the uprising 
initiated by the cavalry in 405 B.C. 40 and, significantly, the opposition 
. 	_ in 396 B.C., which was in response to a , Sykacuaaiinaval victory, had as 
its spokeman a member of the cavalry class. 41 
Control of the military positions and key political offices that 
brought this prestige was very much in the hands of the socio-economic 
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elite. The ruthlessness with which men from within the elite and outside 
it sought to acquire these positions of prestige undermined the social 
order, "for the maintenance of any social order depends on the degree to 
which a group's collective interests coinCide with those of its individual 
members. Social order depends on the extent to which the individual will 
simultaneously contribute to the group's needs in pursuing his own ends. 
The contest system, on the contrary, disposes individuals to make decisions 
that are often at variance with the needs and interests of the group mg, 
There was thus induced a destructive conflict between private interests and 
those of collectivity". 42 
Although they fought for honour among themselves, the socio—economic 
elite were united in opposition to men of obscurity or poverty who sought 
to gain prestige. It was rare for a man in poor circumstances to gain a 
key position in government and when they did so it was obviously excep-
tional since the sources felt compelled to remark on that fact. Thus 
Agathocles' story was related in the light of the fact that he was success-
ful even though his father was supposedly poor and had had to teach 
Agathocles the trade of a potter. 43 This attitude was also reflected in 
the vocabulary used for the two opposing classes. Words of praise were 
used for the minority whereas most words used for the majority were 
derogatory. Moral qualities were thereby attributed to social classes, the 
positive qualities being the privilege of the wealthy minority. 44 This was 
linked to the concept that the wealthy and successful citizen was able to 
lavish goods on the city and to help his friends, thereby becoming morally 
superior and being regarded as a 	/7-AZ75. 45 
Since the contending parties had no absolute constitution upon which 
to base any overthrow of the government, and rarely, it would seem, the 
economic or social conditions of the community, they used political jargon 
to justify their position, if they bothered to justify it at all. The 
oligarchs usually based their claim on wealth and the democrats on freedom. 
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Both groups claimed, at times, to be restoring the ancestral constitution, 
whatever that was meant to mean. 46 Thus Theodorus complained that 
Dionysius I had prevented the Syracusans governing their city in 
"accordance with our ancient laws", 47 laws which in fact could not have 
been so very old since Diodes was said to have made the constitution more 
democratic after the defeat of the Athenians. 
Most oligarchs belonged to the landed estates and had as a 
consequence the privilege of hoplite armour and/or the ability to own a 
horse. The distinction between these and the other citizens remained in 
most cities where a considerable amount of agricultural production was 
still present. It was one of the complaints of the Old Oligarch that 
"Indeed the steersmen, the boatswains, the under-boatswains, the look-out 
officers, and the ship's carpenters, those indeed who give the state its 
strength, much more than the heavy-armed infantry and the distinguished and 
the good", 48 were given more preference under a democratic system. 
This concern with those who were connected with the navy, men who 
were of the poorer classes and owned little or no land was a problem at 
Syracuse also. At Syracuse, a considerable proportion of the people 
retained interest in the land, and for them, the problem of a democratic 
government was not that it necessarily ruled badly, but that it ruled in 
its own interests. It was to undermine the claim of such people to 
political control that Dion disbanded the fleet as soon as he could 
conveniently do so. 
But apart from those who were connected with the navy, inferiority 
was associated with all those who were non-propertied. This can be seen in 
Aristotle's division of the Greek world into four social elements: farmers, 
menially occupied, traders and those employed by others. 49 The social 
strata was closely allied to economic status and occupation. Thus, those 
engaged in menial occupations or employed by others were considered as 
less worthy socially than those who held their own farm. But when, with a 
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power like Syracuse, a great deal of economic prosperity was dependent on 
the rowers in the trading ships and in the navy, these people, socially 
inferior in the sense that they were employed by others, could, and did, 
claim a share in the government. 
'7 /, On another level, political freedom (A14/0 ■- itac) also brought with 
it the demand for economic freedom and it was this type of freedom that 
Hippo sought when he brought forward the proposal for the redistribution of 
land and house in Syracuse in 356 B.C., arguing that "liberty was based on 
equality, and slavery on the poverty of those who had nought". 50 The 
concept in generalf-is, as A. Fuks noted, that "there is no true liberty 
without economic equality, be the political order what it may, nor is true 
civic liberty in a state possible except on the basis of economic-social 
equality". 51 In the same article, he developed the link between social 
status and economic condition. This was centred around the difference 
, 	 / between those who were WAciArigi- and those who were iiiiris since this 
difference was basically between those who did not have to work for a 
living and those who did. 52 
' Because of the inherent social conditions the two opposing groups 
could not be reconciled. These irreconcilable elements in the community 
did not matter where there was an established and recognised constitution. 
At Sparta, for example, there was no questioning of the constitution or of 
what type of constitution should be adopted until the latter half of the 
Third Century B.C. But much of this respect for the constitution was the 
result of the fact that Sparta had been economically and socially insular 
and had therefore experienced very little change in those areas. Conse.;..! 
quently, the constitution suited the structure of the society and the way 
of life of the citizens. In other Greek communities, the changes were such 
that the constitution became wider in its concept or failed to satisfy the 
demands of quite large sections of the community. Citizens sought, there-
fore, to achieve their ends, not by modification of the constitution, but 
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by change, a change which, in the advent of opposition, frequently required 
some measure of violence. 
The widening of privilege and the change of values in no way 
affected the relationship between the Greek citizens and their slaves. The 
existence of slaves naturally remained unquestioned by the Greeks of the 
Fifth and Fourth Century B.C. 53 Where slaves were freed during a state of 
civil disturbance, this was for numerical support ., not because there was a 
feeling that slavery was unjust or that slavery was a root cause of the 
poverty of the poorer citizens. It was part of the complaint by Theodorus 
in 396 B.C. that Dionysius I had given the wives of exiles to slaves. 54 
Although Theodorus was a man associated with the cavalry and therefore high 
in economic and social standing, he was using arguments that would also 
appeal to the crews of the Syracusan fleet and his attitude:. toward slavery 
was the same as that of the poorer citizen. Both resented any suggestion 
of an extension of citizenship. 
Nor was there any real sense of social and economic pressure from 
slaves in an attempt to improve their status. As G.E.M. De Ste Croix 
remarked, "A class can be purely a set of individuals set apart from other 
classes. As a set of separate entities it is not a class in its fullest 
sense - until it becomes united and self-conscious it is not a class for 
itself". 55 And the slaves in the period in question here did not become a 
class in any real sense. It is in this area that the Marxist distinction 
between exploited and non-exploited classes is largely inappropriate and 
leads to difficulties. Ste Croix's emphasis on the struggle between the 
exploiting and exploited classes led him to remark that "in antiquity, 
slave, the exploited class per excellence, must not be seen as somehow out-
side that struggle". 56 Such a position does not allow sufficiently for the 
very fundamental difference between slaves and free men. Free men had 
citizenship and the benefits associated with it, with the result that the 
principal conflict arose from the issue that, given citizenship, to what 
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extent should there bp political and/or economic equality. Thus the 
conflict, since it was based on the assumption of citizenship, was 
completely independent of the position and status of slaves. The question 
of whether slaves should be exploited or not was never asked, whereas 
whether it was right that citizens should be exploited and do similar work 
to that of slaves was. Exploitation on this level was well discussed by 
R.A. Padgug when he demonstrated that while political concepts of democracy 
emphasised man's equality, economic reality dictated their inequality, with 
the result that "the poor wished to use politics to bring about a satis-
factory economic condition; this is what their passionate partisanship of 
democracy involved. The rich wished to model political power on economic 
reality, in essence this was the propaganda of pseudo-Xenophon and the 
oligarchic party. Gradually it became.clear that the close combination of 
politics and economics was doomed". 57 
There were thus two contradictory movements. One movement, atten-
uated by democratic ideology, emphasized the widening Of privileges to 
include all citizens equally and brought with it a corresponding change of 
values. The counter movement, initiated by the socio-economic elite was 
directed at maintaining their elitism and arresting the extension of 
privilege. The tension which resulted from these opposite concepts and 
aims was the basis upon which civil disturbances occurred. 
The Economic Situation in the Fourth Century B.C. 
With regard to the relationship between the economic situation and 
the existence of civil disturbances in the Fourth Century B.C., a distinc-
tion needs to be made between cause and effect. A general survey of the 
economic conditions of the. Fifth Century B.C. reveals that most cities had 
evolved an economic condition under which they were able, in normal circum-
stances, to purchase abroad the deficiencies in their own land. 58 In terms 
of general wealth Sicily in general and Acragas and Syracuse in particular 
had enjoyed prosperity. The one particular commodity in which Syracuse 
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abounded was corn, being able to produce sufficient for export to the Greek 
mainland. 59 In fact, the general wealth and luxury of the Sicilian Greeks, 
in contrast to other Greeks, had become proverbial. 60 
But the general economic situation was basically precarious. In the 
first instance, the cities had no real sense of any reserve fund of any 
magnitude. This was evident in the extraordinary measures taken by 
Dionysius I to gain extra income at Syracuse. 61 Secondly, in times of war, 
those with wealth in land, which was the Cas with the majority of the 
citizens, were liable to hardship, since land was frequently ravaged by the 
enemy. Thirdly, the lack of any reserve also meant the lack of ready cash 
to meet immediate expenses. This became a serious problem in the Fourth 
Century B.C. when the increased use of mercenaries required money with 
which to pay them. Dionysius I was able to circumvent this problem by 
granting land in lieu of payment, but for both Dion and Timoleon, their 
effective power was severely threatened, at times, through their inability 
to pay their mercenaries. 
However, under normal conditions, Syracuse was not in a desperate 
economic situation. On the level of cause, then, it was not the lack of 
resources that promoted civil strife, but rather the uneven distribution of 
those resources. Conflict was over the ownership of land (or the lack of 
it), the cry being for a redistribution of land, usually accompanied by a 
call for the cancellation of debts. The cry came from the poorer citizens. 
There was no pressure from metics, in whose hands the bulk of the trade was 
•centred, for landownership or the full citizenship that accompanied it. 62 
Moreover, since the wealth of the metics was not invested in land, 
revolutions based on economic necessity were not primarily directed against 
them. 
The problem of land distribution in Syracuse was a constant one 
throughout the Fourth Century B.C. Dionysius I carried through some degree 
of land reform, but the nature of that reform is not altogether clear. In 
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c. 404 B.C., according to Diodorus, "As for the territory of Syracuse, he 
picked out the best of it and distributed it in gifts to his friends as 
well as to the higher officers, and divided the rest of it in equal 
portions both to aliens and citizens, including under the name of citizens, 
the manumitted slaves whom he designated as New Citizens". 63 He also 
distributed the dwellings among the common people (ore: 4A°c ), except those 
on Ortygia which he gave to his friends and mercenaries. It is difficult 
to ascertain exactly who the aliens (V'ven.-) were, for from the context it 
is apparent that they were neither mercenaries nor freed slaves. 
Presumably they were such Greeks as had been removed to Syracuse in the 
wake of the Carthaginian invasion and who had remained there after 
Dionysius had concluded peace. 
The land given would have come from that confiscated from the exiled 
cavalry who had revolted in the previous year. Some intermingling seems to 
have occurred for Dionysius was later accused of having married the wives 
of the wealthy to "slaves and a motley throng". 64 When the later influx of 
people from Caulonia65 	m and Hipponiu " occurred, they too must have been 
provided with land. Dionysius also settled his mercenaries, not only in 
Syracuse but in the nearby cities of Catana and Leontini as well. 
What is clear from all this is that Dionysius had two distinct 
levels in his land settlement. The best land was given to his friends and 
high officers and it was therefore inferior land that was distributed among 
the other Syracusans. Certainly Hipparinus gained from the land settlement 
for he had his wealth restored, and this was increased by the gifts which 
Dion received from Dionysius. 67 Thus the better land was being concen-
trated in the hands of a few people, and with the exception of the years 
354-341 B.C., the problem was not that the land was unproductive, but that 
it had become concentrated in the hands of too few people. 
The period for the decline in Syracusan agricultural production has 
been a matter of debate. For the later date, I have taken the date of the 
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battle at the River Crimisus, since it was only after the defeat of the 
Carthaginians that the reconstruction under Timoleon could have effectively 
begun. That Syracuse and Sicily generally was in a devastated condition at 
the time of Timoleon's arrival was attested to by Diodorus, Nepos and 
Plutarch. 68 
For the beginning of the decline I follow Edelstein, who pointed out 
that under Dionysius II, "Sicily remained peaceful and prosperous until 
Dion's attacks. The devastation of the country was the consequence of the 
constant warfare that followed the assassination of Dion and ended, after 
Dionysius' return to Syracuse in 346 B.C., with his final expulsion ••." 69 
Over this latter point there is controversy. Edelstein was in fact 
arguing his case that the proposals for the cure of the evils of Sicily, 
attributed to Dion in Plato's Seventh Letter, were inappropriate for the 
time at which the letter purported to have been written. Solmsen refuted 
the idea in his review of Edelstein's book, stating that, while not knowing 
where and why there was a need for additional settlers, "War and devas-
tation there had been enough in the previous half century, during which 
people had at times been transplanted from their home towns to Syracuse or 
another city. Thus the overall conditions would indicate need for 
repopulating • ."70 Talbert agreed with this general point in his own 
argument that the Sicilian population would have declined as a result of 
the disorders of theshalf( century before 353 B.C. and that therefore the 
proposals suggested in the letter would have occurred to any perceptive 
observer in 353 or 343 B.C. 71 
I am at a loss to understand to what disorders in the years 400-353 
B.C. Solmsen and Talbert refer. The various wars with Carthage had not 
been continuous and there had been no war with Carthage after Dionysius 
succession in 367 B.C. 72 The territory in the eastern end of Sicily had 
been made more secure by Dionysius I's network of forts and he had success-
fully displaced those whom he had exiled from Syracuse from the towns in 
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Sicily, thereby removing what could have been a constant source of 
harassment to the stability of Syracuse and Sicily. 
Furthermore, after c. 390 B.C., Dionysius' major campaigns were 
concentrated in Italy and did not therefore effect the countryside of 
Sicily. Dionysius II had a non—aggressive policy and took part in no major 
campaigns either inside or outside Sicily and this no doubt gave a further 
period of stability. It is true that Dionysius transplanted populations 
from one city to another, but the last of such transplants had occurred in 
388 B.C. when the people of Caulonia and Hipponium were moved to Syracuse. 73 
Apart from the initial unsettling effect of such moves there was little 
economic or social upheaval as a result of them. 
The exact nature of the economic situation during the period is more 
difficult to ascertain due to scarcity of source material. Dionysius I's 
refortification of Syracuse and building programme generally, the main-
tenance of his standing army and his military campaigns must have required 
an immense outlay of money. Where this money came from can only be 
surmised. Some was acquired from war plunder, sale of slaves and temple 
looting, but much is also made of the methods of taxing the Syracusans. 
There was the 20% direct taxation on property, 74 indirect taxation on 
cattle, sheep and luxuries, 75 and levies made for specific projects, and in 
some cases compulsory loans whereby the creditor was payed back with 
devalued money. 76 What all this does reveal is .that there was something to 
tax and that agriculture and farming were operating with a fair degree of 
success. 
Trade was also still flourishing, for after the first two most 
serious Carthaginian invasions of 410 B.C. and 406 B.C., Carthaginian 
merchants were still operating in Syracuse. This is evident from Diodorusl 
remark that, after Dionysius had succeeded in - secuting a .vOte for another 
wax against Carthage in c. 398 B.C., "Syracusans, with the permission of 
Dionysius, seized as plunder the property of the Phoenicians, for no small 
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number of Carthaginians had their homes in Syracuse and rich possessions, 
and many also of the merchants had vessels in the harbour loaded with 
goods, all of which the Syracusans plundered". 77 
During Dionysius II's time, in the absence of any evidence to the 
contrary, we can assume that conditions remained the same as under 
Dionysius I, and since he conducted no wars, I would argue that, if any-
thing, they improved. This would be in part offset, no doubt, by the 
heavier taxation needed to maintain his standing army, for three sources of 
income - war booty, sale of slaves and temple looting - were not available 
to him. Evidence of the general economic stability under Dionysius II can 
be gleaned from the fact that Dion was able to enjoy the profits of his 
extensive property and live in comparative luxury while in exile, until 
c. 360 B.C. when his property was sold. In neither Plato nor Plutarch, 
both of whom deal with Dionysius' appropriation of Dion's property was 
there any mention that the land had become devastated or wasted. In fact, 
Plato remarked that if the property were correctly valued it would have 
been worth about a hundred talents, no small fortune in ancient Greek 
terms. 78 
There was, of course, on occasions, a shortage of ready money as can 
be seen from Dionysius I's need to use extraordinary levies. But this was 
true of the general Greek financial situation and was the result of the 
lack of Greek concern for any great accumulated reserve. Very few cities 
had any real reserve fund and those which did only had a limited supply as 
in the case of Athens at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War when her 
0 reserve fund was seriously depleted after the siege of Potidaea. 79 By 
427 B.C. she was forced to introduce the property tax on her citizens in 
order to finance the continued siege of Mytilene. 80 
In Syracuse, ready money was needed with which to pay mercenaries 
and at times this presented a problem. Dionysius II tried, unsuccessfully, 
to initiate some form of reduced payments according to severity of 
173. 
service, 	356 B.C. the Syracusans voted not to pay Dion's 
mercenaries. 82  In the latter case this does not mean that they could not 
pay, but only that they would not in an attempt to dislodge Dion from the 
source of his power. But they do seem to have been short of funds for 
their later attempt to win over Dion's mercenaries was through a promise of 
civic rights, not of ready cash. 63 Diodorus also remarked that the city 
was short of funds, 64 but it must be remembered that such reserve fund as 
may have existed, would have been in the control of Dionysius II on Ortygia. 
To sum up, I support Edelstein's view that the disasters that ruined 
Sicily did not occur to any great extent until after Dion's assassination, 
and that if Syracuse was not as prosperous as she had been in the Fifth 
Century B.C. she could at least provide for her home needs and engage in 
some overseas trade. 
All this is not to say that there were no poor people. Obviously 
there were, as the land demands of 356 B.C. make clear. But it was a 
problem of distribution, not of scarcity or wastage of land. The 
inequitable distribution of land that had existed under Dionysius I must 
have continued, and perhaps worsened, under Dionysius II for in 356 B.C., 
even before Dionysius II's forces had been expelled from Ortygia, the 
Syracusans, under the leadership of Hippo, proposed a redistribution of 
land and houses. 65 It was clearly passed despite the opposition of Dion, 
himself a large landowner until Dionysius II confiscated his property and 
prompted his fight for 'liberation', and other wealthy men of the cavalry 
class. These were the people who were regarded as yvtxxof and 'o . 86 
The supporters of the bill can be inferred from the later opponents to that 
/ group who were described as a worwos ev,AAos , 24( /4;fte,,,Tos 87 As A. Fuks 
remarked, "The sources speak in general of 'the poor', 'the propertyless' 
(rroves) whose oppressive poverty (7/-coc ) the 'Redistribution of Land 
and Houses' was intended to redress". 86 These poor were obviously in the 
majority, for despite Dion's opposition, the bill was duly passed, followed 
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by two other decrees with more specifically political implications - to 
stop the pay of Dion's mercenaries and to elect a new Board of Generals to 
replace Dion and his colleagues. 
In the unsettled period that followed, with the Syracusans fighting 
Dionysius II's forces and being compelled to seek Dion'e help again, the 
actual redistribution cannot have proceeded very far, if indeed, it had 
begun at all. When Dion did return, 89 although the masses tried to insist 
that the land be redistributed (which would further indicate that no real 
redistribution had as yet occurred), he opposed them and repealed the former 
decree, thereby gaining displeasure from the people. 90 As Fuks noted, "The 
impression given by the text is that the i>epsecEity(os. decree was not repealed 
by vote, but rescinded by Dion (rA7z-s) on the strength of his 
position". 91 
Thus the economic groupings in Syracuse had become the same as 
before Dion's stay at Leontini, with the. majority of the citizens in a 
situation of poverty or near-poverty. 92 The problem was further aggravated 
by the unsettled years before Timoleon's victory at the River Crimisus. In 
accordance with the need to reconstruct Syracuse, Timoleon effected large 
land reforms, together with an extensive colonisation programme to 
supplement the, by then, severely depleted population. 93 
When the offer of citizenship to colonists was made at Corinth, it 
was claimed that plots of land would be allocated equally and justly. 94 
This promise was supposedly fulfilled, but the distribution cannot have 
been so equitable in practice. It must have taken place long before many 
of the colonists arrived as the narrative of Dibdorus makes clear. As 
Westlake noted, "Since it would be uneconomical to leave large tracts of 
the best land uncultivated for subsequent division among an indeterminable 
number of colonists, latecomers received somewhat inferior plots". 95 
Former Syracusans would have had the advantage for, although it would 
appear that all land was confiscated for redistribution, in almost every 
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case an occupant regained the estate hitherto owned by him. So too, with 
the houses, where the owner had the option of repurchase, this would make 
little sense unless he could also acquire the adjacent land. 96 In fact, 
Nepos claimed that the new settlers gained "the estates that had become 
vacant as the result of war". 97 This land was, no doubt, uncultivated and 
inferior and would have taken longer to establish as a profit making 
concern. The owners of such land would have therefore become comparatively 
poorer in relation to those whose lands were readily yielding produce. 
A further problem arises as to what exactly was meant by equally and 
)/ 	 / justly (a"(62V4W( dfikol'ed ). Since people had the option to buy land they 
had previously owned, there must still have been a considerable variation 
in the size of the different land holdings. I would surmise, therefore, 
that equally merely meant that so much land cost a fixed amount, double 
that quantity twice as much and so on. Justly, I would assume must have 
meant that some further adjustment was made in relation to the quality Wand 
productivity of the land sold. Under such circumstances, the wealthier 
were still able to buy larger claims, particularly as there does not seem 
to have been any limit imposed on the size of the holding. The land was 
therefore redistributed but not equally redivided in any real sense. 
That the land system was not faultless and was open to abuse is 
apparent from the fact that within twenty years the old cry for land grants 
and cancellation of debts was again raised. 98 The upper classes had 
obviously contrived to appropriate large tracts of land, thereby invoking 
the hostility of the masses, particularly it would seem, those colonists 
who had settled further inland. 
This had occurred when Syracuse was experiencing an economic revival 
after the troubles of the middle of the century. 99 The key feature of this 
revival was the renewal of stable agricultural production and the export of 
surpluses. As Diodorus remarked, "But now new settlers streamed into the 
land in great numbers, and a long period of peace set in, the fields were 
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reclaimed for cultivation and bore abundant crops of all sorts. These the 
Siceliot Greeks sold to merchants at good prices and rapidly increased 
their wealth". 100 
That this wealth was gathered in the hands of a few is revealed by 
the fact that Agathocles was able to enrol in his army many of the men of 
the interior as well as "those of the citizens who because of poverty and 
envy were hostile to the pretensions of the powerful". 101 It was this 
section of the population who welcomed the revolution led by Agathocles and 
whose support Agathocles further secured by promising an abolition of debts 
and redistribution of land. 102 
Thus, the failure of the governments of Syracuse in the Fourth 
Century B.C. to solve the problem of the division between the rich and the 
poor was instrumental in the continued recurrence of civil strife. Such a 
failure Aristotle had recognised when he placed the division between rich 
and poor as a second major division that caused revolutions. 103 It mani-
fested itself in two ways. Firstly, it provided an issue for individuals 
agitating in favour of a change of government, and secondly, the poor, as a 
group, provided a ready source of support for revolutionaries since they 
tended to regard a change of government as the only means whereby they could 
improve their position. Even when not actively involved in any overthrow, 
their tacit approval of a change of government because of this belief meant 
that revolutionaries could act in the confidence that they had a more than 
fair chance of success, once in power. 
The basic problem lay in the fact that a division in wealth ran 
contrary to the Greek concept of all citizens in a polis being free and 
equal and hence gave rise to constant resentment. Finley noted this when 
he said that "The obvious difficulty with the city—state as a community, 
with its stress on mutual sharing of both burdens and benefits, was in the 
hard fact that its members were unequal. The most troublesome inequality 
was not between town and country, not between classes, but simply between 
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rich and poor". 104 
In terms of the effect on the economy, civil disturbances were 
disastrous. On the simplest level, wealthy citizens were endangered during 
/ a situation of al - (ces , ceiroa—rocols or even when individuals were engaged in 
political subversion. The metics, for example, although not a prime target•
of revolutionaries, often suffered due to the unsettled conditions that 
accompanied civil disturbances and became the targets for looting, plunder 
or systematic confiscation. 105 But whether metic or citizen, the wealthy 
were vulnerable, irrespective of their political convictions, during a time 
of violence. Diodorus made this point quite clear when he described the 
revolutionary situation that brought Agathocles to power in 317 B.C. At 
that time, apart from plundering the property of the Six Hundred and their 
supporters, against whom the revolution was in fact directed, "the armed 
mob, having seized power, did not distinguish between friend and foe, but 
the man from whom it considered most profit was to be gained, him it 
regarded as an enemy". 106 The supporters of the revolution were motivated 
by general hatred and the belief that they would be able "by the slaughter 
of the wealthy to redress their own poverty". 107 
On another level, exiles could, and did, harass the countryside 
around a city in an attempt to bring that city into submission. For this 
reason, Dionysius displaced the exiles at Aetna in 403 B.C. 108 and later 
forced them out of the towns in Sicily. Agathocles also, after assuming 
power, was careful to see that Syracuse was amply stocked with provisions 
and that opposition to him, an opposition primarily initiated by exiles, 
was minimised before he engaged in foreign wars. Thus, as Diodorus said 
about his treatment of Messene and Tauromenium in 310 B.C., "his intention 
was to wage war on the Carthaginians, and he was getting rid of all 
opposition throughout Sicily". 109 These cities had harboured Syracusanf. 
exiles, hence the necessity of directing action against them. Despite 
these precautions, the people of Syracuse experienced famine due to the 
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actions of Deinocrates and the Acragantines, who besieged them by land, and 
the Carthaginians who controlled the sea and prevented the importation of 
grain. The situation was relieved when Agathocles won a naval victory 
against the Carthaginians in 307 B.C. and secured a means of importing 
food. 110 
But most disastrous of all was continued civil disturbances such as 
occurred in the years between 354 and c. 341 B.C. The various conflicts 
over rule at Syracuse and the renewed influx of mercenaries devastated 
Sicily as a whole, and Syracuse in particular. The problem of mercenaries 
in Greece Proper who were seeking employment or were prepared to band 
together under a leader to advance their own interest was a problem with 
which Isocrates had been concerned. He saw an Asian campaign as a solution 
to the problem. 111 But many had found employment in Sicily under the two 
Dionysii. With , the expulsion of Dionysius II by Dion, bands of mercenaries 
existed for whom there was no constant employment and who were prepared to 
support whichever leader promised employment. Callippus, Nysaeus, 
Hipparinus and Hicetas, all contenders for Syracuse, had mercenary armies 
as did the tyrants of the other Sicilian cities at the time. The result 
was that "For many years, because of domestic troubles and border wars, and 
still more because of the numbers of tyrants who kept constantly appearing, 
the cities had become destitute of inhabitants and the open country had 
become a wilderness for lack of cultivation, producing no useful crops". 112 
The effect of civil disturbances was to aggravate an already 
precarious economic situation. The general failure of revolutionaries to 
effect any real and lasting change in the socio-economic strata meant that 
the economic problems that were instrumental in causing revolutions 
remained as a constant underlying problem. There was no real development 
of an economic policy that could see economics as distinct from land owner-
ship and in a system which precluded other forms of wealth socially, and in 
many cases politically, argument over land ownership was bound to continue. 
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In terms of land distribution there was no attempt at genuine equality. 
All that seems to have occurred was a change in the persons holding the 
land so that the differences in size and value of holdings remained with 
the result that similar antagonisms occurred again a few years after any 
redistribution. 
What needed to be looked at was the potential for other forms of 
economic development and the value of including those forms among the 
accepted occupations of a citizen, but partly due to slavery and partly due 
to extreme conservatism, these were precisely the areas which both 
governments and revolutionaries alike ignored. 113 
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CHAPTER FIVE : CONCLUSION 
From this investigation, it can be seen that Aristotle's belief that 
the prime cause of civil disturbances in Greece was the seeking of honour 
and gain by individuals or small groups (together with the states of feeling 
that were a result of this), was indeed applicable to the Syracusan 
situation from 415 to 305 B.C. There was the dual aspect of this that 
Aristotle also noted. Just as the various governments were exclusive and 
denied honour and gain to some individuals, those individuals in turn 
prompted revolutions or subverted the constitution in order to obtain them. 
This feature was prominent in all three of the different forms of 
government experienced by Syracuse during the time in question. In the case 
of the democracy at the end of the Fifth Century B.C., the action of Diodes 
in securing Hermocrates' banishment led to Hermocrates' retaliation in 
effecting Diodes' banishment and attempting to reinstate himself by force. 
Although Hermocrates was unsuccessful it taught Dionysius and his friends a 
valuable lesson. Two years later they successfully subverted the 
constitution by the pretence of championing the poor. 
At the end of the Fourth Century Agathocles subverted the constitu-
tion by a similar means. He claimed to be securing economic equality for 
those who had been oppressed by the oligarchy of the Six Hundred. But in 
actual fact, both Dionysius and Agathocies were primarily concerned with 
leadership and the advantages attached to it. Agathocles was particularly 
motivated by this since the honour and glory of a military campaign, honours 
that were a necessary stepping stone to a political career, were denied him. 
Thus the oligarchy of the time can be held partly responsible for the 
subsequent revolution. 
The oligarchy had failed to take into account the fierce nature of 
the deeply embedded contest system in Greek society which dictated that to 
fulfil one's ambition one had to obtain prominence and recognition above 
others. Just as the democracy under Diodes can be said to have forced 
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Hermocrates 0 hand, so too did the oligarchy force Agathocles' hand. Both 
governments fell through their failure to adhere to the maxim, noted by 
Aristotle, that those in the ruling clique should treat those outside it 
fairly. The general insecurity of generals under such a situation helps to 
explain why individuals sought to put the basis of their position on grounds 
other than that of the will of a democracy or oligarchy. The answer they 
found was in a tyranny established on the basis of mercenary support. 
But the various tyrannies were also exclusive. The tyrants gave 
powerful positions and the honour associated with them to their relations 
and friends. This did not matter when appeasement of the general populace 
was achieved or when the threat of force was sufficient to deter other well—
known citizens from organising a revolt or revolution. In this Dionysius I 
was successful, two oppositions to his rule, by the cavalry in 405 B.C. and 
by the people led by a member of the cavalry class in 396 B.C.,being quelled 
by the use of force in the first instance and the threat of it in the second. 
He then sought to appease the people by his public works and by his military 
prowess in his various campaigns. 
That opposition to Dionysius I should come from the cavalry was not 
surprising. They were the top class in the military field, but their claim 
to exclusiveness had already been undermined by the victories of the 
Syracusan fleet over the Athenians. The supremacy of Dionysius I further 
blocked their means of advancement. Aristotle had correctly observed that 
although the general populace might be discontented with a tyrant, it was 
from the nobles that attacks originated. When the people did initiate a 
revolt of their own accord, without a recognised leader, as they did in 404 
B.C., they failed due to lack of co—ordination. 
But a tyranny could always be undermined. There was a potential for 
a situation of ie,reig-4-ao-rs to arise since one of the ruling clique or another 
from the nobility could win over the people by claiming to be giving them 
back their liberty, as both Dion, and Timoleon at the request of noble! 
182. 
exiles, did. 
Dionysius II was not successful, largely due to his inability to deal 
with opposition. Dionysius I had exiled several leading men, yet his 
position was not undermined by them. Heloris activity against him was 
confined to Italy and did not affect his position at Syracuse. But 
Dionysius II, by trying to thwart Dion's ambition by sending him into exile 
created a figurehead for opposition to his rule. Moreover, since Dion had 
the use of his wealth he could recruit mercenaries and buy weapons. Dion 
returned on the pretext of liberating the Syracusans from their oppressive 
tyranny and was initially successful in gaining support as a result of that 
claim. 
However, as it became increasingly obvious that Dion was motivated by 
personal ambition and his rivalry with Heracleides and the Syracusans came 
to a head he became alienated from the people and his assassination in 354 
B.C. led to ten years when control of Syracuse was blatantly fought over by 
people wishing to instal themselves as tyrants. In turn the claimants were 
Callippus, Hipparinus, WYsaeus, DionysiuB II and Hicetas. 
Timoleon perhaps stands out as an exception among the seekers of 
power, but then physical disability may well have prompted his resignation 
from government. Be that as it may, his attempt to stabilise the Syracusan 
constitution, in whatever form that took, failed. Rivalry and oppression 
had Again come to the forefront by 320 B.C. This failure was no doubt due, 
in part, to the large influx of colonists who came to Syracuse in c.34CLB.C. 
Many of these would have brought different ideas with them as to what the 
best constitutional arrangement might be. Moreover, such original 
inhabitants as had survived the chaos in the years after Dion's death must 
have been of a mixed background as a result of the population transplants of 
Dionysius I earlier in the century. 
This created what Aristotle referred to as racial difference and the 
resulting diversity in population was a key feature in the political 
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upheavals in Syracuse. Added to this was the problem that the new influx 
under Timoleon created a disproportionate growth not adequately catered for 
in the constitutional arrangements. The settlers were placed over a wide 
area so that a sufficiently large section of the population was away from 
the centre of government and unable to participate in it in any real sense; 
what in fact Aristotle referred to when he had said that geographical 
conditions were a cause of esr-nkars . 
Since, in practical terms, a constitution is the result of either 
spontaneous growth or of deliberate invention and in both cases must be 
acceptable to the community in which it exists, it is difficult to see how 
the Syracusans could have effected a workable constitution in the Fourth 
Century B.C. Spontaneous growth had been arrested by the long period of 
tyranny for the first half of the century and the deliberate invention of 
Timoleon, albeit done under the pretext of a revision of the existing code, 
must at best have been extremely makeshift. This may well explain why the 
sources were vague in their terminology as to what exactly the details of 
that constitution were. Nor could it have suited all sections of the 
community. Not only were the citizens of very different backgrounds, but 
such a constitution could hardly have the weight of 'the traditional 
constitution'. 
Moreover, the period of tyranny together with the war years from 
356-343 B.C. had ensured that there could be no simple return to the 
previous arrangements of government as had existed before the rise of 
Dionysius I. In fact, Dion's dilemma in this area when he ousted 
Dionysius II from power had led to the claim that Dion had merely wished to 
replace Dionysius with himself. 
To have succeeded the constitution needed a predominance of consent 
or, where the community was divided in opinion as Syracuse most certainly 
was, the forces of the government needed to be stronger than those of the 
opponents. Aristotle had observed this feature when he stated that those in 
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favour of a constitution must be greater in number than those who were not, 
if the constitution were to succeed. At the time of Agathocles' take-over 
they were not, and although Agathocles was opposed for several years by 
Deinocrates, once a reconciliation between the two men had taken place, 
Agathocles was firmly established in power. 
The variation of background at Syracuse was indeed wide. 'Being' a 
Syracusan did not have the same sense as 'being' an Athenian or 'being' a 
Spartan. The only distinctive feature of Syracusan life we know of was its 
luxury and comparative wealth in contrast to other Greek communities. This 
lack of a unified background must have led to an increase in the 
factionalism that Aristotle saw as a basic feature of ernor's• Agathocles, 
for example, was a comparative newcomer to Syracuse. His father had moved 
there during the resettlements of Timoleon. Heracleides and Sosistratus, 
the men who blocked his advancement, may well have seen him as an upstart. 
To achieve his end, Agathocles enlisted the support of many men from the 
interior, most of whom would also have been newcomers. 
Even under the comparative stability of Dionysius I's government 
factionalism had been rife. It was not a rivalry between rich and poor, but 
rather between contending factions of the comparatively wealthy. Traces of 
it can be seen in the banishments at the end of Dionysius I's rule and it 
came into the open in the rivalry between Philistus and his friends and Dion 
and his group when Dionysius II took over the tyranny. 
Not that the opponents of tyranny were at all unified among them-
selves. The effort against Dionysius II was seriously endangered by rivalry 
between Dion and Heracleides (another member of the nobility) who used the 
services of Hippo to bring the antagonsim of the poor to the forefront. A 
fragment of Theopompum (Fr. 194) sheds further light on this factionalism. 
He mentioned that Heracleides and Athanis were lidoo47-0a 17S TONceids 
and that Archelaus was leader of the mercenaries. 
Although Callippus murdered Dion, various friends of Dion centred 
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themselves at Leontini under Hicetas and they were joined, after Dionysius 
II's return to power in 346 B.C., by other nobles from Syracuse. But these 
nobles distrusted Hicetas' motives since they sent to Corinth for additional 
support. On Timoleon's arrival they supported him in opposition to Hicetas 
as well as Dionysius II. Although the sources are silent about the years 
337-320 B.C., rival groups must have continued for various clubs, one of 
which became the core of the Six Hundred, were prominent at the time of 
Agathocles' rise. 
Aristotle had believed that the solution was to check these factions 
and their rivalries at the outset, but the history of Syracuse from 415 to 
305 B.C. shows that this was not possible. Of course such rivalries could 
be minimized by restraint on the part of the ruler, as shown by Dionysius I 
and Timoleon, but they could not be wholly removed. In the area of 
factionalism it was difficult to take action against it since the ties were 
personal rather than formal. The use of spies by the Dionysii and 
Agathocles went part of the way and so did the use of exile. But spies 
created as much ill—feeling as they were intended to remove and the careers 
of Hermocrates and Dion show that exiles still maintained contacts at 
Syracuse and were able to attempt to regain their position by force. 
What seems to have been lacking was a means whereby such factions 
could express their viewpoint without resorting to force or a change of 
government. This was a general Greek problem for factions saw allegiance as 
being to the faction rather than to the city itself, except when the city 
was indeed the faction since the faction had exclusive control. The 
existence of these factions did not always lead to attempts to subvert the 
constitution or change the government. These attempts occurred when a 
failure in the government highlighted the precarious nature of the basis on 
which that government's claim to rule rested and made its opponents 
confident to attack it. The occasions on which such attacks were successful 
were those when the opponents to the government found a successful leader 
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who gained at least the tacit support of the people. 
But this internal diversity, factionalism and constitutional 
instability did not mean, as Alcibiades thought when he advocated the 
Athenian expedition of 415 B.C., an inability to co-ordinate in fighting 
against a foreign threat. But their method of achieving that co-ordination 
was a distinctive feature of Syracusan history and brought with it further 
internal constitutional stresses. The tendency of the Syracusans was to 
entrust command to a single ruler, and in particular, to the successful 
military general. Such people rose to power, partly by their military 
ability but also by their ability to discredit their predecessors. There 
was no positive programme advocated. 
This tendency was, no doubt, partly the result of the nearness of 
Syracuse to the potentially hostile power of Carthage, a nearness not 
experienced by other Greeks until Philip of Macedon had established his 
leadership by various diplomatic manoeuvres. But Philip was sympathetic to 
Greek thought and ways of life and did not actively intervene in Greek 
internal affairs until forced to do so by the Greeks own inability to settle 
their quarrels. Carthage, on the other hand, had shown extreme hostility to 
Greek sentiment in the invasion of 410 B.C. and although she did, on the 
whole, act the diplomat in the Fourth Century B.C., there was no guarantee 
that this would always be the case. 
Finley saw this foreign environment as fundamental in causing the 
instability of the Sicilian Greeks. He suggested that an answer to the 
failure of the Sicilian Greeks to make a success of the city-state way of 
life lay in the fact that "their behaviour was profoundly influenced and 
disturbed by the fact that they lived in an alien environment. The 
Carthaginians, Etruscans and others were outside but near at hand, the 
Sicels, Sicans and Elymians were on the island itself, and in the case of 
Syracuse at least, within their own territorial sphere, some as a servile 
element .... others as tributaries and potential rebels:" 1 
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In the face of this alien environment together with the fact that the 
Syracusans themselves were of very mixed backgrounds, the Syracusans looked 
for a single ruler who could lead them against any potential foreign enemy. 
In the case of the Athenian invasion, the leader was supplied for them by 
Sparta and he returned to Sparta after his mission was accomplished. But 
when they elevated their own citizens to extraordinary positions to meet 
emergency situations, they did not have the means of forcing the person so 
elevated to relinquish command once the emergency had passed. Nor did they 
create a constitutional arrangement to legitimize his position. Once 
elevated, such a leader became excessively prominent and this engendered 
resentment and hatred from other sections of the community. Not only had 
Aristotle counselled against such excessive prominence but he also saw that 
a fundamental occasion for the change in .government from democracy to 
tyranny was when the same person was both leader of the people and general. 
The Syracusans were particularly prone to a fusion of the military 
and the political, but had no political tradition for that fusion in their 
constitution. This can be seen in the variation of the number in the Board 
of Generals and their tendency in an emergency to limit the number of 
generals, as they had done on the advent of the Athenian invasion. Perhaps 
part of this lack of tradition can be seen in the fact that the Syracusans 
had not psychologically accepted the role of a Board of Generals under an 
oligarchy or democracy. The historical figure who had defeated the 
Carthaginians was Gelo and the period of Syracusan history regarded by the 
Syracusans as their glorious period was the time of Gelo and Hier°. 2 
Thus, the single outstanding ruler was the tradition, if anything was. 
For eighty of the hundred years from 405 to 305 B.C., Syracuse was in the 
control of a single ruler who held his position in defiance of any constitu-
tional arrangement, with the possible exception of Timoleon from 343 to 337 
B.C., whose position was at least extraordinary. Under such circumstances, 
the revolutionary was able to base his recourse to revolution on the fact 
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that he was returning legitimacy to the government. 
But no matter how ambitious the individual and his group of friends, 
he needed to gain wide support if he wished his take-over to be successful. 
In the military area this was primarily done by the use of mercenaries, 
which, incidentally, meant the ability to pay them and meant that the chief 
revolutionaries came from the wealthy class. At the beginning of the Fourth 
Century B.C. the mercenaries were an asset in that they helped Dionysius I 
to stabilise his government. But by the middle of the century they had 
become a problem since the numbers of them actually in Sicily and the ready 
availability of them from Italy and Mainland Greece meant that rival 
claimants for power could each muster their own mercenary army. In this 
context it is instructive to remember that the core of Timoleon's forces 
were mercenaries. By the end of the Fourth Century B.C. the situation arose 
where the rival claimants for power at Syracuse, Agathocles and Deinocrates, 
fought the issue out between them with the support of their mercenary armies, 
in a series of encounters throughout the whole of Sicily. 
The mercenaries were also a problem in that, unless they were given 
citizenship (in which case they ceased to be mercenaries in the real sense) 
their loyalty was to the individual person who could afford them. They had 
no interest in the validity of the cause for which they fought and were 
accordingly unconcerned as to whether the government they were fighting to 
establish was in agreement with the needs of the Syracusans. 
The other main area of support was the Syracusan citizens 3 and at the 
times when they joined in successful revolutions, notably when they supported 
Dion in 356 B.C. and Agathocles in 317 B.C., they did so because of their 
socio-economic situation rather than for any definite political ideology. 
In fact, the supporters of Agathoclee from the inland areas were anti-
oligarchic and anti-democratic. The citizens believed that their position 
would be improved by a change of government. Thus Aristotle's assertion 
that the division of poverty and wealth was a second major cause of 
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revolutions. 
The fallacy of the belief on the part of the Syracusans that their 
position would be improved with a change of government can be seen from the 
fact that although Syracuse was wealthy enough for most of the Fourth 
Century B.C., significant numbers remained poor and underprivileged as the 
support of Dion and of Agathocles showed. Aristotle had observed that 
governments had to be careful to make some provision for the poor. He saw 
the answer to the problem in the creation of a large number of moderately 
wealthy people. But this was not possible in practice, without a complete 
readjustment in Greek socio-economic attitudes. In Syracuse, the area of 
poverty was one with which the various governments would not or could not 
deal. 
Even at the times when Syracuse was a democracy, at the end of the 
Fifth Century B.C. and in the constitutional arrangements made by Timoleon 
when some of the work at least was done by elected bodies, the problem was 
not solved. For the leaders, even under an elected system, were those who 
had gained the respect of the people. This had its socio-economic 
implications because the people preferred to vote for a name, and the name 
was that of one of the established families or a person of outstanding 
military valour. This again meant the wealthy who could afford their own 
armour - we hear of no person who was an extremely successful rower rising 
through the ranks to become politically prominent. There was in fact no 
means of rising to prominence through the military hierarchy. One was born 
into that hierarchy and it was more a case of how successful one was in that 
military area against men of equal standing than of rising from a low to a 
high position. 
Basically, however, the poorer citizens wanted material comforts 
rather than position. Dionysius I had gone part of the way in improving 
their lot, but his son's neglect in that area led to the numbers who wanted 
the land to be redistributed after Dion had 'liberated' Syracuse, even 
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though Ortygia had not at that time been captured. But Dion eventually 
repealed the bill for land redistribution. It illustrates how the revolu-
tionary leaders also neglected the plight of the poor. All the - leading 
families were blind to the reality of the political situation. They madeno 
concessions to the people, nor did they conceive of anything like a system 
of reform which could have removed the areas of discontent. This accounts 
for another aspect of the prevalence of tyranny in Syracuse. The aspiring 
tyrant always had a source in the citizen body from which he could gain 
support in his initial rise to power. 
On the geographical level, Syracuse was an ideal place for splinter 
groups to establish themselves. Until Timoleon demolished the fortifications 
on it, Ortygia was a natural fortress from which to control the Syracusans 
and Leontini, loosely part of Syracuse throughout the Fourth Century B.C., a 
convenient base from which exiles could operate. 
But the principal reason for the recurrence of orluo75 , political 
change and political subversion in Syracuse from 415 to 305 B.C. was the 
fact that the Syracusans failed to establish a constitution that allowed for 
the role of the single ruler. They had a definite need for such a leader 
and because of the diversity of their population the tendency was to entrust 
rule to just such a person. However, they could not conceive of a system of 
government that was not the usual city—state type and therefore did not give 
legitimacy to the continued position of a prominent general. 
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APPENDIX  - : A NOTE ON THE SOURCES FOR SICILIAN HISTORY  
The main problem with the sources for Sicilian history from 415 - 305 
B.C. is the general lack of survival of the contemporary accounts and the 
consequent reliance on derivative literature. This has resulted in the need 
to consider not only the intentions, purposes and prejudices of the extant 
authors, but also the approach of the authors from whom their knowledge was 
probably derived. Because of the vastness of such an undertaking for the 
sources of the whole of the Fourth Century B.C., only those problems which 
have some bearing on the body of the text will be discussed here. 
Moreover, I do not consider it necessary to discuss in detail the 
various sources of passages in the extant authors, but only the general 
traditions and biases that can be detected. In cases where the general tone 
and method has made the location of the particular source fairly certain, 
then the bias in the extant authority is so obvious that the location of the 
original source adds nothing to our realisation that the information was, 
indeed, biased; although, of course, it may explain, particularly in the 
case of Diodorus, seeming inconsistencies in characterization. Thus, unless 
one is studying a 'lost' historian, I consider that the source of the bias 
is irrelevant in such instances since it can be considered in the light of 
the extant author's opinions. 
Where an attribution is less certain a great deal of controversy 
rages, several scholars, with equally cogent arguments, often coming to 
quite different conclusions. To illustrate this point I will take a cross-
section of viewpoints on Diodorus' narrative on Sicilian affairs in Book XVI. 
N.G.L. Hammond sees the Sicilian narrative as being divided into 
three sections - the account of the liberation of Syracuse by Dion (ch. 5-6, 
9-13, 16-20), the first stage of Timoleon's career to the expulsion of 
Dionysius II (65-70), and the later career of Timoleon down to his death 
(72.2-73.3, 77.4-83.3, 90.1). 1 From this Hammond argued that Group 1 showed 
a general impartiality toward the leaders, Dionysius II, Heracleides and 
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Dion and that it was a detailed account, probably drawn from one source. In 
Group II he noted that Timoleon was eulogized, Hicetas mentioned without 
censure and that the account was also detailed, coming from one source, 
probably the same as Group I. His third group he saw as lacking moderation 
and being extravagant in its praise of Timoleon. This, he believed, 
indicated a different source from the first two groups. 
Of the principal authorities for these events, Ephorus, Theopompus 
and Timaeus, Hammond ruled out Ephorys since his account was known to end in 
357/356 B.C. 2 and therefore fell short of the time period covered by the 
first two sections. He further added that the vivid detail of Diodorus' 
account was not compatible with the acknowledged dullness of Ephorus. 
Timaeus he rejected on general grounds because of Timaeus' hatred of tyrangy. 
Thus he believed that Theopompua was the source for the first two sections. 
Since, however, Theopompus could not be the source for events after 343/342 
B.C., 3 he believed that Group III must have been derived from Timaeus. This 
he believed was in accord with the extravagance of the third section, for it 
was probably Timaeus who was responsible for the extreme praise of Timoleon. 
Finally, Hammond came to the conclusion that Diodorus did not conflate his 
sources. Hammond's conclusions were accepted by R.K. Sinclair with the 
modification that "the inadequacy of our information does not rule out the 
possibility of at least minor checking of the principal source by reference 
to another". 4 
H.D. Westlake agreed with Hammond's view that there was a probable 
change of source after the expulsion of Dionysius II to Corinth and that the 
section describing the mission of Timoleon up to that point was derived from 
a single source, that of Theopompus. 5 He also agreed that the later events 
were based on Timaeus. 6 
However, he disagreed that the section concerning the liberation of 
Syracuse by Dion was derived from Theopompus. His main ground for objection 
was the fact that he felt that the view of Dion found there (6, 9-13, 16-20) 
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was hardly one that Theopompus would have held. As evidence, he noted that 
the narrative was a panegyric on Dion, that Dion's philosophical training 
was mentioned twice with obvious approval, something hardly likely from 
Theopompus who was known to detest Plato, and that the impartiality of the 
narrative, to which Hammond drew attention, was incompatible with the 
violent partisanship of Theopampus, who was unlikely to have praised 
Philistus and Nypsius, officers of the tyrant, or Heracleides, the champion 
of the Syracusan proletariat. 7 
Westlake also noted that the first chapter of the Sicilian narrative 
(5) was wholly concerned with Dionysius and had, as Hammond had pointed 
out, 8 a close affinity with the content of the final section on the banish-
ment of Dionysius to Corinth (70.2=3). But this, he argued, did not 
necessarily mean that the intervening account of Sicilian history was 
derived from the same source. He therefore came to the conclusion that 
Diodorus began Group I with Theopompus but broke off after 5 "when he found 
that Theopompus was more interested in Dionysius than Dion", 9 and moved to 
another source. After demonstrating that this source could not be Timaeus 10 
he came to the conclusion that Ephorus was the most likely since the 
attitudes were all compatible with the probable outlook of Ephorus and 
Ephorus was known to have ended his account at approximately the point where 
Diodorus "so strangely breaks off his narrative before reaching the final 
struggle for Syracuse". 11 When Diodorus resumed his narrative on the 
mission of Timoleon, the objections to the use of Theopompus were no longer 
valid and he again returned to that author. Thus, Westlake postulated for 
Hammond's first two groups, Theopompus (5), Ephorus (6, 9-13, 16-20) and 
Theopompus (65-70). Ephorus as the base for the account of Dion was also 
accepted by Fuks. 12 
The problem of the source identification for Group II and III was 
taken up by R.J.A. Talbert who, after a detailed discussion of the 
differences between Plutarch and Diodorus on the events narrated in 
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Group III, came to the conclusion that if Timaeus was Plutarch's main source 
for those events then Diodorus' source for Group III was not Timaeus. 13 
Furthermore, Talbert argued that, contrary to Hanmond's view, Groups II and 
III were based on the same source. 14 At first he had thought that the 
source may have been Theopompus who could have included Sicilian affairs 
outside his Sicilian digression, but finally suggested "with due caution 
that for his whole narrative of Timoleon's career Diodorus used an unknown 
historian for his main source, and that he also referred to Theompompus' 
Sicilian Excursus for the fall of Dionysius II". 15 
To sum up these viewpoints on Diodorus' Sicilian narrative in Book 
Xvi 5-6, 9-13, 16-20 65-70 72-73, 77.4-83.3, 90.1 
Hammond The opompus' Theopompus Timaeus 
Sinclair Theopompus Theopompus Timaeus 
Westlake Theopompus (5), Ephorus Theopompus Timaeus 
Fuks Ephorus 
Talbert X (Not Theopompus) X (Not Timaeus) 
As can be seen, there is no agreement on any one section. This is 
perhaps not particularly surprising since all the scholars argued from the 
probable viewpoint of the earlier lost source in conjunction with an inter-
pretation of Diodorus' tone and most insisted on a single source for 
particular sections. In this context it is instructive to remember that, as 
Sinclair pointed out, it is by no means certain that Diodorus used a single 
source for sections of his work and that cross—checking may well have 
occurred. 16 Sinclair further questioned the use of fragments to illustrate 
the derivation of a detail when he noted that "It is hardly satisfactory to 
insist that a particular detail could have been drawn only from the 
particular fragment which happens to have been preserved." 17 
Before leaving this discussion, I would like to add that where 
Diodorus is concerned scholars seem to grant him no inventiveness and very 
little intelligence. For example, Hammond's objection to Ephorus as a 
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source for Diodorua in Group I would be removed if one allowed that Diodorus 
may have made Ephorus' dull account more vivid, or, at least, supplemented 
the dull account with vivid touches from another source. Worse still, 
Westlake asks VW to believe that Diodorus started writing his section from 
Theopompus and then found out that Theopompus concentrated on the Dionysian 
family and therefore looked for another source. Surely Diodorus would have 
the sense to read the whole account of his source before writing a particular 
section, especially since his work was of a different type to that of his 
source and required some revision or abridging. Moreover, I see no reason 
why the similarity between the introduction of Dionysius II and the comments 
when he is expelledlfrom Corinth may not be the result of Diodorus himself. 
Thus, I prefer to)leave definite attribution of sources unresolved. 
However, there are obviously divergent traditions observable in the extant 
sources and these I will point out, together with possible reasons for the 
divergence. 
1. 415-406 B.C. s Athenian Invasion and Hermocrates' Actions  
For the period of the Athenian invasion we have the contemporary 
account of Thucydides who devoted Books VI and VII to the campaign. 
Thu?ydides is all the more valuable because of his objectivity in this 
instance, since his malice toward Cleon and his theory that the Athenians 
lost the war due to their failure to choose generals of the calibre of 
Pericles do not affect his narrative of the sequence of events. Perhaps 
traces of bias can be seen in the extreme folly revealed by Athenagoras in 
his speech, a speech typical of the worse type of demagogue, but then 
Athenagoras may, indeed, have been extremely reckless, particularly if he 
did try to convince the Syracusans that the Athenians were not coming at all. 
In contrast, Hermocrates' speech was concerned with measures for the defence 
of the city. Subsequent facts show that Hermocrates was zealous in the 
defence of the city. However, Thucydides did not make the mistake of seeing 
Hermocrates as the saviour of the city. His whole narrative shows that the 
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key feature was the generalship of Gylippus. In this he was supported by-
another contemporary, Philistus, who was a child at the time and an eye-
witness of the events. 18 That there was, however, a divergent Sicilian 
tradition that overrated the role of Hermocrates and underrated that of 
Gylippus is evident in the remarks of Timaeus on the matter. 19 It may well 
be this tradition that was responsible for the variant accounts of the 
condemnation of the Athenian generals. Thucydides mentioned that 
Demosthenes and Nicias were killed against the will of Gylippus, 20 but 
Diodorus, whose account generally adds little to that of Thucydides, records 
a long speech in which Gylippus supports Diodes' proposal that the generals 
be killed. 21 It was a convenient tradition whereby the blame for that 
action was shifted from the Syracusans to Gylippus. But it is a minor point 
and the accounts of Thucydides and Diodorus do not vary significantly and 
are supported by the relevant sections in Plutarch's lives of Nicias and 
Alcibiades. 
For Hermocrates' actions on returning to Syracuse we have the contem-
porary brief notes in Xenophon's Hellenica and the fairly straightforward 
account of Diodorus. 
2. 406-337 B.C. s The Dionysii, Dion and Timoleon  
The chief extant authorities for the period are Plato, Diodorus, 
Repos, Plutarch and Justin. 
Central to the question here is the authenticity, date and purpose of 
Plato's Letters. Much discussion has centred around their authenticity and 
it is not my purpose to add to the already voluminous literature on the 
subject. 22 Little of value can be said that has not already been said by 
J.E. Raven. 23 For the purposes for which I have used the Letters I would 
stress two points that Raven made in regard to Letter VII. Firstly, that 
the letter, even if not by Plato himself, was composed at a time shortly 
after his death. Even the most vehement of the opponents to the authen-
ticity of the letters concede that the letters in language style and diction 
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belong, at the latest, to the end of the Fourth Century B.C. Secondly, 
since the letter was obviously composed for publication, then the events 
mentioned concerning Sicilian affairs would need to be generally accurate or 
it would fail to achieve its aim of defending Plato's actions, as it would 
have been read by people who were familiar with the events of the time. 24 
I would also add that the letters were believed to be authentic by 
Cicero25 and Plutarch26, both of whom had access to the lost historians of 
the time, and neither found the contents of the letters to be in violent 
disagreement with the general course of events as recorded by the historians. 
In adopting this attitude I must concede that I am assuming that the letters 
accepted by Cicero and Plutarch are the same as those we have today. 
• The purpose of the Sicilian letters is self evident. They attempt to 
• defend the part played by Plato and the Academy in Syracusan politics. As 
such they tend, in the main, to be pro-Dion (although some faults of Dion 
are acknowledged) 27 and anti-Dionysian. Plato's letters can be seen there-
fore as part of the tradition that concentrated Syracusan history on the 
liberators. This tradition can be seen later in the works of Nepos and 
Plutarch, both of whom were primarily concerned with the lives of the 
liberators, Dion and Timoleon. 
But there was another tradition which centred Syracusan history on 
the tyrant house, using its fall as a theme to illustrate a moral purpose.' 
Westlake pointed this out in his discussion on Theopompus, supporting his 
view that Theopompus was part (if not the founder) of such a tradition on 
the basis that many of the fragments deal with the vices of the Dionysii and 
on the fact that his narrative was known to end with the expulsion of 
Dionysius II to Corinth, thereby omitting the later and greater 
achievements of Timoleon. 28 
That two rival traditions in motive and interpretation existed is by 
no means surprising. The principal contemporary sources on which the 
traditions were based were extremely partisan in their approach. Philistus, 
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who covered the rule of Dionysius I and the first years of Dionysius II down 
to c. 362 B.C. 29 was a friend of Dionysius I and an acknowledged supporter 
of tyranny. As such his sympathies can be easily guessed. Ephorus, who 
although not a partisan in Syracusan politics, seems to have most probably 
accepted Philistusl account for Plutarch criticizes Ephorus for his extreme 
praise of Philistus. 30 Athanis, who wrote a History of Dion was also 
partisan as can be seen from the fragment of Theopompus where he is linked 
with Heracleides, the opponent of Dion. 32 Morrow also believes that "the 
fact that his history is explicitly a continuation of Philistus'! makes it 
highly probable that it was written from the perspective of Plato's 
opponents". 33 
Of the opponents to tyranny, Timonides was a member of the Academy 
who joined Dion's expedition and is supposed to have written an account of 
the expedition to Speusippus. 34 His viewpoint may also be easily guessed. 
Theopompus, although not directly involved, was extremely vehement and 
moralistic in his opinions and can hardly be termed an objective recorder of 
events. As Von Fritz noted, "It was the unanimous opinion of antiquity that 
the most striking feature of his works was the bitterness of his judgements 
on personalities, nations and forms of government. Even the most casual 
survey of the fragments which have come down to 1.15- shows that this opinion 
was justified". 35  
Finally, Timaeus, writing in the time of Agathocles, wrote a history 
of the Greeks in Sicily and Italy from ancient times down to 264 B.C. 36 
Timaeus' hatred of tyranny was well known and he was criticised by Diodorus 
for his general partisan attitudes 37 and by Plutarch for the malice he 
showed in his account of the death of Philistus. 38 
It was this conflicting tradition that was transmitted through to 
Diodorus, Nepos and Plutarch, either directly or through the medium of the 
secondary biographers of Hellenistic times. 39 But of all the partisan 
literature, Philistus' account seems to have been least preserved, except 
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perhaps in the favourable portions of Diodorus' account of Dionysius I. In 
both traditions the Dionysii fare badly. In the tradition concentrating on 
their tyranny it was the degeneracy of the house that was of interest rather 
than their success as rulers. In the second tradition they became the 
natural foils for the 'good' liberators and were treated accordingly. 
There are traces of the laudatory approach to the liberators in Nepos 
but it is particularly apparent in Plutarch's accounts. In Dion, Dion is 
given lavish praise and after Dionysius II left it was the leaders of the 
'demos' and Heracleides who became the foils for Dion's good actions and 
intentions. Heracleides is presented as an opportunist who persuaded the 
people in the interests of his own advancement. 40  His positive points are 
overlooked and the impression is gained that Dion reluctantly consented to 
his assassination. A more balanced view of the relations between the two 
men is found in Plato and Nepos. 
Even more excessive is Plutarch's eulogy on Timoleon. 41 Like Dion, 
Timoleon faces more than one adversary. He is contrasted not only with 
Dionysius II but also with Hicetas. Timoleon's virtue and good fortune is 
made much of and Plutarch's treatment of this in contrast to the vices of 
Hicetas and the decadence of Dionysius II is well discussed by Talbert. 42 
This moral and ethical purpose of Plutarch caused him to gloss over 
some details of which we would like to know more, such as Timoleon's 
alliance or agreement with Hicetas before the Battle at the River Crimisus. 
This raises another problem with the use of Plutarch by the historian. 
Plutarch was primarily concerned with the biography of a particular person 
and the moral lesson to be derived from it. His material was therefore 
arranged or selected accordingly. The historian must therefore extract fact 
from moral purpose and supply, where possible, explanations on points where 
Plutarch is silent or glosses over an issue. 43 The centralization on the 
individual person was in itself a method which resulted in the eclipsing of 
other protagonists and the subordination of wider issues to the life of the 
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particular person. 	account is, in this regard, more balanced 
since he was concerned with a general historical survey. That, of course, 
created its own problems since Diodorus' Sicilian narrative was interspersed 
with the events of the rest of the Greek world. 45 
By the time of Justin, the moral point of interest was the fall of 
Dionysius II from a position of such power. As Westlake pointed out, 46 
Justin, in fact, believed that the ignominious career of Dionysius II was 
the only noteworthy feature of Sicilian history in the middle of the Fourth 
Century B.C. 47 Both the expulsions were attributed to local uprisings and 
neither Dion nor Timoleon were mentioned. 48 Justin's work is an epitome 
with little real understanding of military or political history and must be 
used with caution, although at times his work fills in otherwise inexplicable 
gaps. But, as Justin said at the beginning of his work that he took from 
Trogus such passages as seemed to him specially interestiag, 49 it is obvious 
that no real balance can be expected in his account. This explains why 
there is a great deal of rhetorical ornament while whole series of facts are 
summed up in a single phrase. 50 
Thus the sources for the Dionysii, Dion and Timoleon vary in their 
emphasis, value judgements, attribution of motive and view of the role 
played by the unexpected. This results in a difference in approach but, on 
the whole, the actual facts are consistent, 51 even though they often have to 
be extracted from the bias and preconceptions that cloud them. 
3. 320-305 B.C. : Agathocles  
The career of Agathocles suffers in a similar way to that of the 
Dionysii since both Diodorus and Justin, the principal sources, derived 
their information from contemporary historians who took a definite moral 
attitude to tyranny and who were extreme in their adherence to one view or 
the other. Diodorus acknowledged this in his comments about the narratives 
of Callias and Timaeus. Callias was accused of giving Agathocles, his 
. 	52 paymaster, undeserved praise. 	It would seem that he was the official 
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court historian and his viewpoint was formed accordingly. Timaeus, on the 
other hand, was accused of blackening Agathocles' reputation because of his 
own personal feud with the tyrant and Diodorus goes so fax as to say that 
"the last five books of this writer, in which the acts of Agathocles are 
comprised, ought not to be accepted as truthful history". 53 
The standpoint of the other two contemporary authorities on 
Agathocles, Antander and Duris, can not be known for certain. We can guess 
that Antander, being Agathocles' brother and a colleague in the tyranny, 
probably wrote a favourable account, but the fragments of Duris' works as a 
whole are such a strange assortment of anecdotes and trivia that no real 
sense of his attitude. or principles can be gauged. 54 
The biased nature of the contemporary sources accounts for the 
oscillation in Diodorus between hostility and friendliness in his account of 
Agathocles, and the consistent hostility in Justin's brief summary. It also 
accounts for the variation in detail and emphasis by Diodorus, Justin and 
Polyaenus in their accounts of the rise of Agathocles. 55 
The general problems of Diodorus and Justin have been mentioned 
above. One further problem with Diodorus, most observable in his account of 
Agathocles' rise, is the fact that his annalistic approach covering the 
whole Greek world necessitated not only fragmentation of a particular 
account but also compression of a series of events under one year. Thus all 
the sequence of events leading to Agathocles' rise are included under 
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power with whose help the person or party concerned hoped to establish 
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131. The method whereby Critias secured the death of Theramenes in Athens is a notorious example of coercion by force. Xenophon, Hellenica II. 
3.49-54; Diodorus, XIV.4.6. 
132. Diodorus, 
133. Hermocrates, whether in office or not, was an influential politician. He had been foremost in the peace nogotiations at Gela in 424 B.C. 
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attempt, however, to show Hermocrates' patriotism and pan-Hellenic 
feeling causes him to gloss over the extent to which Hermocrates' 
behaviour was revolutionary when he returned to Sicily after his 
banishment, and dangerous to Syracuse insofar as he provoked the 
Carthaginians into further action on the island. 
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exonerate the latter from factionalism. 
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command of the force in the Aegean may well have been supported by his 
political opponents who were probably planning to take advantage of 
his absence. 
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(1954), 280-288 discussed the disruptive element of these groups and 
came to the conclusion that a man's attachment to his group was valued 
more highly than the most general citizenship and that his attachment 
to his city was fundamentally conditioned by his belonging to one or 
other of the groups which, in turn, frequently determined his basic 
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177. Plutarch, Dion XXIX.2; Diodorus, XVI.10.3. Diodorus places the 
election before the entry into Syracuse and does not mention the 20 
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earlier actions of Pharax and Callippus. (Plutarch, Timoleon X1.4). 
64. Plutarch, Timoleon XXXVIII.2, 3; Nepos, Timoleon 3.5, 6, 4.2. 
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the immediate situation. On the later occasion a thorough revision of 
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169. Plutarch, Dion XXVI.3. 
170. Plutarch, Dion XXVII.1, XXVIII 2. 
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188. Plutarch, Timoleon XIII.5; Strabo, 6.1.8; Athenaeus, XII 541C-E; 
Plutarch, Moralia 821D; Aelian, Vaxia Historia VI 12. Strabo 
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Westlake, on the whole, rejected Diodorus' version since he believed 
that Timoleon's men could not make the dash to Syracuse after the 
Battle at Adranum with such speed without Hicetas' trying to prevent 
it and that his forces would be unlikely to have been able to 
withstand the armies of Hicetas and Mago later. Talbert demonstrated 
that although the march to Syracuse would have required a feat of 
physical endurance it was not completely impossible and that Hicetas 
may not have known of Timoleon's intentions and therefore was unable 
to attempt to prevent Timoleon's march to Syracuse. Even if he did 
know of Timoleon's intention, Talbert pointed out that his army was in 
a disordered state and probably not capable of co-ordinated action. 
The unbelievable nature of Timoleon's small force retaining the 
positions it had captured after the arrival of Hicetas' Punic 
reinforcements Talbert believed to be mitigated, in part, by the fact 
that Diodorus himself stressed how the situation in Syracuse was 
unbelievable. In an attempt to reconcile the accounts, Westlake 
accepted Diodorus' chronology, but Plutarch's sequence of events. To 
explain Plutarch's allegation that Dionysius surrendered after the 
Battle at Adranum and that Timoleon captured Syracuse within 50 days 
of landing in Sicily, Westlake postulated that Dionysius entered into 
negotiations with Timoleon at that time, handed over the defence of 
Ortygia to him and Timoleon began his siege of the rest of Syracuse 
from there. However, it was only in 343/342 B.C., after the 
Carthaginians had come and gone, that Dionysius abdicated the tyranny 
and left for Corinth. Talbert quite rightly objected to this 
reconstruction since it leaves Dionysius at Timoleon's camp from 
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345/4 to 343/2 B.C. This would have been an obvious embarrassment to Timoleon in his relations with his other Sicilian allies. I believe 
that Talbert's objection is removed if Dionysius is left on Ortygia 
rather than going to Timoleon's camp. Furthermore, I would place the 
time of the negotiations between Dionysius and Timoleon and the 
infiltration of Timoleon's men into Ortygia to the time when knowledge 
of Punic reinforcements was known, but before they actually arrived. 
It was not impossible that this should happen within fifty days of 
Timoleon's arrival, but the short time mentioned by Plutarch may well 
be the result of later propaganda. If this is accepted, it could also 
explain how Timoleon's small forces in the outlying areas of Syracuse, 
together with the forces on Ortygia were able to withstand the 
combined actions of Hicetas and the Carthaginians as reported by 
Diodorus. I believe then, that Timoleon did move to Syracuse after 
Adranum and secured some of the outlying areas, negotiated with 
Dionysius and established a base at Catana, then, with the help of 
Dionysius, withstood the Carthaginian invasion. But I admit that this 
is conjecture and that other explanations are possible. After the 
Carthaginian departure, the accounts of Plutarch and Diodorus are 
substantially the same. Westlake's reconstruction, I believe, 
dismisses Diodorys' account too summarily. Talbert came to the 
conclusion that while both accounts are possible it is not possible to 
make a definite choice between the two, nor is it valid or possible to 
reconcile them and that those who are unwilling to leave the matter 
unsettled must firmly follow one account or the other. While I admit 
that a complete reconciliation is not possible, I believe that some 
sort of reconstruction is valid (particularly since Talbert believes 
that neither Diodorus nor Plutarch were likely to have invented parts 
of their narratives) insofar as it is admitted as a reconstruction. 
Allowance must be made for the fact that the seeming contradictions 
are probably the result of a difference in emphasis on different 
aspects of the capture and that some of the sources upon whom Plutarch 
and Diodorus relied had probably given the facts a propagandistic 
twist. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
1. See Chapter 1, 21-36. 
2. The prevalence of the latter type of motivation was dealt with by 
A. Pas in 'Patterns and Types of Social Economic Revolution in Greece 
from the Fourth to the Second Century B.C.', Ancient Society  5 (1974), 51-81. 
3. A. Fuks, op. cit. 'Isokrates and Greece', Ancient Society  3 (1972), 
17-44, 1 Thucydides and the Stasis in Corcyra, Thuc. III 82-3 versus (Thuc.) III 84', AJPh 92 (1971), 48-55. In the latter article he used the absence of socio-economic revolutions as a concept in the Fifth 
Century B.C. for a refutation of the authenticity of III 84, since he 
believed that the concepts expressed in that paragraph only became 
developed and common place after about 370 B.C. While a detailed 
discussion of the authenticity of III 84 is out of place here, I would 
like to point out that even if it is a later interpolation, the 
sentiments expressed are in accordance with Thucydides' own 
observations. For Thucydides, when speaking specifically about the 
slaughter of the Corcyraean oligarchs by the democrats at III 81.4, said that although the victims were accused of trying to destroy the 
democracy, some were killed because of private enmity and others were 
killed by their debtors because of the money the latter owned. 
Admittedly, Thucydides did not specifically contrast 7A0u7"0$ and 
, but the presence of debtors in sufficient numbers to warrant 
Thucydides' comment is a significant indication that such a division 
existed. 
4. This was what Peisistratus had done as early as the Sixth Century B.C. and it is noteworthy that Cleisthenes opened the franchise for 
numerical support against Isagoras, not for reasons of political 
ideology - Herodotus, V.69.2. 
5. G.E.M. De Ste Croix, 'The Character of the Athenian Empire', Historia  3 
(1954/1955), 1-41 at 24. Passages cited : Xenophon, Hellenica IV.8.20, Memorabilia IV.2.36-37, Memorabilia 1.2.40-46, Hell. Oxy. 1.3. 
6. Thucydides, VI.39.1. 
7. Diodorus, XIII.91.4, 5. 
8, Diodorus XIII.92.3. 
9. Diodorus, X111.96.1. 
10. For a useful discussion on the dating of the pamphlet see A.W. Gomme, 
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'The Old Oligarch' in More Essays in Greek History and Literature  
(Oxford 1962), 38-69. 
11. There were, of course, shades of meaning between these terms.  
for example, had far more derogatory overtones than i, A;7/4i.o.s and was 
used in instances which showed Sc%eos at its worst. S 1/40 5 could 
also be used to denote simply all those in the city. (See Chapter 1 
notes 123-125.) That the terms could be used synonymously and in 
contrast to the rich reveals the basic Greek attitude on such matters. 
12. Pseudo-Xenophon, The Constitution of the Athenians, 1.3, 11.10. 
13. This point was made by G.E.M. De Ste Croix, Historia 3 (1954/1955), 243 
as was the variety of Greek terminology mentioned above. 
14. Such divisions were constant throughout the Fourth Century B.C. At the time of Dionysius' rise, similar groups existed at Gela where o-'-is 
 out between the most wealthy (e50-crwv-x-roc.. ) and the Spoc 	On 
that occasion, Dionysius sided with the people and confiscated the 
property of the wealthy (Diodorus, XII1.93.2). The references to Dion 
all attest to his wealth and fame and that he kept company with men of 
a similar standing, both at Syracuse and when in exile, and it was such 
a group that welcomed him back in Syracuse. (Diodorus, XVI.6.1; 
Plutarch, Dion XVII.3, 5, XXVIII.1, 	XLVII.2.) He was opposed 
later by the populace led by the 11.4.74.,,KL. (Plutarch, Dion XXXII.3, 
MVO.) The whole rise of Agathocles was narrated in terms of his 
support of the poor against those Syracusans who were first in 
reputation and property and who had formed part of the oligarchy of 600 
or were believed to be supporters of it. See especially, Diodorus, 
XIX.4.3, 5.6, 6.3, 6.5, 7.1, 8.2, 9.5. It was the wealthy who remained hostile to Agathocles, hence his action against them before going to 
Africa in 310 B.C. (Diodorus, XX.4.6-7). 
15. The comments about Dionysius I's supposedly obscure origins were no doubt exaggerated to give the colourful story of how he rose to 
greatness from nothing in contrast to his son who fell from greatness 
to nothing. On Dionysius' supposed humble origins see Plutarch, 
Moralia 176D and Isocrates, Oration V (To Philip) 65. That he was a 
type of secretary or scribe was stated by Diodorus (XIII.96.4) and 
Polyaenus (Stratagemata V.2.2). From Diodorun' use of the word 
it would seem that his family did not have a background of political 
power. But neither, it must be added, was he particularly poor. 
R.P. Legon, op. cit. 178-179 noted that within the Greek cities, the 
demos was too poor to run democratic states and that it followed that 
the democratic faction was composed of men of substance and that they 
were, in fact, similar to the oligarchs in background, and only 
differed in ideology, especially in terms of domestic policy. 
16. Agathocles' low origins as a potter were mentioned by Justin XXII 1.1, 
2, 6 and Polybius XV.35.2 and XII.15.6 where he attributed the reference of Agathocles as a potter to Timaeus. See also, Plutarch, 
Moralia 176E, Marcellinus XIV.11.30 and Athenaeus 466A. Tillyard, 
Agathocles (Cambridge 1908), 28-29 discussed this evidence and pointed 
out that since the story originated from Timaeun it must not be taken 
without suspicion and that when Agathocles fell from favour with the 
oligarchs it would have been natural for his enemies to cast discredit 
on his birth. It must also be noted that not only was Agathocles on 
favourable terms with the wealthy Daman, but his brother held a high 
command in the army (Diodorus XIX.3.3). The story of his extremely low . 
origin should therefore possibly be discounted. 
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17. Note especially his fortifications and building programme - Diodorus. 
XIV.18.2-8, XV.13.5. 
18. Diodorus, XIII.96.3 made the comment that Dionysius married Hermocrates' 
daughter so tir he would become allied to a distinguished house. 
(czrzovv,0, eici›t'"v ), Similarly, Aristomache was regarded as most 
notable ( 7e0yr"'47 ). Such alliances were extended to other members 
of Dionysius' family - see Table II. 
19. Dion's wealth : Nepos, Dion 1.2; Plutarch, Dion XV.3. His wealth was 
also obvious from his offer to furnish 50 triremes at his own expense. 
(Plutarch, Dion VI.4) and from Plato, gyistle VII  347B where his 
property was estimated to be worth over 100 talents. Dion also had the 
use of this wealth when in exile and it was his wealth and status that 
enabled him to employ mercenaries and buy weapons. It was partly, I 
believe, for this reason that Dionysius II suspended payments to Dion 
c. 361/360 B.C. and sold his property. (Plutarch, Dion XVIII.1). 
20. A. Fuks, 'Redistribution of Land and Houses in Syracuse in 356 B.C. and 
its Ideological Aspects', ca XVIII (1968), 207-223 at 207. 
21. A. Fuks, ibid. 210 and note 7. 
22. Plutarch, Dion XXXV.2 —3; cf. Diodorus, XVI.17.3. 
23. Plutarch, Dion XLIV.2. 
24. Diodorus, XVI.20.6. 
25. Plutarch, Dion XLVIII.2, 3. Despite Plutarch's general equation good 
citizens = aristocracy, the poorer folk and those not sympathetic to 
the highest class must have been the larger group to make such a 
concession necessary. There is the continuous implication in Plutarch 
that the supporters of Heracleides were not the 'better citizens' and 
that they were motivated by a desire to create disorder purely for its 
own sake. 
26. Plutarch, Dion L.1. 
27. For his opposition to the land bill and reasons for it see above 46-47. 
28. Fuks, Ancient Society 5 (1974), 75. 
29. Plato, Epistle VII 336A, 337B-D, Epistle VIII 355A-357D; Plutarch, Dion 
LIII.2.Loeb editions used here and in the following paragraph. 
30. Plutarch, Dion 1,11.4. 
31. Socrates was charged with not believing in the gods of the state and 
with corruption of the youth. Plato, The Apology, especially 24B, C. 
32. Aelian, Varia Historia XIII.18. 
33. Plutarch, Dion XXVIII.1, Moralia 523A, Polyaenus, Stratagamata V.2.13 
cf. Aristotle, Politics V 1313b 11-17 where a similar system was 
attributed to Hiero. 
34. Plato, Epistle VII 332D. 
35. Diodorus, XIII.91.4, 96.3. 
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36. Plutarch, Dion 
37. Diodorus, XIX.6.5-8.6. 
38. A.W. Gouldner, Enter Plato, (London 1965) 51-55. 
39. Agathocles was motivated primarily by the failure of the government of the time to give him due recognition for the distinguished part he 
played when the Syracusans helped the Crotonians against the Brutti. 
Diodorus, 
40, Diodorus, XIII.112.3-113.3, XIV.44.5; Plutarch, Dion 111.1. 
41. Diodorus, XIV.64.5. 
42. A.W. Gouldner, op. cit. 54. A.H. Chroust, 'Treason and Patriotism in Ancient Greece', JHI 15 (1954), 280-288 also discussed this conflict 
between private interests and those of the community as a whole and 
showed that individuals placed the private interests first and tended 
to look to others with similar interests, hence the forming of 47-.19occ.,e 
where the individuals gave each other mutual support in law suits and 
political schemes. Such a coalition of interests was obvious in 
Syracuse in 406 B.C. when Philistus, Hipparinus, Dionysius and the 
remnant of Hemocratean supporters all combined to elevate Dionysius to 
power. 
43. See above note 16. 
44. M.N. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet, Economic and Social History of Ancient  Greece : An Introduction (translated and revised by N.M. Austin, London 
1977) discussed this aspect in the chapter 'Concepts and General 
Problems'. 
45. The value system inherent in this and its accompanying morality was discussed by A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility (Oxford 1960). 
Although much of the terminology derives from Homeric society, Gouldner 
made the pertinent remark that "The point is that the Greeks were 
raised on this literature and, for the most part, found the behaviour 
of its protagonists meaningful and admirable". Zater Plato, 54. 
46. A useful discussion on what the Greeks meant by 'ancestral constitution' is M.I. Finley, The Ancestral Constitution (London 1971). 
47. Diodorus, XIV.65.2. 
48. Pseudo-Xenophon, The Constitution of the Athenians, translated H. Frisch (Copenhagen 1942), 
49. Aristotle, Politics VI 1321a 5-6. 
50. Plutarch, Dion XXXVII.3 
51. Fuks, Ancient Society 5 (1974), 81. 
52. M.I. Finley, The Ancient Economy (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1973) also 
commented (40-41) on the fact that kcg-4e, meant compulsion to earn 
one's living by toil. On the widening of the division between the two 
groups in the Fourth Century B.C. see A. Fuks, 'Isokrates and the 
Social-Economic Situation in Greece', Ancient Society 3 (1972), 17-44. 
251. 
53. On the status and role of slaves see the discussions in M.1. Finley 
(ed.), Slavery and Classical Antiquity (Cambridge 1960), and in 
particular Finley's own article, 'Was Greek Civilization based on Slave 
Labour', reprinted from Historia 8 (1959), 145-164. 
54. Diodorus, 
55. G.E.M. De Ste Croix, 'Karl Marx and the History of Classical Antiquity', 
Arethusa 8 no. 1 (1975), 7-41 at 27. 
56. ibid. 26. 
57. R.A. Padgug, 'Classes and Society in Classical Greece', Arethusa 8 
no. 1 (1975), 85-117 at 109. 
58. On the general economic situation see J. Hasebroek, Trade and Politics  
in Ancient Greece (translated L.M. Fraser and D.C. Macgregor, London 
1933); H. Mitchell, The Economics of Ancient Greece (2nd ed. Cambridge 
1957); F.M. Heichelheim, An Ancient Economic History, Vol II, (revised 
edition, translated J. Stevens, Leyden 1964) and more recently, 
M.I. Finley, The Ancient Economy (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1973). 
59. H. Knorringa, EMporos (Amsterdam 1961), 98-99 cited the evidence for the export of corn down to the time of Hiero II. 
60. Strabo, YI.2.4 and VI.2.7 (speaking of Roman times). Plato mentioned 
the general wealth of the Sicilians - Epistle VII 326 B-C and Republic  
III 404D. cf . Diodorus XIII.81.4-84.6 on the wealth of Acragas. But 
even amid the wealth at Acragas there were poor people as the story 
about the action of Antisthenes' son shows (XI11.84.4). It is also 
worth mentioning in this context that Diodorus believed that before the 
expedition of 427 B.C., the Athenians had always been covetous of 
Sicily because of the fertility of its land (XII.54.1). 
61. His means were: indirect taxation, Aristotle Oeconomia 1349a, b; temple 
plunder, Aristotle, Oeconomia  1349a, 1350a, Polyaenus, Stratagemata 
V.2.21, Strabo Y.2.8, Cicero, Ad Verrem !II 83, 84, Aelian, Varia 
Historia 1.20; compulsory loans and donations, Aristotle, Oeconomia 
1349a. A discussion of the financial situation under Dionysius I can 
be found in E.A. Freeman, A History of Sicily Vol IV (Oxford 1894), 
Supplement III (by the editor A.J. Evans), 230-238. 
62. Although some citizens were engaged in trade and industry, they were a 
minority and they were seen as socially degraded. Moreover, since such 
citizens were in competition with metics who were not concerned about 
their political status and slaves who had to work, they came off badly. 
The citizen was liable for war service in the army or navy or jury 
service in some states and this further disadvantaged him. It was on 
this basis that the poorer citizen; sought some financial compensation 
from the State for his services. Aristotle saw this as a basic failure 
of democracy since it meant that the money to do this had to be 
extracted from the rich. Thus he counselled that democratic statesmen 
ought to see that the multitude was not extremely poor for they would 
then require no payment for their services - Politics VI 1320a 18-35. 
This tension between the rich and the poor over the issue of taxation 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
1. M.I. Finley, A History of Sicily : Ancient Sicily to the Arab 
Conquest, 72. 
2. This can be contrasted with the Athenians who believed that it was their 
democracy and the freedom they enjoyed under it that had been 
responsible for their defeat of the Persians at Marathon and Salamis. 
3. I have shown in Chapter Two that outside intervention and support was 
minimal. The Greek cities of Sicily were not powerful enough to uphold 
any ruler they might wish to install at Syracuse. In fact the opposite 
was more the case - Syracuse interfered in the affairs of the other 
cities. The cities of the Greek Mainland gave moral support to the 
Dionysii and Corinth inexplicably gave support to Timoleon's mission, 
but otherwise they remained unconcerned. Carthage tried diplomacy, but 
only supported one or other of the contenders when the opponent had 
threatened Carthage's interests. 
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TABLE I  
PRINCIPAL POLITICAL EVENTS IN SYRACUSE, 415-305 B.C. 
415 	Rivalry between Athenagoras and Hermocrates 
Number of Syracusan generals limited to Three 
414 	The generals, Heracleides, Sicanus and Hermocrates dismissed from 
office 
Arrival of Gylippus to take command of Syracusan forces 
412 	Reform of the constitution by Diodes 
Hermocrates in charge of the forces in the Aegean 
410 	Exile of Hermocrates 
409 	Return of Hermocrates to Sicily 
408 	Banishment of Diodes Hermocrates attempted coup d' etat 
406/405 Dionysius I lodges accusations against the generals 
Deposition of some of the generals, Ldonysius becomes general 
Recall of exiles 
Accusations against the new Board of Generals 
Dionysius elected istrategos autocrator' 
Dionysius gains a bodyguard and establishes himself on Ortygia 
Daphnaeus and Demaretus condemned and executed 
405 	Revolt of the cavalry, Death of Hermocratee' daughter 
404 	Widespread rebellion of the Syracusan people against Dionysius 
'stasis' amongst the people themselves 
Dionysius victorious and confiscates the arms of the Syracusans 
403 	Syracusan exiles from the revolts of 405 and 404 flushed out of 
Aetna 
398/397 Dionysius' double marriage 
396 	Opposition of the Syracusans to Dionysius, led by Theodorus 
389/388 Transfer of the inhabitants of Caulonia and Hipponium to Syracuse 
384 	Banishment of Philistus and Leptines Banishment of Polyxenus? 
383 	Recall of Leptines 
368/367 Death of Dionysius I 
Dionysius II succeeds to the tyranny 
367 	Recall of Philistus 
Exile of Dion 
361/360 Mercenary trouble under Dionysius II 
Exile of Heracleides 
Confiscation of Dion's property by Dionysius II 
261. 
360 Dion and Heracleides prepare for a Syracusan expedition 
357 Dion arrives at Syracuse Timocrates fails to hold Syracuse and the Syracusans join Dion 
Ortygia besieged by land 
357/356 Arrival of Heracleides in Syracuse 
356/355 Dionysius II leaves Ortygia, placing his son, Apollocrates in 
charge 
Syracusans propose and pass Land Redistribution Bill 
Dion withdrew to Leontini 
Nypsius, Dionysius' commander, breaks through the siege wall and a 
general massacre of Syracusans takes place 
Dion recalled from Leontini, takes over command and repeals the 
Land Bill, Rivalry between Heracleides and Dion continues 
Capture of Ortygia 
354 Murder of Heracleides Assassination of Dion 
Callippus takes over control of Syracuse 
Fighting between Callippus and Hicetas and the friends of Dion 
Hicetas and Dion's friends retire to Leontini 
353 Hipparinus and Nysaeus seize Syracuse 
351 	Assassination of Hipparinus, Nysaeus retains command 
346 	Dionysius II recaptures Syracuse Syracusan nobles go to Leontini and join Hicetas 
346/345 Exiles at Leontini appeal to Corinth for help. Timoleon appointed 
Hicetas and Dionysius II fight for Syracuse 
344 Arrival of Timoleon in Sicily Hicetas steps up the siege of Syracuse with Carthaginian help 
344/343 Carthaginians withdraw, Timoleon defeats Hicetas' forces Hicetas retires to Leontini 
343 Surrender of Ortygia by Dionysius II Dionysius II departs for Corinth 
343/339 Resettlement and Colonisation of Syracuse by Timoleon 
342 	Makeshift constitutional arrangements by Timoleon? 
340/339 Death of Hicetas? Constitutional arrangements of Timoleon? 
337 Resignation of Timoleon 
320-317 Sosistratus and Heracleides refuse to give Agathocles due 
recognition for his military services 
Formation of the Oligarchy of Six Hundred 
Agathocles aids the Italians against Sosistratus and Heracleides 
Syracusans revolt and expel the oligarchs who attach, themselves to 
the Carthaginians 
Agathocles returns to Syracuse 
262. 
Acestorides placed in charge and a reconciliation between the 
democrats and oligarchs effected 
Expulsion of Agathocles 
317 	Agathocles raises an army in the interior, but reconciled to 
Syracuse through the mediation of Hamilcar 
Agathocles made 'general and protector of the city' 
Massacre of the oligarchs and other citizens, Deinocrates exiled 
Agathocles elected 'strategos autocrator' 
Syracusan exiles flee to Acragas, Gela and Messana 
314 	Syracusan exiles expelled from Messana 
312-309 Deinocrates and the exiles in league with the Carthaginians against 
Agathocles 
309-307 Exiles and Acragas against Agathocles 
307 	Murder of Agathocles' sons by his African army 
306 	Desertion of Agathocles' commander, Pasiphilus to Deinocrates 
Negotiations between Agathocles and Deinocrates 
305 	Victory of Agathocles over Deinocrates 
Agathocles assumes the kingship 




   
   
    
1 	 I 	I 	I Dicteosyne 	Hermo ritus Dionysius II 	Sophrosyne Hipparinus Nysaeus Arete = 	Thearides 
m. Leptines 2 Dion 
TABLE II  
FAMILY CONNECTIONS OF THE DIONYSII AND DION 
Hermon 
HermoI rates Hermocrii,tos 
 
Daughter - 	Polyxenus 
m. Theste 
 
   
     
Lejtines Thelides Thiste Dionysius I = (1) Daughter 	Hipparinus 
3 Timocrates 
Daughter 
m. Philistus 1 Appollocrates Son Da hter Da hter Hipparinus Posthumous son 
1. Plutarch (Dion XI.3) merely says that Philistus married a daughter of Leptines by a woman he had 
corrupted and later married. However, Dionysius I's reaction to the marriage makes little sense 
unless it was the daughter of Dicaeosyne, whom_we know Leptines did marry. (Diodorus XV.7.4). 
-.- 	- 	- 
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